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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
In this thesis I trace the relations between thinking about space and the spatiality of 
thought as it relates to epistemology in the eponymous authors. I argue that the verbal, 
visual, and mental tools used to negotiate the ideas and objects under consideration are 
not merely representative or rhetorical, but are part of the process of knowledge-making 
itself. I contend that the spatialities of language, visual presentation, and mental image 
facilitate new ways of seeing and the exploring of previously invisible relationships. I 
show how the dynamic spatiality of the imagination is used for testing hypothesis, 
considering multiple points of view, accommodating uncertainties, and thinking about 
expansive ideas that push at (or exist beyond) the boundaries of the known or possible. 
In this way I offer new readings of key texts that foreground the inherent relativity of 
human experience, which I contend is at the heart of a scientific uncertainty found even 
in the new science that strove for objectivity. In four case studies I explore the 
relationship between external and internal space in the thinking and perceiving subject, 
building on Steven Connor’s assertion that ‘thinking about things is unavoidably a kind 
of thinking about the kind of thing that thinking is’ (‘Thinking Things’, 2010). In 
addition to this unidirectional relation between thinking and things, I demonstrate a 
complex dialogue between interior (thought) and exterior (thing) that occurs in the ways 
processes of thought and perception are externalized on the page and with instruments 
of viewing; in the way objects are brought into the mind; and in the way the mind 
creates infinities within by tracing expansive external spatialities.  
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Prologue 
 
Shortly before his death, Newton reportedly described himself: 
 
Like a boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then 
finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great 
ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.1 
 
This quotation is widely held to contain reference to Milton’s attack in Paradise 
Regained on the incessant reader who fails to bring to his reading ‘a spirit and judgment 
equal or superior’ as being: 
 
Deep-versed in books and shallow in himself, 
Crude or intoxicate, collecting toys, 
And trifles for choice matters, worth a sponge;  
As children gathering pebbles on the shore.2  
 
The anecdote is a favourite of biographers keen to show a link between Newton and his 
contemporary literary culture, or to demonstrate to the non-specialist reader some more 
readily accessible beauty in a life of arcs and angles. However, the quotation is not just 
a pretty image or a pleasing intertextuality. With an ironic inversion of the supposed 
humility of his statement, Newton rehabilitates Milton’s metaphor by recontextualizing 
its space. The imagery of Milton’s reader is closed in — any depth to the reader’s 
learning is constrained by the image of the book as container (‘in books’ (my 
emphasis)) and undermined by his shallowness in himself. It is petty and trivial; the 
pebbles — deemed of little worth — are the end purpose of the reader’s book learning 
and the shore is just a location. But Newton’s image is expansive, limitless even. He 
zooms out on the scene and turns the shore into a metaphor for the edge of knowledge 
by placing it at the boundary of the ocean of undiscovered truth. As such, the pebbles 
become not an end purpose, but a starting point for a much wider exploratory venture. 
They take on greater value because of this, even though they are smaller pieces of the 
                                                
1 David Brewster, Memoirs of the Life, Writings, and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton, 2 vols (Edinburgh: 
Thomas Constable, 1855), II, 407. 
2 John Milton, Complete Shorter Poems, ed. by John Carey, 2nd edn (Harlow: Longman, 1997), ‘Paradise 
Regained’, IV. 322–30.  
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larger image.  
The search for these pebbles also becomes elevated. There is a sense of 
discovery and development to Newton’s play; it is not mere collection for its own sake. 
He finds new things and, as suggested by the comparative adjectives smoother and 
prettier, distinguishes them. This use of judgment to categorize and bestow value on his 
findings echoes empirical methods of natural history, methods which contrast with 
myopic book learning, redolent of scholasticism, and which are more evocative of the 
fit reader of Areopagitica, whom Milton argues is ‘sufficient both to judge aright, and to 
examine each matter’.3 Newton’s gathering takes him into the realm of new knowledge, 
and the connection he makes between his work of ‘finding’ on the shore and the 
‘undiscovered’ ocean of truth echoes Milton’s Isis-like search for the scattered limbs of 
truth, ‘searching what we know not, by what we know’ (CPW, II, 551), rather than just 
assimilating established ideas. The shifting boundary between shore and sea — Newton 
expands Milton’s ‘shore’ to ‘sea-shore’ and the shells and pebbles he examines are 
items cast up by the ocean of truth itself — suggests both the proximity and 
interrelation of the known and the unknown. Newton’s image acknowledges the limits 
of the current state of human learning, but is latent with potential for the future acts of 
mankind: the ocean of truth is not unknowable, it is merely as yet undiscovered.  
Newton’s image captures some of the key concerns of this thesis. It imbricates a 
spatial metaphor for knowledge (the ocean and sea-shore) with the scientific object 
itself (the pebbles and shells examined, make up the sea-shore), at the boundary 
between the known and the unknown (both the spatial boundary of the sea-shore image 
and the moment of discovery in the act of finding and examining). In so doing it relates 
the seemingly narrow focus of discrete and atomic attention to a much more expansive 
project of discovery and knowledge making. It also does so in a way that foregrounds 
both the potential capability and the subjective experience of the practitioner himself, 
which obviates the shallowness of self possessed by Milton’s reader by engaging the 
capacity of man both with the external world and with the expanse of the unknown that 
is waiting to be discovered. Newton’s similetic description of himself also reveals the 
value of linguistic devices and imagery to think through scientific and epistemological 
                                                
3 Complete Prose Works of John Milton, ed. by Don M. Wolfe, 8 vols (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1953–82), II, 511. Further references to this edition are denoted CPW and given by volume and 
page number parenthetically in the text. 
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concepts, and the potential effect on the understanding of an object when one 
approaches it with a new spatial understanding.  
In this thesis I examine these concerns by means of four case studies on different 
writers, each exploring different kinds of space. I investigate the relationships between 
their ideas about and investigations into physical, objective space; their ideas about 
epistemology, particularly the accommodation of the unknown or uncertain; and the 
mental, verbal, and visual tools (which have their own spatiality) that they use to 
understand and convey that work. In this way I combine a study of the philosophical 
concerns of thinking about space and spatial thinking with an interest in a more 
practical kind of spatiality, that of the verbal and visual methods of the page. I am 
interested in the spatial imagination and how this relates to our external experience of 
space. As Kate Flint suggests in her study of the Victorian visual imagination, ‘Seeing 
in the mind’s eye was linked to scrutinising the world around one, but it was not an 
identical process.’ I follow Flint’s lead in paying close attention to ‘the slipperiness of 
the borderline between the visible and the invisible, and the questions which it throws 
up about subjectivity, perception and point of view’.4 
The setting for my thesis is mid- to late seventeenth century England: the early 
days of the Royal Society. While it is important to avoid the anachronism and the 
reductive, positivist implications of the idea of a ‘Scientific Revolution’, it is significant 
that during the early modern period a range of developments in technology and method 
were made, which, in the new ways of looking this afforded, entailed the opening up of 
new spaces and the re-imagining of old ones. Outer space became more vast and subject 
to new theories about its structure; minute objects were viewed at magnification 
revealing a new world only appreciable with a change of scale; the concept of vacuum 
gained greater acceptability; and in some circles corpuscularian theories of matter took 
hold. Concurrent with the emergence of these new focuses for natural philosophical 
enquiry, developments in epistemology also occurred. As Barbara J. Shapiro’s seminal 
work shows, ‘The new philosophy was fashioned from a reconsideration of what 
constituted science or knowledge, a re-evaluation of opinion and probability, and the 
                                                
4 Kate Flint, The Victorians and the Visual Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
p. 2. 
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creation of a new role for hypothesis.’5 As Newton’s image of the shore on the edge of 
the ocean of undiscovered truth suggests, knowledge making became much more 
engaged with uncertainties and the unknown. I believe that this period of scientific 
history is a particularly rich one for the themes of my study as it offers a range of new 
types of space being considered as scientific objects or realms of enquiry, as well as 
examples of engagement with epistemological questions about how and what we can 
know by those very natural philosophers working at the frontiers of new knowledge.  
The scientific subjects of my study — Robert Hooke, Robert Boyle, and Isaac 
Newton — were all key members of the early Royal Society who worked and published 
on new spaces and spatialities. In the first chapter of the thesis I consider Hooke’s work 
on microscopy and the sub-visible spaces this revealed; in the second chapter I consider 
Boyle’s work on air and the concepts of invisible and experimental spaces; and in the 
third chapter, I consider Newton’s concepts of absolute and relative space. These three 
natural philosophers are of particular interest to this thesis because as well as engaging 
with these spaces as objects of study, they also engage with spatiality both on the page 
and in the mind, and with questions of epistemology including the role of uncertainty 
and hypothesis. 
As well as considering the work of these three natural philosophers, I also 
include the poetic work of John Milton. This is not to trace particular scientific theories 
in Milton’s work as many studies have already done, or to assert any biographical 
connection or direct influence (in either direction) between the Royal Society and 
Milton — as William Poole’s sceptical account demonstrates, the points of contact 
between Milton and the new scientists do not necessarily equate to non-critical 
‘engagement’ or ‘connections’ between the two.6 Rather, I include Milton because he is 
a poet who engages with the subjects under discussion: the understanding and 
imagining of space as an object; the use of presentation (in Milton’s case rhetorical and 
figurative effects of language) to evoke different spatialities in the mind of the reader; 
and epistemological questions about how and what we can know of creation and cause 
through our creaturely experience. Like Angelica Duran, I believe Milton’s literature is 
‘as much a part of the project that Francis Bacon called the advancement of learning as 
                                                
5 Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the 
Relationship between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), p. 16. 
6 William Poole, ‘Milton and Science: A Caveat’, Milton Quarterly, 38 (2004), 18–34 (pp. 18, 28). 
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were the optical lenses, air pumps and intravenous syringes created by early modern 
scientists’, and that more than merely recounting or praising the work of natural 
philosophers, ‘literature concerned with the development of knowledge […] 
participated in a profoundly encompassing cultural project.’7 I study Milton’s poetry 
alongside the works of Hooke, Boyle, and Newton for what that juxtaposition can 
reveal of processes of thought, belief, and knowledge-making in all four writers. 
The four chapters trace two merging trajectories. The first is a trajectory of 
object: micro space, invisible space, mathematical space, poetic space. The second is a 
trajectory of method: observational space, experimental space, conceptual space, 
imaginative space. The trajectories merge in the third and fourth chapters as the subject 
and method become nearly congruent. This is not intended to imply any sort of 
hierarchy or historical progression, but the progression inwards is a deliberate part of 
my attempt to understand how spatiality, in the context of the practice of studying space 
as external object, relates to (and possibly affects) the ‘inner’ spatiality of thought. The 
trajectories also draw out ways in which these various spatialities and methods speak to 
one another, for example, the study of micro space has implications for the 
understanding of invisible space, and the techniques of observational and experimental 
spaces are recreated in conceptual and imaginative spaces.  
 In combining the study of understandings of object space(s) with the spatiality 
of thought, I take my cue from Steven Connor who traces the connection between 
thinking about things to the act of thinking about thinking, and places a particular 
importance on certain ambivalent substances, such as air, for this dynamic. Connor is 
interested in ‘the ways in which subjects may be said to be the outcome or achievement 
of objects’.8 From this sort of subject/object relation, Connor derives two consequences: 
first, ‘that thinking about thinking can only ever be done through the things that draw, 
drain and detain our thinking, and that make thinking accessible as a kind of thing’, and 
secondly, ‘that thinking about things is unavoidably a kind of thinking about the kind of 
thing that thinking is.’9 By examining how early modern thinkers conceived of space as 
an object, I hope to understand the interior expansiveness of the thinking subject’s 
mind. 
                                                
7 Angelica Duran, The Age of Milton and the Scientific Revolution (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 2007), p. 3.  
8 Steven Connor, ‘Thinking Things’, Textual Practice, 24 (2010), 1–20 (p. 3).  
9 Ibid.  
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Connor connects these relations to ‘certain thinking things’ whose role it is: 
 
to embody, not thinking itself, but thinking’s exceeding of every thing, 
including the things it takes for itself, takes itself for. Certain objects, by 
failing to capture thought, seem apt to capture its uncapturability. Hence the 
importance of certain kinds of ambivalent matter and bodiless substance — 
in particular, air, gas, vapour and their allotropes, […].10  
 
Connor uses a suggestive imagery of ‘thinking as a kind of atmosphere’.11 The spatial 
effects of these ambivalent substances — for example considering bubbles as things that 
‘compound interiority and exteriority’12 — led me to think about the dynamics of the 
spatiality of thought in a more abstract way, as distinct from ideas about substances like 
air or gas, but also about how this abstraction is understood and perceived by means of 
object relations. As Angela Leighton writes of ‘form’:  
 
It is an abstraction from matter, removed and immaterial; but it is also 
subtly inflected towards matter. As a word it holds off from objects, being 
nothing but form, pure and singular; at the same time, its whole bent is 
towards materialization, towards being the shape or body of something.13 
 
This more abstract idea of space, spatiality, form, is very relevant to the kind of thought 
that happens at the boundaries of knowledge and in encounters with the unknown. 
Leighton reminds us that ‘form’ may sometimes refer: 
 
not to a single boundary line, but to a dividing line, an outline, between 
different dimensions of understanding. Form, by this account, is not a 
fixed shape to be seen, but the shape of a choice to be made.14  
 
                                                
10 Connor, ‘Thinking Things’, (2010), p. 12. 
11 Steven Connor, ‘Thinking Things’, (2008), 1–37 <http://www.stevenconnor.com/thinkingthings/> 
[accessed 8 November 2009] (p. 4): this is an earlier version of the article published in Textual Practice. 
12 Connor, ‘Thinking Things’, (2010), p. 14. 
13 Angela Leighton, On Form: Poetry, Aestheticism, and the Legacy of a Word (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 1. 
14 Leighton, p. 16. 
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This idea of form is suggestive of the encounter with the unknown and the ways in 
which natural philosophers come to understand and to categorize a new object. It 
perhaps also accounts for the contrast between the expansiveness of mind inherent in 
Newton’s description of himself as a boy on the shore, compared to the shallowness of 
self possessed by Milton’s closed-in reader. 
Although Connor’s work focuses on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, his 
way of looking at subjectivity and objectivity (the subject as a backformation from the 
object) has suggestive resonance with the potentially troubled place of the subject in the 
scientific milieu of the early Royal Society, which sought to be objective in producing 
empirically valid and testable knowledge in order to create a body of truth gathered 
from multiple practitioners and external to a solipsistic sense of self, but which also 
relied on the sensory experience of individual practitioners, and the acts of 
interpretation that are imbricated in experimental and instrumental seeing, in order to 
harvest that data. As Patricia Fara describes, ‘The more you use elaborate technology 
the more you need skilled interpretation, so you get more objectivity, but also a much 
greater layer of subjectivity.’15 Bronwen Price suggests, ‘The object of knowledge is not 
something which is extractable from those who examine it, but merges with them.’16 
Everything is mediated by the perceiving subject’s relation to it and the awareness of 
this creates a need for the accommodation of more uncertain categories such as 
probability and hypothesis in early modern knowledge making. As Henry Pollack 
argues, ‘it is certainty, rather than uncertainty, that impedes science’ and indeed, 
‘uncertainty is a stimulus that propels science forward.’17 
By including a consideration of the visual presentation of ideas and data in my 
thesis, I draw out an often unremarked upon spatial element or stage in the process of 
developing knowledge. Although the importance of themes from the field of the history 
of the book has been recognized for the history of science in the early modern period, 
                                                
15 Patricia Fara, ‘What You See Depends on How You Look: Time and Space in Scientific Imagery’, a 
talk given at the Royal Institution (London, 10 May 2012). 
16 Bronwen Price, ‘Journeys Beyond Frontiers: Knowledge, Subjectivity and Outer Space in Margaret 
Cavendish’s The Blazing World (1666)’, in The Arts of Seventeenth-Century Science: Representations of 
the Natural World in European and North American Culture, ed. by Claire Jowitt and Diane Watt 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 127–45 (p. 132). 
17 Henry N. Pollack, Uncertain Science… Uncertain World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p. 5. 
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the emphasis has traditionally been on the role of the text and its contexts in persuading 
a reader to its content.18 While persuasive effects are undoubtedly important, I do not 
believe that they are all that a study of presentation can reveal, or that the relationship of 
influence between content and presentation only works in one direction. We see this, for 
example, in Robin Rider’s demonstration of how technology and printing practice ‘did 
much to shape the forms of mathematical discourse’ in early modern Europe.19 I locate 
my work within a critical tradition that studies the scientific illustration as a way of 
challenging ‘the privilege given to theory in the image of science inherited from logical 
empiricism’, and understanding ‘the role scientific illustration plays in the creation of 
scientific knowledge’.20 This approach seeks to incorporate methods from history of the 
book and history of art to the understanding of history of science in a way that is much 
more integrated with epistemology and the making of knowledge rather than just 
concerned with representation. Wolfgang Lefèvre, Jürgen Renn, and Urs Schoepflin 
describe a ‘dependence’ of scientific knowledge on external representations, and list 
various potencies of images including their ability to ‘mediate between practical 
knowledge and theoretical reflection’, or ‘to synthesize fragments of knowledge to a 
global picture, thus providing them with new meaning’.21 
In this thesis I expand the notion of illustration to cover a wide range of visual 
instantiations of data, knowledge, or object, including illustrations, tables, diagrams, 
lists, and other mise en page effects. I consider these as visual strategy for ordering, 
understanding, and working with information. As James Mussel suggests in his book on 
nineteenth-century astronomy periodicals:  
                                                
18 See for example R. W. Serjeantson, ‘Proof and Persuasion’, in The Cambridge History of Science, Vol 
3 Early Modern Science, ed. by Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), pp. 132–76 (p. 165). Two key studies operating in this sociological and rhetorical tradition 
are Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the 
Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985; expanded edn, 2011), and Bruno Latour, 
‘Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands’, Knowledge and Society: Studies in the 
Sociology of Culture Past and Present, 6 (1986), 1–40. I discuss these in detail in Chapter 2.  
19 Robin E. Rider, ‘Early Modern Mathematics in Print’, in Non-Verbal Communication in Science Prior 
to 1900, ed. by Renato G. Mazzolini (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1993), pp. 91–113 (p. 91). 
20 Picturing Knowledge: Historical and Philosophical Problems Concerning the Use of Art in Science, 
ed. by Brian S. Baigrie (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), ‘introduction’, p. 1. 
21 The Power of Images in Early Modern Science, ed. by Wolfgang Lefèvre, Jürgen Renn, and Urs 
Schoepflin (Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag, 2003), ‘introduction’, pp. vii, viii. 
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astronomy is more than observation with the naked eye. In order to work 
with the stars, they must be translated into a form that can be handled, 
recorded, moved and compared. Instruments such as telescopes and 
spectroscopes not only bring the stars closer, they also provide quantifying 
measures of location and time. […] it is actually these mediating factors 
that constitute the science.22  
 
Like Mussel, I argue that form and mediation are a part of science, and follow his 
suggestion that, ‘For the study of space […] we must turn to the study of spaces, textual 
and otherwise.’23  
By considering the visual presentation of science in this way, I include it as a part 
of the process of knowledge making rather than a subsequent communication of made 
knowledge. As Stephen Jay Gould asserts, ‘Scientific illustrations are not frills or 
summaries; they are foci for modes of thought.’24 This emphasis in turn places greater 
significance on the spatiality of the page as it relates to the ways in which thought is 
spatial, and to its role in the wider context of new ways of seeing. I build on Lorraine 
Daston’s recent work on early modern weather watching in which she describes the table 
as a tool for discovery in its function of enabling the practitioner to see.25  
 Furthermore, I integrate my study of visual aspects of the publications under 
discussion with the study of their content and verbal contexts. The literary approach of 
my study continues in the vein of established critical attention to the role played by 
language in the creation of knowledge. As Peter Dear wrote in the early 1990s when it 
was still only an emerging sensitivity in the history of science, ‘language is not simply a 
transparent medium of communication, but a shaper (perhaps a realizer) of thought and 
an embodiment of social relations.’26 Picking up on the suggestiveness of Dear’s word 
                                                
22 James Mussel, Science, Time and Space in the Late Nineteenth-Century Periodical Press (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2007), p. 27.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Stephen Jay Gould, Bully for Brontosaurus: Reflections in Natural History (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1991), p. 171. 
25 Lorraine Daston, ‘Super-Vision: Weather Watching across Space and through Time at the Early Royal 
Society and Académie Royale des Sciences’, a talk given at the Royal Society conference ‘Curiously 
Drawn: Early-Modern Science as a Visual Pursuit’ (London, 21–22 June 2012). 
26 The Literary Structure of Scientific Argument: Historical Studies, ed. by Peter Dear (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), ‘introduction’, p. 4. 
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‘shaper’, I combine this linguistic and literary attention with a particular focus on the 
nuances of spatialilty as expressed and explored through language.  
Over the last decade there has been a move within early modern science and 
literary studies towards an understanding of science and literature as ‘functioning as 
interacting facets of a broadly-defined intellectual culture’,27 and a trend towards 
looking for overlaps in the ways writers from the two (increasingly considered non-
discrete) spheres ‘tried to understand — both imaginatively and empirically — the 
workings of the natural world’.28 By applying the same interpretive methods and asking 
the same questions of both scientific and literary texts, I hope that they will speak to 
each other in a way that promotes a more holistic understanding of the relationship 
between early modern space and epistemology.  
Elizabeth Spiller’s work on the constructed nature of knowledge is a key text for 
this approach to science and literary studies. Her central argument is that: 
 
science maintains strong affiliations with poetic fictions because, in ways 
that are rarely acknowledged, its practice emerges out of a central 
understanding of art as a basis for producing knowledge. A belief in the 
made rather than the found character of early modern knowledge unites 
poets and natural scientists.29 
 
While I disagree with the implication that there was a conscious awareness of the made 
quality of knowledge (all of the writers in this study consider themselves to be working 
to uncover the truths of nature), that engagement with the act of artificial construction is 
certainly present. As Spiller notes, there is a centrality to artifice in the new science, 
with instruments such as the telescope and microscope, and even print itself, making it 
‘possible to discover knowledge but to do so only by means of artifice’.30 As well as 
relating to the theme of the role of the visual and the verbal in developing knowledge, 
Spiller’s notion of artificiality connects with my theme of spatiality in the idea of 
framing. As I shall demonstrate throughout the thesis, the artificial demarcation of 
                                                
27 Science, Literature and Rhetoric in Early Modern England, ed. by Juliet Cummins and David Burchell 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), ‘introduction’, p. 6. 
28 The Arts of Seventeenth-Century Science, ed. by Jowitt and Watt, ‘introduction’, p. 5. 
29 Elizabeth Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature: The Art of Making Knowledge, 1580–
1670 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 2. 
30 Spiller, p. 7. 
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spaces (under a microscope, in a sealed air pump, on a page, in a metaphor, in the 
conceptual space of a thought experiment) is an important practice for the development 
of knowledge under the methods of the new science, in particular for aiding a 
practitioner to be able to see. It is no coincidence that the word theory is related to 
theatre.31  
By combining the study of language in the texts under consideration with the 
study of their visual aspects and the scientific practices and philosophical theories they 
discuss, I follow the integrated methods proposed by Sachiko Kusukawa and Ian 
Maclean. Moving against prior critical traditions that presupposed the relationships 
between content and context and that studied individual vehicles of transmission 
separately (e.g. illustrations without text), their book collects together essays that 
demonstrate ‘how words, images, and instruments frequently interact with one another 
in the same act of transmission’. They propose that this critical move ‘has profound 
consequence for the knowledge transmitted’, that it avoids the misinterpretations of 
disconnected study, and that it can reveal divergent interpretations and receptions by 
acknowledging tensions between vehicles.32  
The originality of my study lies in applying this integrated approach of studying 
content, visual presentation, and verbal exposition together to texts which I read in the 
contexts of the spatial themes of their content and their author’s engagement with 
questions of perception and epistemology. By doing this, I begin to unlock the 
relationship between external and internal spatiality, by tracing the processes of thought 
and imagination in mediating between the experience of the external world and the 
understanding of it in the mind and on the page.  
My thesis starts with a study of Robert Hooke’s microscopical investigations, in 
which he created an observational space within the scope of his lens that revealed by 
magnification a newly visible world within our existing one, invisible to the naked eye. 
In Chapter 1, I focus on the ways in which Hooke navigated this new spatiality and 
traversed the boundaries between the macro and micro worlds, and on the act of 
interpretive seeing — as opposed to the amanuensis model proposed by Michael Dennis 
                                                
31 Theory is derived from the root θεωρία: ‘a looking at, viewing, contemplation, speculation, theory, also 
a sight, a spectacle’ (OED). 
32 Transmitting Knowledge: Words, Images, and Instruments in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Sachiko 
Kusukawa and Ian Maclean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ‘introduction’, pp. 1, 7–8. 
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— as revealed in his magnificent illustrations and their accompanying descriptions.33 I 
also examine Hooke’s use of tables, lists, and illustrations in the presentation of his 
natural historical data, arguing that they are visual and spatial strategies for ordering and 
grouping thoughts and information in order to produce knowledge. 
Robert Boyle’s investigations into the properties of air required the creation of 
an experimental space by means of the air pump in order to partition this invisible and 
ubiquitous substance that is in some ways synonymous with space itself. In Chapter 2, I 
consider the ways in which Boyle works on and engages his reader with the invisible 
air. I explore both his verbal strategies and his choices about what to depict and to not 
depict in pictures, relating these choices to his epistemological position of nescience, 
which looks for pattern and order but resists premature systematization. I also read 
Shapin and Schaffer’s concept of ‘virtual witnessing’ in a different context to their 
social one of the mustering of assent for hypothesis, contending that it facilitates in the 
reader the sort of imaginative thinking and mental laboratory necessary for the sort of 
illative natural philosophy that can understand and think about air.34  
In Chapter 3, I examine Isaac Newton’s concepts of absolute and relative space, 
considering how we understand space through human experience and how this relates to 
a conceptual, mathematical understanding of it. I follow Howard Stein and Robert 
DiSalle in arguing that Newton’s absolute space is offered as an epistemological 
construct required for understanding and working with Newtonian dynamics, rather than 
posited as an ontological reality, even if there is an abstract sense in which it is more 
‘true’ than its relative counterpart.35 Furthermore, I argue that absolute and relative 
space are intimately connected and can only be understood in terms of each other, and 
that this dynamic traces a similar relation between absolute and relative in Newton’s 
exploration in spatial terms of the nature of God.  
In Chapter 4, I consider the work of John Milton and demonstrate the echoes of 
the experiential, experimental knowledge making (as seen in the Royal Society natural 
philosophers considered in Chapters 1–3) that are found in Milton’s depictions of 
                                                
33 Michael Aaron Dennis, ‘Graphic Understanding: Instruments and Interpretation in Robert Hooke’s 
Micrographia’, Society in Context, 3 (1989), 309–64 (p. 323). 
34 Shapin and Schaffer, pp. 23, 25, 60. 
35 Howard Stein, ‘Newtonian Space-Time’, The Texas Quarterly, 10 (1967), 174–200 (p. 197); Robert 
DiSalle, Understanding Space-Time: The Philosophical Development of Physics from Newton to Einstein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 17. 
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learning and in his epistemological relation of the visible and invisible worlds. I also 
consider the spatiality of Paradise Lost, which offers the reader observational and 
experimental spaces in the garden of Eden where we observe Adam and Eve and 
witness their testing, as well as relative and absolute depictions of space as we follow 
both the astronomical speculations of earth-bound Adam and the cosmic flights of 
Raphael and Satan as reported by an omniscient narrator. I argue that Milton also 
explores ideas of place as a psychological function, further emphasizing the importance 
of relativity in the experience and understanding of space, and contend that Milton’s 
expansive explorations of space and spatiality give the reader a new way of thinking 
about the invisible and the unknown and help the reader look beyond the creation to the 
creator.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Robert Hooke and Micro Space 
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Fig. 1.1. Robert Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), Scheme 35. Photo: RS.466 © The Royal Society. 
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Introduction 
 
Hooke’s Micrographia (1665) is an intensely visual and spatial work. Its thirty-eight 
engraved plates are unprecedented in extent, detail, and quality, bringing a range of 
completely new — indeed otherwise inaccessible — sights to his reader.1 The images 
speak of deep visual scrutiny in their attention to detail, and of a new understanding of 
spatiality in their dramatic rescaling of microscopic objects. The head or body louse 
examined in Observation 54 would have been between 2.1 and 3.6 mm in length (about 
the size of a sesame seed), however, the magnificent illustration depicting it in Scheme 
35 (see Fig. 1.1) is 52 cm long — roughly two hundred times actual size. The level of 
exaggeration is announced by the fact that, large as the folio volume is, the reader must 
still unfold the oversized plate to view it. This blowing up of micro space is also found 
in Hooke’s text, which provides lengthy and dense descriptions of these minute objects, 
including details not visible to the naked eye, such as the louse’s outer surface texture or 
the claws on its feet. 
In the preface to the book, Hooke writes of ‘a new visible World discovered to 
the understanding’.2 The insertion of visible into his analogy with the New World 
highlights the fact that this newly discovered microscopic world is not a new location, 
but rather a different way of seeing a known one — a new spatialization of the very 
world ‘under our feet’ (ibid.). Further, that this new visible world is discovered to the 
understanding, rather than to the eyes, suggests that this is more than just an expansion 
of knowledge based on newly visible data. It hints at a more complex relationship 
between visible data and understanding in Hooke’s epistemology. This relationship will 
be the main theme explored in this chapter as I demonstrate that for Hooke, visuality 
                                                
1	  Micrographia was not the first publication of illustrated microscopical observations — that honour goes 
to the Apiarium of Federico Cesi and Francesco Stelluti, published in Italy in 1625. However, Hooke’s is 
certainly the most impressive and wide ranging of the eleven books on microscopy published in Europe 
in the forty years since then. For a list of publications see Marian Fournier, The Fabric of Life: 
Microscopy in the Seventeenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), Appendix A.	  
2 Robert Hooke, Micrographia: or Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies Made by 
Magnifying Glasses with Observations and Inquiries thereupon, (London: Jo. Martyn and Ja. Allestry, 
1665), sig. a2v (prefatory material is unpaginated). The 1665 edition is also available as a facsimile 
reproduction (New York: Dover Publications, 1961). All further references are to this edition and are 
made parenthetically in the text. I have silently modernized the long s and the spacing around 
punctuation; otherwise, spelling, punctuation, and emphasis follow the original. 
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and spatiality were core components of producing knowledge, and that as such, the new 
world revealed by the microscope was more than just a new object of study, it was 
inextricably linked to questions of epistemology. In this introductory section, I 
summarize the epistemology and scientific methodology outlined in Hooke’s preface 
and demonstrate how visuality and spatiality are integral to those systems. This sets the 
scene for a more detailed consideration in the rest of the chapter of the legibility of 
nature through Hooke’s microscope, of the relationship presented between the micro 
and macro worlds, and of Hooke’s methods of presenting his findings.  
 
The preface to Micrographia gives a clear outline of Hooke’s epistemology as well as a 
programme of methodological intent, both of which bear obvious marks of Baconian 
influence. Hooke describes the prerogative and capacity of mankind to behold the works 
of Nature and furthermore to consider, compare, alter, assist, and improve on those 
works — a summary programme of natural history and philosophy with a somewhat 
utilitarian bent. He acknowledges the limited capacity of fallen man (in Hooke’s 
conception a result of both original sin and man’s own culpable choices), but suggests 
that this might be corrected by post-lapsarian, human means: 
 
By the addition of such artificial Instruments and methods, there may be, 
in some manner, a reparation made for the mischiefs, and imperfection, 
mankind has drawn upon it self, by negligence, and intemperance, and a 
wilful and superstitious deserting the Prescripts and Rules of Nature, 
whereby every man, both from a deriv’d corruption, innate and born with 
him, and from his breeding and converse with men, is very subject to slip 
into all sorts of errors. (sig. a1r) 
 
Instruments such as the microscope, and indeed the scientific method itself, are seen as 
potential reparation for human imperfection and error.  
More specifically, Hooke writes that the way ‘to recover some degree of those 
former perfections, seems to be, by rectifying the operations of the Sense, the Memory, 
and Reason’ (ibid.). He outlines the various flaws of these faculties and asserts that their 
remedy ‘can only proceed from the real, the mechanical, the experimental Philosophy’ 
(sig. a2r). Hooke thus emphasizes the lack of reality he ascribes to a science not 
grounded in the observation of material things, a preference echoed in his famous 
comparison between the current state of the science of nature as ‘a work of the Brain 
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and the Fancy’ (Bacon’s idols of the tribe), and the science to which he urges a return: 
‘the plainness and soundness of Observations on material and obvious things’ (sig. b1r). 
The reason he gives for preferring mechanical and experimental philosophy over ‘the 
Philosophy of discourse and disputation’, is that the latter does not pay regard to ‘the 
first ground-work, which ought to be well laid on the sense and memory’, whereas the 
former ‘intends the right ordering of them all’ (sig. a2r). 
Hooke prescribes the methods he believes will counter the effects of our flawed 
faculties. Regarding the senses, he encourages ‘a watchfulness over the failings and an 
inlargement of the dominion, of the Senses’ and also ‘a supplying of their infirmities 
with Instruments’ (ibid.). To remedy the ailing memory Hooke recommends the careful 
recording of observations, and hints at a particularly useful ‘manner of compiling a 
Natural and Artificial History’ (sig. b1v) comprising of tables. To remedy the 
understanding, Hooke suggests comparison, scrutiny, and consideration: ‘nothing is to 
be omitted, and yet every thing to pass a mature deliberation’ (ibid.). He also urges the 
ordering of the other faculties by the understanding so that the whole system operates 
smoothly. 
It is tempting to read Hooke’s preface as claiming to offer a perfect remedy for 
the cognitive weaknesses of man. Indeed critics often interpret without question the 
line, ‘a sincere Hand, and a faithful Eye, to examine and to record, the things 
themselves as they appear’ (sig. a2v), as an expression of presumed access to truth; 
Michael Dennis even describes Hooke as ‘not so much an observer as the microscope’s 
amanuensis’.3 However, there is an important potential contingency in the phrase, ‘as 
they appear’. Hooke admits the potential for human imperfection into his remedy and 
indeed his method for developing knowledge. He believes that the defects of fallen man 
are redeemable, but this is no magical restoration; the aim of repairing the faculties is 
‘to recover some degree of those former perfections’ (sig. a1r, my emphasis). Hooke’s 
method includes ‘a watchfulness over the failings […] of the Senses’. It is the admission 
of and watchfulness for their failings — rather than the removal of the cause of their 
failure — that is remedy for the senses. This is reiterated in the instruction for the 
understanding to order the lower faculties as a lawful master rather than a tyrant: ‘It 
must watch the irregularities of the Senses, but it must not go before them, or prevent 
their information’ (sig. b2r).  
                                                
3 Dennis, p. 323. 
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The method is to gather observational data as accurately as possible, and indeed 
as much of it as possible, Hooke being proud to contribute to ‘the large stock of natural 
Observations, which so many hands are busie in providing’ (sig. b1r). The next step is 
to apply methods of judgement in considering this data. Hooke addresses the dilemma 
in trying to remedy the understanding: 
 
least by seeking to inlarge our Knowledge, we should render it weak and 
uncertain; and least by being too scrupulous and exact about every 
Circumstance of it, we should confine and streighten it too much. (sig. 
b1v) 
 
To resolve the dilemma between credulity and scepticism, he resolves that, ‘In both 
these the middle ways are to be taken’ (ibid.). All data is to be admitted, but must then 
be subject to ‘mature deliberation’: 
 
all to be so severely examin’d, that there remain no room for doubt or 
fallibility; much rigour in admitting, much strictness in comparing, and 
above all, much slowness in debating, and shyness in determining, is to be 
practised. (sigs b1v– b2r) 
 
There is no perfect certainty with this method, but by committing to best practice in the 
gathering of data — a hesitancy in determining fact and the exercise of collaborative 
social controls such as comparison of results and lengthy debate — a reliable body of 
knowledge is possible.4 As well as utilizing the social controls provided by his 
immediate community, Hooke also highlights the temporary nature of the knowledge he 
is producing, offering it up to be refined or superseded by the wider scientific 
community and by later generations. He asks the reader, ‘not absolutely to rely upon 
these Observations of my eyes, if he finds them contradicted by the future Ocular 
experiments of sober and impartial Discoverers’ (sig. b1r). 
In a similar vein, Hooke comments on the uncertainty of any seeming 
conclusions he makes:  
 
                                                
4 Hooke’s approach is more in line with what Richard H. Popkin describes as ‘constructive scepticism’ in 
The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (New York, 1961).  
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If therefore the Reader expects from me any infallible Deductions, or 
certainty of Axioms, I am to say for my self, that those stronger Works of 
Wit and Imagination are above my weak Abilities; […] Wherever he 
finds that I have ventur’d at any small Conjectures, at the causes of the 
things that I have observed, I beseech him to look upon them only as 
doubtful Problems, and uncertain ghesses, and not as unquestionable 
conclusions, or matters of unconfutable Science. (sig. b1r)  
 
Hooke’s conjectures are to be read as ‘doubtful Problems’ and ‘uncertain ghesses’. 
However, despite Hooke’s apparent humility, the ‘Works of Wit and Imagination’ are 
simply a recasting of the ‘work of the Brain and Fancy’ and thus the infallible 
deductions and certain axioms the reader might expect are not really desirable or 
credible elements of Hooke’s method. Contingent hypotheses are preferred and it is the 
contingency with which Hooke frames them that allows him to admit such conjectures 
into his work. He admits uncertainty without rendering knowledge thus uncertain. The 
embracing of conjecture goes beyond the usual remit of the Royal Society’s sanctioned 
approach and indeed, in a separate prefatory note to the Society, Hooke apologizes for 
this and publicly distances his approach from theirs. Hooke acknowledges that in 
Micrographia ‘there may perhaps be some Expressions, which may seem more positive 
then YOUR Prescriptions will permit’, referring to the Society’s rule against ‘the 
espousal of any Hypothesis not sufficiently grounded and confirm’d by Experiments’, 
and confirming that he intends these expressions to be ‘understood only as Conjectures 
and Quaeries’ (sig. A2v).  
In summary, Hooke believes that man has a capacity for natural knowledge with 
the help of instrumental and methodological correctives. However, this is not a perfect 
antidote to man’s weaknesses and Hooke’s methods reflect that, accommodating man’s 
imperfections with various checks to mitigate against potential error and with the 
admission of the contingency of human knowledge. Hooke’s approach to true 
knowledge is very much by means of a process of the refinement of imperfect 
knowledge. As Lotte Mulligan observes, for Hooke ‘it was possible to reach the most 
complex problems by an incremental increase in knowledge’.5 
                                                
5 Lotte Mulligan, ‘Robert Hooke and Certain Knowledge’, Seventeenth Century, 7 (1992), 151–69 (p. 
156). 
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With the general emphasis on observation and sensory data within Hooke’s 
method, and the specifically visual nature of observation which the use of the 
microscope privileges in Micrographia, there is an obvious visual bias to the practical 
elements of these instances of knowledge development. However, it is my argument 
that visual and spatial elements are more fundamental to Hooke’s philosophy, and I 
believe that this is a result of the central importance of proportion and organization to 
Hooke’s epistemology and method.  
When Hooke describes the flaws in the faculties of sense, memory, and 
understanding or reason, he figures them as problems of proportion, of physical 
reception, and of organization. The ‘infirmities of the Senses’ are the result of ‘the 
disproportion of the Object to the Organ’ or from ‘error in the Perception, that many 
things, which come within their reach, are not received in a right manner’ (sig. a1v). The 
problems with memory are expressed by metaphors of location, which indicates the 
importance of their spatial organization: ‘we often let many things slip away from us 
[...] or [become] so overwhelmed and buried under more frothy notions, that when there 
is need of them, they are in vain sought for’ (ibid.). The faults of reason are also cast in 
terms of proportion: ‘for the limits, to which our thoughts are confind, are small in 
respect of the vast extent of nature it self; some parts of it are too large to be 
comprehended, and some too little to be perceived’ (ibid.). Proportion does not 
necessarily refer to spatial proportion (Hooke discusses senses other than sight) but 
when he discusses mental processes he defaults to spatial and visual metaphors, here 
considering objects of nature as too large or too little. The close association of 
comprehension and perception exhibited here is also significant and (together with the 
emphasis on the senses elsewhere in the preface) makes sensory perception a part of 
understanding, not just a preliminary to it.  
The spatial metaphor for the mental organization of the memory reveals that 
Hooke thinks about his own processes of thought in spatial terms. This goes further and 
Hooke casts spatiality as something useful; in his remedy for a disorganized memory he 
urges the ‘ranging and registring its [natural history’s] Particulars into Philosophical 
Tables, as may make them most useful for the raising of Axioms and Theories’ (sig. 
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b1v). For Hooke, spatial organization is a tool of thought, and as Nick Wilding observes, 
Micrographia has an apparent ‘obsession with questions of order’.6 
In this chapter I build on my initial reading of the preface to demonstrate the 
ways in which visuality and spatiality play a significant role in Hooke’s understanding 
of thought and in his methodology for developing knowledge as shown in Micrographia 
and his wider works. I do this by exploring three key themes. In the first section, on the 
legibility of nature, I consider the disparity between what is sought by means of the 
microscope and what is actually revealed, and the relationship between the visible, 
exterior surfaces of nature and the secret, inner workings Hooke aspires to understand. 
In the second section, on the relationship between the macro and the micro worlds, I 
examine how Hooke uses analogy, metaphor, and the relationship between known and 
unknown to explore new knowledge. In the final section, on the presentation of data, I 
look at Hooke’s visual strategies, including illustration and the assemblage of data in 
tables, as methods for developing knowledge. I also consider how this method is 
mirrored in his theories of mental processes such as memory.  
 
 
The Legibility of Nature 
  
In this section, I consider the tension between the access to interiority natural 
philosophers hoped the microscope would provide, and the granularity it actually 
offered — a tension intimately connected to the relationship between vision and 
understanding. Hooke shares in this frustration, but utilizes methods — both of 
observation and epistemology — to ensure that some degree of knowledge (albeit 
incremental and contingent) is attained.  
The natural philosophers of the Accademia dei Lincei were Hooke’s precursors 
in microscopical science. The mythological figure Lynceus, from whom they took their 
name, was one of the Argonauts and had telescopic eyesight and a glance that 
penetrated matter. However, as Cristoph Lüthy demonstrates, while the telescopic 
aspect was interpreted literally, the penetrative aspect of Lynceus’s gaze was considered 
                                                
6 Nick Wilding, ‘Graphic Technologies’, in Robert Hooke: Tercentennial Studies, ed. by Michael Cooper 
and Michael Hunter (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 123–34 (p. 125). 
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by the Lincei to be metaphorical.7 Stelluti wrote that Prince Cesi chose the lynx as 
emblem of their academy, ‘to remind us of the acuteness of vision, not of the corporeal 
eyes, but of the mind, necessary [...] to penetrate the inside of things’.8 Lüthy points out 
that the Persio tradotto, in which these words appear, also contains some of the first 
microscopical illustrations but does not connect microscopy with the Lyncean 
penetration of the ‘inside of things’, concluding that ‘neither Cesi, nor Stelluti 
understood “internal” and “external” as references to spatial, material, and therefore 
visualizable arrangements’.9 
However, Hooke’s reference to Lynceus (and indeed the Lynceans) in the 
Horatian couplet quoted on the title page of the Micrographia is rather more 
ambiguous. The quotation reads, ‘Non possis oculo quantum contendere Linceus, | Non 
tamen idcirco contemnas lippus innungi.’ (If you were/are not able to stretch as far as 
Lynceus with your eyes, nevertheless, you would not for that reason, having swollen 
eyes, scorn to anoint them.) The idea of anointing swollen eyes acts as a metaphor for 
limited human vision aided by the corrective salve of the microscope. The verse seems 
to encourage human efforts to see further and to validate the ideas (also encountered in 
the preface) of utilizing man-made helps in this endeavour, and of the value of even 
limited (and thus contingent and incremental) sight. Just because we do not have 
Lyncean vision does not mean that we should not try to improve what we do have. 
Although it is framed as a negative, the subjunctive Non possis (as opposed to the 
indicative non potes) entertains the hypothetical idea of the reader seeing as far as 
Lynceus and so puts the other degrees of vision (unassisted and microscopical) into a 
spectral relation with perfection at one end, rather than a binary relation of 
perfect/flawed vision or even seeing/not seeing. By referring to Lynceus’s telescopic 
gaze on the title-page of a book of microscopy, Hooke also brings into contact the literal 
and metaphorical aspects of hyper-perception, Lynceus’s enhanced vision with the 
penetrative capacity of the mind, and perhaps implies that the microscope facilitates 
both penetrative vision and penetrative understanding. This suggestion matches the 
corpuscularian confidence that the inner workings of things are empirically knowable.  
                                                
7 C. H. Lüthy, ‘Atomism, Lynceus, and the Fate of Seventeenth-Century Microscopy’, Early Science and 
Medicine, 1 (1996), 1–27 (pp. 7–9). 
8 Francesco Stelluti, Persio tradotto in verso sciolto e dichiaroto (Rome: Giacomo Mascadi, 1630), p. 37, 
quoted in translation in Lüthy, ‘Seventeenth-Century Microscopy’, p. 8.   
9 Lüthy, ‘Seventeenth-Century Microscopy’, p. 9. 
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There seems to have been a hope that with the aid of the microscope, vision 
could be literally as well as metaphorically penetrative. Fournier and Lüthy have both 
argued that the rise of the microscope corresponds to the rise of mechanical or 
corpuscularian philosophy in the 1660s due to the belief that the microscope would 
reveal the finer texture of atomic structure.10 But by February 1692, Hooke in his 
‘Discourse Concerning Microscopes and Telescopes’ complains of the ‘Neglect and 
Slighting’ of serious microscopical study, ‘now reduced almost to a single Votary, 
which is Mr. Leeuwenhoek; besides whom, I hear of none that make any other Use of 
that Instrument, but for Diversion and Pastime’.11 Fournier warns against the 
oversimplification of the rise and fall model and highlights the tendency for scholars to 
ignore eighteenth-century work and/or microscopical studies of less relevance to 
mechanical philosophy. However, she also notes that while microscopical discoveries 
initially seemed to support the mechanical explanation by revealing finer structures, the 
operation of the ‘finely woven fabric of organic matter’ revealed under the lens did not 
actually correspond with mechanical actions, and that consequently other theories, such 
as that of capillary vessels, came into vogue. These new theories were confirmed by 
existing microscopical data and so did not require further investigation.12 Lüthy 
implicates the new conception of space — the victory of Newtonian mechanics over the 
‘visual reductionism of corpuscularian physics’ — in the relegation of microscopy to its 
marginal, eighteenth-century status.13 Both accounts agree that the microscope failed to 
reveal a fine enough texture to prove the corpuscularian thesis. 
The accounts of the rise and fall of microscopy offered by Fournier and Lüthy 
presume a positivist philosophy of science, which demands absolute certainty in its 
explanations. Hooke’s epistemology, however, although empirically based, allows room 
for information with a greater degree of uncertainty to be a contingent part of an 
incremental knowledge. It also relies on the vision and understanding operating in more 
integrated ways to achieve penetration of the objects studied. As such, while frustration 
with the limits of microscopy is evident in Micrographia, it is not the full story. 
                                                
10 Fournier, pp. 4, 197; Lüthy, ‘Seventeenth-Century Microscopy’, p. 16. 
11 Robert Hooke, Philosophical Experiments and Observations, ed. by W. Derham (London: Frank Cass, 
1967), p. 261. 
12 Fournier, pp. 6, 197. 
13 Lüthy, ‘Seventeenth-Century Microscopy’, p. 25. 
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In Observation 18, ‘Of the Schematisme or Texture of Cork, and of the Cells and 
Pores of some other such frothy Bodies’, Hooke, judging from the weight and pliability 
of Cork, anticipates that ‘certainly the texture could not be so curious, but that possibly, 
if I could use some further diligence, I might find it to be discernable with a 
Microscope’ (pp. 112–113). He carefully prepares his sample and is rewarded with the 
sight of ‘the first microscopical pores I ever saw, and perhaps, that were ever seen’ (p. 
113). The spectacle is not all he apprehends though; he writes, ‘I no sooner discern’d 
these [...] but me thought I had with the discovery of them, presently hinted to me the 
true and intelligible reason of all the Phaenomena of Cork’ (ibid.). Hooke, basing his 
analysis on sensory information about cork at the macro level, anticipates the ability of 
the microscope to reveal that substance’s ‘texture’. On seeing the microscopic pores, he 
has an instantaneous understanding of cork and its phenomena, a revelation of truth 
whose immediacy (‘no sooner discern’d’, ‘the discovery of them presently hinted’) 
suggests an intimate relationship between the vision of microscopic structures and 
knowledge or understanding of them.14 However when he goes on to list a series of 
questions and answers about the properties of cork using the hints suggested by the 
view in the microscope, this relationship is found to be more complex as his answers 
bear less and less certainty and go from being immediately discernable of the visible 
evidence to being more speculative and interpretive. 
The solution to the first query — why cork is so light — is immediately and 
visually discernible: ‘my Microscope could presently inform me’ (ibid.). The second 
enquiry — why cork does not take in water and air (for example, when floating on 
water) — has a slightly more laboured explanation derived from what can be seen of the 
microscopic pores but also relying on a certain amount of deductive reasoning: ‘since 
our Microscope informs us […]. It seems very plain […], since […], and consequently’ 
(ibid.). The third enquiry — why cork is springy and returns to shape when compressed 
— is based on visual examination and on further ‘divers trials’ (p. 114) of this act of 
compression. However, these trials yield only a circular explanation as Hooke finds that 
cork ‘consists of an infinite company of small Boxes or Bladders of Air [i.e. pores], 
which is a substance of a springy nature, and that will suffer a considerable 
                                                
14 From context it is clear that presently is here used in the original sense, common in the period, of 
‘without delay’ or ‘immediately’ (OED, 1a), rather than the current usage of ‘soon’ (OED, 1b), which is 
dubious before c. 1650.  
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condensation’ (ibid.). This observation is apparently not satisfactory as an explanation, 
and Hooke recourses to speculation about the substance at an even more microscopic 
level (beyond the reach of Hooke’s contemporary technology): ‘besides, it seems very 
probable that those very films or sides of the pores, have in them a springing quality’ 
(ibid.). Even though the observation is entirely new to natural history and in itself would 
be an interesting and valuable contribution, Hooke has an urge to explain — to seek and 
find, or at least hypothesize — the hidden causes behind observable phenomena, even 
when those reasons are not visibly or immediately discernible. This desire to push 
beyond the limits of visibility may also explain his metaphorical use of the word infinite 
to describe the number of ‘Boxes or Bladders’. 
Hooke, following from his three enquiries, digresses into a discussion of the 
potential power of the microscope to reveal the finer texture the corpuscularians sought, 
revealing his frustration that the technology is not yet able to fulfil that potential: 
 
And could we so easily and certainly discover the Schematisme and 
Texture even of these films [the sides of the pores], and of several other 
bodies, as we can these of Cork; there seems no probable reason to the 
contrary, but that we might as readily render the true reason of all their 
Phenomena; as namely, what were the cause of the springiness, and 
toughness of some, both as to their flexibility and restitution. [...] But till 
such time as our Microscope, or some other means, enable us to discover 
the true Schematism and Texture of all kinds of bodies, we must grope, as 
it were, in the dark, and onely ghess at the true reasons of things by 
similitudes and comparisons. (p. 114) 
 
Hooke — a committed empiricist and corpuscularian philosopher — is looking for the 
true reason of phenomena (i.e. an explanation of its cause) in visible matter. He 
believes that better optical technologies will reveal an underlying structure of particles 
whose size and shape will provide this explanation and that in the meantime we must 
use similitudes and comparisons to guess at those reasons. Hooke repeats the phrase 
‘schematism and texture’, the first use seemingly with sole reference to the material and 
to what can be seen visibly (with a strong enough microscope), and the second 
somewhat more ambiguously as the ‘true Schematism and Texture of all kinds of 
bodies’. It is unclear whether this refers to a precise microscopical view or a more 
Platonic, axiomatically ‘true’, and indeed universal schematism and texture, that is, a 
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secret knowledge of nature. This potential double meaning creates a more complex 
interrelation between vision and understanding. The term is found throughout the 
observation, concatenated by repeated mental zooming with a hypothetically more and 
more powerful microscope. Hooke finds the observable schematism and texture of 
Cork, then hypothesizes about finding the schematism and texture of this texture itself, 
and so on until a ‘true’ schematism and texture of bodies is found. Being ‘as it were’ in 
the dark gives an element of metaphoricity to the condition of visibility for knowledge 
and thus the necessary visibility of this true texture. This both highlights the 
corpuscularian problem of basing one’s ability to know the world on the vision of 
something that as yet cannot (and perhaps may not) be seen, and also provides a 
temporary solution to scepticism by offering a way to hypothesize the phenomena based 
on ‘similitudes and comparisons’. 
In a similar passage in the preface, Hooke writes: 
 
It seems not improbable, but that by these helps [i.e. lenses] the subtilty of 
the composition of Bodies, the structure of their parts, the various texture 
of their matter, the instruments and manner of their inward motions, and 
all the other possible appearances of things, may come to be more fully 
discovered; […]. From whence there may arise many admirable 
advantages, […] because we may perhaps be inabled to discern all the 
secret workings of Nature, almost in the same manner as we do those that 
are the productions of Art. (sig. a2v)15 
 
Again, Hooke expresses a belief in (and desire for) the microscope’s potential to reveal 
corpuscularian truths visibly and man’s ability to understand causality (‘the secret 
workings of Nature’) based on mechanical principles (i.e. by analogy with ‘productions 
of Art’). The understanding of causality is presented as a likely result of visual data at 
the right level of magnification. However, it is important to note Hooke’s careful 
wording; the ‘true Reason’ in the previous extract and ‘the secret workings of Nature’ in 
this, are probable, not necessary, results of microscopic vision. In particular the idea that 
we may ‘perhaps be inabled to discern’ leaves a subtle amount of room for the 
possibility that microscopic vision will not reveal nature’s secrets, and also for the 
                                                
15 The theme of the ‘inward Texture and Constitution’ of bodies also recurs in Hooke’s long essay, ‘A 
General Scheme, or Idea of the Present State of Natural Philosophy’. See Robert Hooke, The Posthumous 
Works of Robert Hooke, ed. by Richard Waller (London: Sam Smith and Ben J. Walford, 1705), p. 3.  
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structural separation of the two stages of this knowledge production — discovering the 
appearances of things and then discerning their secret workings. This again speaks of a 
more complex relation between seeing and knowing, which requires an interpretive 
stage, than the ideas of Hooke as the microscope’s amanuensis (admittedly suggested by 
some of his own rhetoric) might suggest. The fact that the discernment of secrets of 
nature occurs ‘almost in the same manner’ (my emphasis) as the discernment of the 
familiar productions of art, also admits some degree of interpretation and 
approximation. 
The sense that increased vision might be simultaneously literal and metaphorical 
is present in other early encomiums to the potential revelatory power of the microscope. 
Henry Power writes,  
 
If the Dioptricks further prevail [...] we might hope, ere long, to see the 
Magnetical Effluviums of the Loadstone, the Solary Atoms of light [...] 
the springy particles of Air, the constant and tumultuary motion of the 
Atoms of all fluid Bodies, and those infinite, insensible Corpuscles 
(which daily produce those prodigious (though common) effects amongst 
us).16  
 
The atoms of light, springy particles of air, and atoms of fluid bodies are all given a 
sense of materiality or tangibility. However, corpuscles themselves are described as 
‘infinite’ and ‘insensible’, even while Power claims the possibility of seeing them. 
Similarly the insubstantial particles are associated with motion and substance while the 
corpuscles are associated with abstract causality, making corpuscles seem a 
philosophical rather than material reality. 
John Henry observes that whenever Hooke has recourse to hypothetical concepts 
beyond the reach of the senses, Hooke claims he can, ‘make the existence of this 
concept probable by analogy with experimentally amenable phenomena’, and when 
discussing methodology, Hooke ‘always emphasises the usefulness of experimentation 
for establishing the behaviour of “secret”, “subtle”, “abstruse”, and “hidden” principles 
of nature’.17 However, Henry overstates his case when he argues that the mechanical or 
                                                
16 Henry Power, Experimental Philosophy, In Three Books (London: T. Roycroft, 1664), fols c2v–c3r. 
Quoted in Fournier, p. 93. 
17 John Henry, ‘Robert Hooke, The Incongruous Mechanist’, in Robert Hooke: New Studies, ed. by 
Michael Hunter and Simon Schaffer (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1989), pp. 149–80 (p. 163).  
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corpuscularian philosophy was more occult than Aristotelian philosophy because of its 
reliance on the occult behaviour of invisible and insensible particles.18 The attention 
Henry draws to the inclusion of uncertainty in Hooke’s epistemology is much more 
adequately explained by his openness to metaphor and conjecture as tools of thought in 
a wider programme of knowledge, than a philosophy of natural magic.  
 
There seems to be a fundamental disconnect between what the microscope can offer and 
what many microscopists, and even historians of microscopy, want it to offer. Brian 
Ford, comparing microscopes and telescopes, writes: 
 
Telescopes maintain our remoteness from the Universe, whereas 
microscopes let the observer penetrate the recesses of life, peer at atoms 
and molecules, watch the processes of living organisms, and discern the 
hidden nature of humankind. Telescopes hold you up to a window, 
microscopes open doors and invite you to explore within.19  
 
According to Ford, the microscope does allow for that second penetrative aspect of 
Lyncean sight, and his list aligns views of atoms with the discernment of a ‘hidden 
nature’ and the idea of exploring ‘within’. However, he is missing a step. The 
microscope allows scientists to see smaller, finer surface detail, that is to see with a 
higher level of granularity, but this does not necessarily imply access to interiority — 
either literal or, like Hooke’s ‘inward texture’, somewhat metaphorical — however 
much this is desired (as Gaston Bachelard observes, ‘an empty drawer is 
unimaginable’).20 Interiority is frustratingly elusive to the microscopist.  
Margaret Cavendish repeatedly berates the microscopists for their mistaken 
assumption that the instrument offers them access to the interior of things, parodying 
                                                
18 Henry, p. 169. Cf. Mark E. Ehrlich, ‘Mechanism and Activity in the Scientific Revolution: the Case of 
Robert Hooke’, Annals of Science, 52 (1995), 127–51, who counters these ‘revisionist’ claims for the 
presence of natural magic and active principles in Hooke’s work by Henry and others, finding Hooke to 
be a purely mechanical philosopher. 
19 Brian J. Ford, ‘The Royal Society and the Microscope’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society, 55 
(2001), 29–49 (p. 29). He makes a similar claim in Brian J. Ford, Images of Science: A History of 
Scientific Illustration (London: The British Library, 1992), p. 167: ‘Only the microscope takes us within 
worlds we cannot otherwise know’ (my emphasis). 
20 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. by Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. xxxvii. 
 30 
Hooke’s methods in her Description of a New World Called the Blazing-World (1666). 
Mary Baine Campbell, in exploring the submicroscopic and interior worlds of Hooke 
and Cavendish respectively, upholds Cavendish’s assessment, claiming that while 
Hooke investigates interiors, his optical instrument deconstructs the very notion of 
interior, and all it finds is further surfaces.21 Campbell compares Cavendish’s interest in 
the immaterial interior of the person and her sense that the immaterial and unverifiable 
were losing status as objects of knowledge, with Hooke’s material gaze and the ‘cyber-
certainty of instrument-based (prosthetic) perception’.22 Campbell highlights the almost 
fetishistic act of objectification that takes place in Hooke’s examination of the head of 
the dead drone fly in Scheme 24 (see Fig. 1.2), describing the striking foldout plate as 
‘hyperbolically visible, hyperbolically blind at once’.23 She writes that Hooke’s 
examination of the eye, while emphasizing the mechanism of vision, ‘manages only to 
convey a sense of the surface beneath surface, each of them reflecting back to the 
unexamined eye of the scientist an image of himself and his own domestic “interior”’ 
(ibid.). The somewhat sinister irony of the examination of a dead eye, which no longer 
sees but only reflects the surroundings, turns the eye into a surface and robs it of its 
interiority.24 John Locke also complains that the microscope reveals nothing but 
surfaces:  
 
Poreing and gazeing on the parts which we dissect without perceiving the 
very precise way of their working is but still a superficial knowledg, and 
though we cut into there [sic] inside, we see but the outside of things and 
make but a new superficies for ourselves to stare at.25  
 
                                                
21 Mary Baine Campbell, Wonder and Science: Imagining Worlds in Early Modern Europe (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 182. 
22 Campbell, pp. 182–83. It is also a concern of Campbell’s paper that this prosthetic perception was one 
to which women in particular had little or no access. 
23 Campbell, p. 198. 
24 Cavendish, who parodies Hooke’s description of the drone fly with a blazon on her Empress’s dress, 
switches the viewpoint and identifies with the eye beneath the microscope, and not the eye behind the 
gaze. See Campbell, p. 213. 
25 John Locke, attr., ‘Anatomie’ fragment (1668), quoted in Anne-Julia Zwierlein, ‘Queen Mab under the 
Microscope: The Invention of Subvisible Worlds in Early Modern Science and Poetry’, in Spatial Change 
in English Literature, ed. by Joachim Frenk (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2000), pp. 69–97 (p. 73). 
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Locke highlights the fact that the interiority sought was something more than just the 
interior of bodies. Even when practitioners dissect and ‘cut into there inside’, they still 
only see outsides, succeeding only in making new surfaces. This in turn frustrates 
knowledge production; as Zwierlein notes, Locke, ‘expresses his epistemology in 
spatial terms: “superficies” and “superficial knowledg” are synonymous’.26  
 
 
Fig. 1.2. Robert Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), Scheme 24. Photo: RS.1885  
© The Royal Society. 
 
 
As shown above, Hooke’s search for the inner texture of cork is frustrated, 
despite his various acts of dissection.27 There is a similar tension in Scheme 7 where 
there is a striking contrast between Hooke’s illustration of the gravel found in his urine 
— what he saw through the microscope — and his speculative diagrams of the atomic 
                                                
26 Zwierlein, p. 73. 
27 See Micrographia, Scheme 11, Fig. 1 for cross and longitudinal sections, and p. 115 for the 
accompanying description. 
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alignment of crystalline structures (discussed below) — the interiority he was actually 
seeking (see Fig. 1.4).28 Before the accompanying description in the preface is read (sig. 
f1v), even Hooke’s illustration of the interior of the microscope, Figure 4 in Scheme 1, 
is not obviously a cross section of an internal part of the compound microscope shown 
in Figure 6, rather than an exterior view of a different piece of apparatus (see Fig. 1.3). 
Surfaces prove themselves to be fractal in nature, and interiority an ever-retreating 
concept.  
 
 
Fig. 1.3. Robert Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), Scheme 1. Photo: RS.1871 © The Royal Society. 
                                                
28 Hooke was fascinated by and highly aware of what went into and out of his body, an instinct that I 
believe echoes this desire for knowledge of interiors. See Lisa Jardine, Ingenious Pursuits: Building the 
Scientific Revolution (London: Little Brown, 1999), p. 296. 
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The contextual relation of interiority and exteriority seems to be important. The 
act of looking at something under a microscope or looking at an illustration of a 
microscopic subject, has a different effect to witnessing, for example, a dissection or 
looking at anatomical illustrations, even in cases where that microscopic subject has 
been dissected. Macro level dissections or experiments (such as the gruesome 
experiment into respiration which Hooke performed on a live dog in 1664), and strange 
phenomena such as Hugh Montgomery’s chest, allow the context of the exterior body to 
be preserved.29 Similarly, anatomical illustrations, such as those of Vesalius, show the 
interior of the body in the context of the whole body, the interior being revealed by the 
peeling back of flaps of skin. This preservation of the exterior context signals the 
transgression of a threshold and thus creates a sensation of interiority to what is 
witnessed. Microscopic views or illustrations, by contrast, do not preserve this 
distinction and by adjusting his or her gaze to the microscopic level, the reader instead 
creates new exteriors. The threshold becomes one of optical power, the threshold 
between the macro and micro views, which is different to the threshold between the 
exterior and interior of the body. Simply viewing an object through a microscope, that 
is, viewing a surface at a higher granularity, is not enough to cross the threshold into 
interiority. 
However, Hooke does manage to gain some access to interiors in certain 
instances where he is able to see through the transparent body of his subject to observe 
interior organs. The resulting illustrations, such as the water gnat of Scheme 27 and the 
louse of Scheme 35 (see Fig. 1.1), preserve the context of the intact exterior of the 
insect at the same time as depicting its shadowy innards through the transparent 
exterior. They are reminiscent of the illustrations of the veins in the forearm shown 
through the transparent skin in William Harvey’s De Motu Cordis (1628), and — as 
with Harvey’s study of the circulatory system — one of the advantages of this view of 
insects is the ability to witness live movement. In writing of this method of viewing in 
his study of the water gnat (Observation 43), Hooke acknowledges some of the tensions 
inherent in other methods of scientific observation: 
 
                                                
29 Hugh Montgomery (1623–1663) was an Irish peer who received an injury in childhood that left him 
with a permanent hole in his side that he covered with a metal plate and through which his heart could be 
seen. Both Charles I and William Harvey witnessed this phenomenon and Montgomery even allowed 
them to touch his beating heart. 
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I could perceive, through the transparent shell, while the Animals 
surviv’d, several motions in the head, thorax, and belly, very distinctly, of 
differing kinds, which I may, perhaps, elsewhere endeavour more 
accurately to examine, and to shew how great benefit the use of a 
Microscope may be for the discovery of Nature’s course in the operations 
perform’d in Animal bodies, by which we have the opportunity of 
observing her through these delicate and pellucid teguments of the bodies 
of Insects acting according to her usual course and way, undisturbed, 
wheras, when we endeavour to pry into her secrets by breaking open the 
doors upon her, and dissecting and mangling creatures whil’st there is life 
yet within them, we find her indeed at work, but put into such disorder by 
the violence offer’d, as it may easily be imagin’d how differing a thing 
we should find, if we could, as we can with a Microscope, in these 
smaller creatures, quietly peep in at the windows, without frightening her 
out of her usual byas. (pp. 185–86) 
 
Hooke’s description of such processes undertaken in the preparation of many 
microscopic samples (including Hooke’s own) as mangling, violent, and disordering to 
nature, reflect both the unseemliness of acts such as dissection, and the scientific 
uncertainty they produce. As well as dissection, other preparatory techniques — boiling, 
macerating, or injecting with substances such as wax, gypsum, or ink — were used to 
help counter the difficulties of conducting microscopical observations on animal tissue, 
in particular the difficulty of rendering it and its features visible under the microscope.30 
However, practitioners were concerned about the veracity of their observations under 
such conditions as they suspected their samples were being changed from their natural 
state by this very processing (‘how differing a thing we should find’).31 Hooke seems to 
find a valuable compromise in insects whose transparent bodies allow for observation 
without this disruption to the usual course of nature. In contrast with the urge to dissect 
and anatomize, Hooke is sometimes able to see more, and see more faithfully, by 
keeping the subject whole and closed up. Here, it is the body of the insect, not the 
microscope, which is the window, thus allowing Hooke some (limited) access to a more 
genuine sense of interiority. It is particularly interesting that Hooke’s imagery here is 
the reverse of that used by Ford; in Hooke’s description, opening doors is not intimate 
                                                
30 Fournier, pp. 31–32. 
31 See also Fournier, p. 33, on Jan Swammerdam’s anxieties in this regard. 
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but destructive and reduces accurate visibility, whereas looking through a window is not 
distancing but allows one to witness interior functions. 
The problem of the fractal nature of surfaces suggests that Hooke’s search for 
visual proof of the inner workings of nature — particularly as attacked by Cavendish, 
Locke, and by modern critics such as Campbell — was a failure. However, the partial 
solution based on what can be seen by peeping in at windows suggests this was not the 
case. This is not just a practical solution of technical method and visibility, but an 
epistemological one as well. As Mulligan’s insightful reading demonstrates, Hooke had 
a cumulative, incremental approach to knowledge and for him, ‘Internality and 
abstruseness were matters of degree, not of kind.’32 As I have demonstrated of his 
epistemological methods, which, rather than enforcing a strict binary between factual 
certainty and all other levels of probability, allows for contingent knowledge, Hooke 
does not enforce a binary structure between interior and exterior. The interior, and thus 
the secret knowledge of the inner workings of nature, is something that can be 
approached by steps, even while the final step is still elusive. 
The incremental approach to knowledge of interiors can also be made with 
hypothesis, and indeed hypothetical visual images. In Scheme 7, Hooke models a 
hypothetical atomic structure for crystalline objects (the gravel in urine and ‘Cornish 
diamants’ or crystals in flint described in Observations 12 and 13) based on his 
experiments with the alignment of bullets when arranged into shapes.33 He theorizes 
that it is the arrangement of corpuscles (also referred to as the ‘texture of Globules’ (p. 
86, my emphasis)) that determines the composition of bodies: 
 
I could make probable, that all these regular figures that are so 
conspicuously various and curious, […] arise onely from three or four 
several positions or postures of Globular particles, and those the most 
plain, obvious, and necessary conjunctions of such figur’d particles that 
are possible, so that supposing such and such plain and obvious causes 
                                                
32 Mulligan, ‘Robert Hooke and Certain Knowledge’, p. 156. Mulligan’s choice of words here 
suggestively allude to Milton, echoing Raphael’s words to Adam on angelic and human reason: ‘Differing 
but in degree, of kind the same.’ John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. by Alastair Fowler, 2nd edn (Harlow: 
Longman, 1998), V. 490. 
33 The description in Observation 12 refers to ‘the second Figure of the sixth Plate’ (p. 81), but this is 
clearly an error and the description in fact corresponds to Scheme 7, Fig. 2.  
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concurring the coagulating particles must necessarily compose a body of 
such a determinate regular figure, and no other. (p. 85) 
 
This hypothesis cannot be confirmed by the microscope, but is, as a stage of thought, a 
valuable contribution to the incremental development of knowledge. Hooke outlines the 
reasons for his hypothesis and the method he would follow to test it, which substantiates 
the idea that the hypothesis is a step in the incremental development of knowledge. The 
nature of Hooke’s hypothesis also demonstrates how he believes observation at a micro 
level can lead to understanding and knowledge: because there is some degree of 
causality in the arrangement of particles.  
 
 
Fig. 1.4. Robert Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), Scheme 7. Photo: RS.9433 © The Royal Society. 
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Hooke outlines some of the philosophical advantages of his theory, should it 
prove true: 
 
And fourthly, for the usefulness of this knowledge, when acquir’d, 
certainly none can doubt, that considers that it caries us a step forward 
into the Labirinth of Nature, in the right way towards the end we propose 
our selves in all Phillosophical Enquiries. So that knowing what is the 
form of Inanimate or Mineral bodies, we shall be the better able to 
proceed in our next Enquiry after the forms of Vegetative bodies; and last 
of all, of Animate ones, that seeming to be the highest step of natural 
knowledge that the mind of man is capable of. (pp. 87–88) 
 
The knowledge of the underlying forms of bodies is a step forward in a wider structure 
of knowledge and will also lead to greater knowledge of other, more complex, aspects 
of nature. This even includes the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, and as Henry 
observes, ‘For Hooke it seemed possible to arrive at an understanding of the soul by a 
gradual progression […] “making the steps or foundations of our Enquiry, Fluidity, 
Orbiculation, Fixation, Angularization, or Crystallization Germination, or Ebullition, 
Vegetation, Plantation, Animation, Sensation, Imagination”.’34 The imagery of steps is 
repeated in Observation 14: 
 
I judge it [the hypothesis of Observation 13] the second step by which the 
Pyramid of natural knowledge (which is the knowledge of the form of 
bodies) is to be ascended: And whosover will climb it, must be well 
furnish’d with that which the Noble Verulam [Francis Bacon] calls 
Scalam Intellectus; he must have scaling Ladders, otherwise the steps are 
so large and high, there will be no getting up them, and consequently little 
hopes of attaining any higher station. (p. 93) 
   
Hooke refers back to the hypothesis of Observation 13 to again illustrate the stepped or 
incremental structure he envisions for the attainment of knowledge. 
As well as providing evidence for the incremental nature of Hooke’s theory of 
knowledge and an example of the utility of hypothesis, the nature of the hypothesis of 
                                                
34  Henry, p. 154, citing Micrographia, p. 127. For reasons of brevity I do not include a discussion of 
Hooke and spirit or soul here, but for more on this topic see Mulligan, ‘Robert Hooke and Certain 
Knowledge’, esp. pp. 155–54. 
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Observation 13 is a significant visual and spatial development of corpuscularian ideas. 
As Ford points out, Hooke was the first person to suggest that the angles of the facets in 
crystals were related to molecular alignment within the crystal.35 Norma Emerton shows 
that Hooke was enlarging on Kepler’s structural speculations on snow and mineral 
crystals, Hooke following Kepler’s geometrical tendencies by arranging spherical 
bullets in geometrical figures. She writes that Hooke believed there was an orderliness 
and pattern to nature, and that angularization or crystalization was an intermediate stage 
on the way to organic form.36 Emerton points out that Hooke (along with Kepler and 
Huygens) diverged from the majority of those involved in crystal studies in not thinking 
that the particles themselves had to be polyhedral.37 Most mechanist microscopists 
subscribed to the idea that the qualities of bodies were a consequence of the shape of 
their particles: Leeuwenhoek, when he examined pepper water, expected to find spikey 
corpuscles abrasive to the tongue to account for its sharp taste.38 Hooke instead posited 
spherical particles whose subvisible arrangement, not their shape, was the salient factor 
in producing crystalline shapes at the macroscopic level.  
Hooke’s divergence from the focus on the shape of particles to the more abstract 
notion of the alignment of particles, raises the question of how nature yields information 
visibly, or rather, how man interprets what he observes in nature to produce knowledge; 
this question is the missing step between the search for interiority and the search for 
knowledge. The legibility of nature is a recurring theme in microscopy, and brings with 
                                                
35 Ford, Images of Science, p. 137. 
36 Norma E. Emerton, The Scientific Reinterpretation of Form (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 
pp. 133. Kepler’s text is Strena seu De nive sexangula (Frankfurt, 1611). 
37 Ibid., pp. 249–50. Emerton puts the success of angular particles down to their expression of a host of 
chemical and philosophical meanings rooted in the Paracelsian tradition and minimist form theory, 
including the predominance of the crystalline salt principle and the belief that the form of the part was the 
same as the form of the whole (p. 250; for the compound as a unified whole in Paracelsian matter theory, 
see also Ursula Klein and Wolfgang Lefèvre, Materials in Eighteenth-Century Science: A Historical 
Ontology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), p. 41). In a typically eclectic early modern fashion, it is 
also possible to see echoes of Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus (and perhaps even Plato’s geometric 
solids) in the idea of a correspondence between the shapes of atoms and the qualities of the material they 
made up, although as Cristoph Lüthy points out, the classical atomists left the relation between the shapes 
of atoms and substances strongly undetermined. ‘The Invention of Atomist Iconography’, in The Power 
of Images in Early Modern Science, ed. by Lefèvre, Renn, and Schoepflin, pp. 117–38, p. 121. 
38 Jardine, p. 94. 
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it the intersection of graphic culture and epistemology. As Susan Stewart points out, the 
‘-graphia’ element in the title of Hooke’s work is significant, in that ‘somehow it was 
the writing of the natural, the previously unreadable, which now stood revealed’.39 
Janice Neri comments upon the discrepancy between Hooke’s note in the Covel 
notebook describing ‘A Kind of Teek found creeping upon paper’, and the 
corresponding account in Micrographia: ‘a very small creature creep[ing] over the 
Book I was reading’ (p. 208).40 Neri suggests that the reworking of this encounter 
allows Hooke to present himself as scholarly, but it also perhaps suggests a desire to 
associate his subjects with text and legibility.  
The opening observation of Micrographia, on the point of a needle, also 
includes consideration of printed and handwritten points of punctuation: ‘the mark of a 
full stop or period’ (p. 3). This observation, as well as participating in the tradition from 
geometry of starting with a point, participates in the optical tradition of considering 
enlarged text through a lens or optical instrument, as undertaken by Seneca, Roger 
Bacon, and Galileo.41 It frames the rest of the observations with the idea that reading 
and interpreting are a part of microscopy. 
In Observation 1, as well as noting the imperfections of the graphic point under 
the microscope, Hooke considers the practice of microscopic writing (both as a curiosity 
and as a potentially useful technology for secret intelligence). Critics including 
Elizabeth Spiller and Michael Dennis make a connection between the reading of tiny 
writing and Hooke’s discussion of the writing of the creator in Observation 29 (on the 
seeds of thyme). Hooke’s discussion reads: 
 
Who knows but Adam might from some such contemplation [on what 
may be learned of the nature, or use, or virtues of bodies, by their several 
forms and various excellencies and properties], give names to all 
creatures? If at least his names had any significancy in them of the 
creature’s nature on which he impos’d it; as many (upon what ground I 
                                                
39 Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 41. As Dennis notes, the term micrographia 
includes the illustrations as well as the words used in the descriptions, literally ‘tiny writing or drawing’: 
Dennis, pp. 311, 336. 
40 Janice Neri, The Insect and the Image: Visualizing Nature in Early Modern Europe, 1500–1700 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), pp. 129–30. 
41 David Bardell, ‘The Invention of the Microscope’, Bios, 75 (2004), 78–84 (pp. 78, 79, 81).  
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know not) have suppos’d: And who knows, but the Creator may, in those 
characters, have written and engraven many of his most mysterious 
designs and counsels, and given man a capacity, which, assisted with 
diligence and industry, may be able to read and understand them. (p. 154) 
 
The passage makes reference to the pre-lapsarian language of Adam and wonders 
whether this language was ‘written and engraven’ by the creator in his creature’s 
‘characters’ (i.e. the forms, excellencies, and properties which reveal their nature), and 
whether this could possibly be read and understood by man — the implication being 
that if so, this would be achievable by the scrutiny of nature.42 Spiller makes the 
connection between this passage and the microscopical observation of letters and texts, 
but she oversimplifies the relation.43 In quoting from the passage above, she ignores the 
context (given here in square brackets and quoted from Hooke’s previous sentence) of 
what ‘such contemplation’ refers to beyond the generality of the microscopical 
observation of nature. She also omits by ellipsis the phrases in which Hooke questions 
whether or not Adam’s ability to rightly name the creatures was associated with any 
particular significance in the names themselves. In full, the quotation reveals an 
altogether more complex set of ideas. Spiller’s simple association of the writing and 
engraving of nature by the creator with microscopical text suggests a direct ability to 
read the book of nature, where the causes and inner workings of phenomena are 
knowable by their visible form. Similarly Dennis, in his reading of this passage, sees in 
the connection between the concept of micrographia and Adam’s naming, the idea that 
the microscope (when used with diligence and industry) has the power to restore man’s 
sight and ability to read God’s non-alphabetic writing in an act of re-presenting: ‘Adam 
simply saw and knew; man would do the same, as his microscopes and telescopes 
improved and he understood more about the (re)production of form.’44 However, 
Hooke, with his interjection about the significance of names, queries the legitimacy of 
this position of direct interpretation.  
                                                
42 Adam’s naming of the animals in Genesis 2. 19 led to a popular belief that Adam spoke in a language 
with perfect congruence between sign and referent. The loss of this language was used as evidence of the 
corruption of man’s faculties at the fall, and the interest in language systems by Royal Society members 
(including Hooke who used both John Wilkins’s and Francis Lodwick’s artificial languages) was related 
to the hope that (as Hooke discusses in his preface) these faculties could be redeemed. 
43 Spiller, pp. 137–39. 
44 Dennis, p. 336. 
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Svetlana Alpers offers a rather more subtle reading which observes this tension, 
concluding that, while Hooke turns away from the authority of texts to nature herself, he 
still wants nature to be not only visible but readable.45 In the passage from Hooke it is 
the contemplation of the forms and properties of nature that is important to Adam’s 
ability to name, not the particular significance of the naming word itself. This is 
evocative of the scientific act of classification based on physical observation rather than 
a mystical linguistic trick. Similarly when Hooke suggests that man might have the 
capacity to read the divine inscription of nature, he uses the phrase ‘read and 
understand’, again suggesting a level of consideration, thought, and interpretation 
beyond the act of simply seeing and knowing. As with his hypothetical atomic structure 
of crystals, Hooke seems to lean towards a theory of nature as legible, in that it is 
understandable from its visual cues, but also requiring of interpretation.  
Another significant aspect of Hooke’s treatment of the theme of -graphia, is that 
while the consideration of the full stop in Observation 1 is suggestive of the analogy 
between reading text and interpreting nature, Hooke also uses it to highlight a 
disanalogy: the imperfection of man-made text as revealed by the microscope compared 
to the perfection of magnified nature. The period viewed under the microscope is 
described as ‘disfigur’d’, ‘deformed’, and ‘rugged’, and looking at the illustration in 
Scheme 2 (see Fig. 1.5), we can agree with Hooke that regardless of how even and 
black a period looks with the naked eye, under the microscope it looks ‘like a great 
splatch of London dirt’ (p. 3). This suggests some ambivalence about using the reading 
of text as a direct model for interpreting nature, at the same time as letting a wider, more 
metaphorical analogy hold. This also extends to other man-made objects and in his 
discussion of the enlarged needle point (also illustrated in Scheme 2) shown to be pitted 
and rough, Hooke writes of the revelation of the ‘rudeness and bungling of Art [...] 
whereas in the works of Nature, the deepest Discoveries shew us the greatest 
Excellencies’ (p. 2). Ambiguity and the need for interpretation in the reading of tiny 
writing is also suggested by the brief description of the letter O as viewed under a 
microscope (p. 4). The O is considered for the suggestiveness of its shape and Hooke 
compares the roundness (or rather lack thereof) of a drawn circle with that of the point, 
thus bringing the letter, which can symbolize (among numerous other things) ‘the 
                                                
45 Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983), p. 93. 
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world’, into the chain of analogies already made between the magnified point and ‘those 
vaster bodies (which comparatively are called also Points) such as the Earth, Sun, or 
Planets’ (p. 2).  
 
 
Fig. 1.5. Robert Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), Scheme 2. Photo: RS.8429 © The Royal Society. 
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As Catherine Wilson observes, except in a few lucky instances where structure 
and function seemed to explain one another, microscopists were faced with ‘the 
absolute unintelligibility of the structures perceived: their scientific muteness’. 
Microscopy could reveal muscle fibres or vessels for sap, but ‘it did not really show  
how much of anything could happen’.46 This does not support the microscopist as 
amanuensis model suggested by Dennis, but rather one that requires the microscopist to 
interpret what he sees. In Observation 1, Hooke makes an analogy between learning to 
write and draw and the method of making observations in natural history. He likens the 
way we must learn our letters and draw single strokes before writing whole sentences or 
drawing larger pictures to the way we must, in physical enquiries, 
 
endeavour to follow Nature in the more plain and easie ways she treads in 
the most simple and uncompounded bodies, to trace her steps, and be 
acquainted with her manner of walking there, before we venture our 
selves into the multitude of meanders she has in bodies of a more 
complicated nature; lest, being unable to distinguish and judge of our 
way, we quickly lose both Nature our Guide, and our selves too, and are 
left to wander in the labyrinth of groundless opinions; wanting both 
judgment, that light, and experience, that clew, which should direct our 
proceedings. (p. 1) 
 
While this passage alludes to the metaphor of reading the book of nature by analogy 
with human writing and drawing, I think it suggests a far less immediate level of 
comprehension than is suggested by Dennis and Spiller, and indeed connects it with the 
idea of incremental knowledge. It also emphasizes the agency of the practitioner by its 
incorporation of writing and drawing into the metaphor of the book of nature, more 
usually associated with only the passive act of reading. Hooke’s conception of 
knowledge relies much more on experience and judgement, and acknowledges the 
difficulty and contingency of reading nature, of the ‘scientific muteness’ of the object 
seen through the lens. We do not simply see and know as Dennis claims; we need the 
light of judgement and the clue of experience to guide us.  
 
 
                                                
46 Catherine Wilson, The Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 230. 
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Micro and Macro Worlds 
 
Hooke’s use in the preface of the New World metaphor to refer to the microscopical 
world suggests an epistemological continuity between the macro and micro worlds. 
Indeed this assumption of consistency is central to the doctrines of mechanical 
philosophy and, as Fournier notes, ‘Hooke insisted that for any effect whose cause is 
invisible it is necessary to make an analogy with a similar effect whose cause is 
visible.’47 Zwierlein writes of the New World metaphor that it ‘embodies the claim that 
the regions beyond the threshold of visibility are as accessible (and exploitable) as, 
earlier, it had been claimed of America’.48 However, Zwierlein’s thought provoking 
essay goes on to highlight the ambivalent relationship between the visible and 
subvisible worlds, citing figures such as Locke and Cavendish to question the 
corpuscularian assumption that there is a link of cause and effect between the two 
worlds, and describing the never-ending dialectic between wonder and assimilation at 
the heart of early modern microscopy.49 In this section, I examine the relationship 
between the two worlds, in particular the ways in which reference to the macro world is 
used to explore the new and unknown micro world. I suggest that while the relationship 
includes ideas of correspondence, this is not a narrative of assimilation of the micro to 
the macro, and that Hooke also leaves room for discontinuities and the exploration of 
the micro world on its own terms. 
While I admire Zwierlein’s sensitive teasing out of these epistemological 
complexities, I believe her positioning of Hooke in relation to this context assumes a 
more positivist epistemology for him than his work in fact suggests. Zwierlein cites 
Hooke’s comments in the preface about the ‘invisible Notions’ and ‘fine dreams’ of 
natural philosophers before Bacon, and then questions whether the porousness of the 
boundary between smallness and nothingness in seventeenth-century microscopic texts 
means that, ‘the separation of subvisible fact from invisible fiction is more difficult than 
Hooke contends’.50 However, for Hooke, there is a distinct difference between the pre-
Baconian notions and dreams, which are not based on empirical evidence, and the best 
guesses or hypotheses of mechanical philosophy, which are. As I have demonstrated, 
                                                
47 Fournier, p. 52. 
48 Zwierlein, p. 71. 
49 Zwierlein, pp. 73, 77. 
50 Zwierlein, p. 70. 
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meaningful visibility in the subvisible realm is not as simple as the binary notion of 
fact; it is contingent and interpretive and exists in a space of hypothesis, somewhere 
between fact and fiction. And, as with Hooke’s epistemology more generally, while he 
strives towards the determination of fact, knowledge also exists in the realm of what is 
most probable based on current data, again, a realm which lies somewhere between fact 
and fiction. Zwierlein compares Hooke’s belief that ‘the epistemological “gap” between 
the worlds above and below the threshold of sight can be filled’, and that the 
‘“Schematism and Texture”’ of objects will provide clues to the ‘“true reason of all their 
Phaemomena”’, to Catherine Wilson’s observation of the ‘“scientific muteness”’ of the 
structures perceived with the microscope. Zwierlein deems this to imply failure on 
Hooke’s part: ‘Hooke rarely succeeds in meaningfully correlating form and function’.51 
However, Hooke’s incremental approach to knowledge makes a binary between success 
and failure an inappropriate model; partial successes, hypotheses, even failures, all point 
the way for future experiments, future scientists, and future technology. Also, the layer 
of interpretation required to understand the significance of microscopic structures 
(rather than some sort of Adamic instant comprehension) suggests that for Hooke the 
‘scientific muteness’ of microscopical images is not an inherent epistemological gap, 
but rather an initial stage of unfamiliarity to be overcome with judgement and 
experience. 
Finally Zwierlein suggests that the presence of both assimilation and wonder in 
Micrographia represents the unsuccessfulness of Hooke’s attempt to assimilate and 
make familiar the objects of his study. She writes, ‘on the one hand, Hooke assimilates 
the new strangeness: on the other, to guard their specificity, he has to insist on the 
otherness of the discoveries’, and ‘By juxtaposing the old wonder to the new, Hooke 
attempts to categorize his microscopic animals, and to render them less “strange” — not 
wholly successfully’.52 In a similar vein to Zwierlein, Ford notes that Hooke was 
‘concerned with making familiar objects appear larger’ — insects, seeds, textiles — and 
that it was other microscopists, such as Leeuwenhoek, who really revolutionized the 
science with the discoveries of protozoa and other micro-organisms.53 Likewise, 
Margaret ’Espinasse writes of the ‘power of assimilation’ in Hooke’s comparisons 
                                                
51 Zwierlein, p. 72. 
52 Zwierlein, pp. 76, 77. The quotation from p. 77 refers to Micrographia, pp. 186–87. 
53 Ford, Images of Science, p. 30. 
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(where the gnat is like an opossum and spider legs are like levers), and Alpers observes 
that the illustration of seeds of thyme in Scheme 18 looks just like a dish of lemons as 
would be painted in the Dutch tradition.54 But while this aspect of familiarity is 
certainly present in Hooke, these critics miss what is unfamiliar in the Micrographia. 
Howard Gest, for example, attributes to Hooke the first accurate description and 
depiction of any microorganism.55 Figure 1 of Scheme 12 shows a magnified view of 
what to the naked eye appears as ‘a small white spot of hairy mould’ (p. 125) and which 
the graphical scale shows to represent just 1/32 of an inch (see Fig. 1.9). Hooke studies 
both the familiar and the unfamiliar, and furthermore he finds the unfamiliar in the 
familiar, and indeed the familiar in the unfamiliar. As I show in this section, Hooke 
does not treat wonder and assimilation as an either/or; for Hooke they are not 
expressions of comprehension at which to fail or succeed, but rather, techniques of 
exploration which can be used simultaneously and interconnectedly. I show that 
Hooke’s approach is much more in line with Zwierlein’s own idea of the ‘dialectic 
between wonder and assimilation [as] a never-ending process’.56 
Zwierlein’s reading of Hooke suggests that he believed in the continuity and 
correspondence between the macro and micro, or visible and subvisible, worlds. With 
the idea of incremental knowledge, and the importance of the judgement and experience 
of the microscopist in interpreting what he or she sees through the microscope, a 
relationship between the existing knowledge of the microscopist and the new 
knowledge discovered with the instrument is implied. Similarly with the idea of an 
underlying structure of universal particles, some sort of material relationship between 
the micro and macro worlds is understood. However, these relationships are not strictly 
defined and in this section I show that they are more complicated than simple continuity 
or correspondence. Like Hooke’s hypothesis that it is the alignment rather than the 
shape of particles that determines their nature, the relationship between the macro and 
micro worlds — and indeed how practitioners come to know the micro world — relies 
in part on disruptions to continuity.  
One source of anxiety about the micro world comes from the uncertainty of the 
image in the lens. If a practitioner uses a telescope to view an object at a distance, he or 
                                                
54 Margaret ’Espinasse, Robert Hooke (London: William Heineman, 1956), p. 57; Alpers, p. 84. 
55 Howard Gest, ‘The Remarkable Vision of Robert Hooke (1635–1703): First Observer of the Microbial 
World’, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 48 (2005), 266–72 (p. 267). 
56 Zwierlein, p. 77. 
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she can compare the image seen via the instrument with a close up view of the object, 
and thus verify both the optical effect and the image. Indeed, Galileo’s experiments of 
reading distant text through a telescope (experiments which Hooke persuaded the Royal 
Society to reproduce) were done to demonstrate the veracity of the instrument. With the 
microscope no such check with the naked eye is possible. However, Hooke does create 
something similar to this verification effect in Observation 1 with his examination of 
minute text. Although the minute text itself cannot be checked with the naked eye, the 
reader can verify the enlarged image against his or her knowledge of the text.57 
Although Hooke acknowledges the difficulty of resolving images in lenses, he always 
expresses confidence in the microscope, treating the image in the lens as faithful and 
rather watching and guarding against human errors of interpretation. The results of 
Observation 1 emphasize this. The flaws revealed in the magnified full stop or the point 
of the needle (see Fig. 1.5) do not cause Hooke or the reader to question the accuracy of 
the microscope, they cause us to question unassisted human perceptions at the macro 
level. Hooke considers the point of a needle, which is, ‘for the most part, made so sharp, 
that the naked eye cannot distinguish any parts of it’ (p. 1). However, viewed with a 
good microscope, ‘we may find that the top of a Needle (though as to the sense very 
sharp) appears a broad, blunt, and very irregular end; not resembling a cone, as is 
imagin’d, but onely a piece of a tapering body’ (pp. 1–2). Rather than assimilating what 
is seen in the lens to existing knowledge, Hooke allows this new knowledge of the 
micro world to destabilize the certainty of the macro world. What had once been known 
by sense, and indeed had become axiomatic knowledge — as Hooke highlights by 
commenting on the superlative idiom ‘As sharp as a Needle’ (p. 2) — has now become 
only ‘imagin’d’ knowledge. As part of the first observation, this destabilization of 
existing knowledge frames the rest of the book. 
Although the idea of destabilizing existing knowledge might seem anxiety 
inducing, it speaks of honesty and helps the reader to trust in something unverifiable. In 
                                                
57 This is similar to what Ian Hacking refers to as ‘the argument of the grid’, which describes the modern 
practice of producing minuscule grids by drawing a grid of a known size and with identifying markers 
and reducing it photographically. When the tiny grid is viewed through the microscope and the viewer 
sees the same identifying markers as in the original, it becomes impossible to doubt the verity of the 
image. See Ian Hacking, ‘Do we See through a Microscope?’, in Images of Science: essays on realism 
and Empiricism with a Reply from Bas C. Van Fraasen, ed. by Paul M. Churchland and Clifford A. 
Hooker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 132–52 (p. 146). 
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a similar way, Hooke’s recording of failed experiments or disproven hypotheses 
actually helps to generate trust, both in the instrument and the practitioner.58 In 
considering a seemingly plausible hypothesis for the porous texture of sponge, Hooke 
writes: 
 
Nor from this Hypothesis would it have been difficult to explicate, how 
[…]: But this inded [sic] was but a conjecture; and upon a more accurate 
enquiry into the form of it with the Microscope, it seems not to be the true 
origine of them. (p. 137) 
 
Hooke emphasizes the role of the microscope as a verifier of data and demonstrates 
himself to be an honest reporter and to be enacting the watchfulness over error he 
recommends in the preface. In Observation 32, Hooke examines a hypothesis about the 
structure of human hair based on an analogy with the hairs of other creatures. The 
hypothesis is debunked by evidence from the microscope: ‘though I grant that by an 
Analogie one may suppose them so, […] I think we have not the least encouragement 
[…] from the Microscope, much less positively to assert them such’ (pp. 157–58). This 
becomes a general principle: 
 
And therefore I think it no way agreeable to a true natural Historian, to 
pretend to be so sharp-sighted, as to see what a pre-conceiv’d Hypothesis 
tells them should be there, where another man, though perhaps as seeing, 
but not forestall’d, can discover no such matter. (p. 158) 
 
Again, the microscope is used to verify or falsify hypothesis, and Hooke is watchful for 
the human error of preconception, which has the potential to affect what a man sees. 
The reading of Hooke that sees a presumption of continuity between the micro and 
macro worlds is largely based on Hooke’s use of analogy. However, we see here that 
analogy is admitted as a means of structuring the exploration of the natural world by 
suggesting hypotheses to be tested, but it does not itself presume the status of fact, nor 
is it to be slavishly followed.  
                                                
58 On the use of a rhetoric of truthfulness to help instil confidence in experimental accounts, see Steven 
Shapin, ‘Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle’s Literary Technology’, Social Studies of Science, 14 
(1984), 481–520 (pp. 493–94).  
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Hooke makes frequent use of analogy between the micro and macro world as a 
tool for negotiating the threshold of the subvisible world. This is used in several key 
ways: to explain an observation to the reader; to deduce the hypothetical cause of 
phenomena (in conjectures with varying degrees of certainty) and offer rational support 
to the likelihood of this theory; and to explore phenomena as a precursor to making 
deductions about it. A lot of these analogies rely on Hooke’s genius as a mechanic and 
inventor; as Jim Bennett claims, Hooke’s knowledge of mechanics, of instruments and 
machines in the macro world, ‘tuned and prepared the mind to construct explanations of 
the unseen, micro world that lay behind all the phenomena of our experience’.59 Bennett 
cites Hooke’s ‘General Scheme’ where Hooke asserts that mathematics and mechanics 
help the mind in its thinking about experiments: mathematics provides a model for 
reasoning and mechanics demonstrates general laws of motion and physical 
operations.60 Even where natural analogies are used, they are understood in a 
mechanical way that relies on general laws and universal properties. That much 
continuity is assumed. However, the allusion to this method in the preface also 
highlights its contingency: ‘because we may perhaps be inabled to discern all the secret 
workings of Nature, almost in the same manner as we do those that are the productions 
of Art’ (sig. a2v, my emphasis). 
There are numerous examples of Hooke’s various uses of analogy with the 
macro world. In Observation 21, on moss, Hooke’s macro analogy has a purely 
explanatory intent: ‘To explain my meaning a little better by a gross Similitude: 
Suppose a curious piece of Clock-work [...]’ (p. 133). In Observation 38, on the wings 
of flies, Hooke uses the macro analogy of the vibration of musical strings to deduce the 
swiftness of wing beats: 
 
And these vibrations or motions to and fro [of the wings of flies] between 
the two limits seem so swift, that ’tis very probable (from the sound it 
affords, if it be compar’d with the vibration of a musical string, tun’d 
unison to it) it makes many hundreds, if not some thousands of vibrations 
in a second minute of time. And, if we may be allow’d to ghess by the 
sound, the wing of a Bee is yet more swift, for the tone is much more 
acute. (p. 173) 
                                                
59 Jim Bennett, ‘Instruments and Ingenuity’, in Robert Hooke: Tercentennial Studies, ed. by Cooper and 
Hunter, pp. 65–76 (p. 67). 
60 Ibid.; see Posthumous Works, pp. 19–20. 
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Hooke uses the analogy of the musical string to deduce a persuasively rational 
hypothesis about a phenomenon unavailable to the unassisted human senses.  
In several instances, analogy between the micro and macro worlds is used for 
multiple ends. In his account of the physiology of stinging nettles Hooke uses 
mechanical analogies to describe and explain the phenomena in his verbal description: 
‘the whole surface of it very thick set with turn-Pikes, or sharp Needles’ (p. 142), and 
‘those small Bodkins were but the Syringe-pipes, or Glyster-pipes, which first made 
way into the skin, and then served to convey that poisonous juice’ (p. 143). As well as 
helping describe and explain the phenomenon to the reader, the language also suggests 
the likelihood that Hooke’s familiarity with artificial devices, such as syringes and glass 
pipes, helped him to understand what he was seeing in the first place. The use of 
metaphors rather than similes possibly indicate a closer relationship between the vehicle 
and referent in Hooke’s thought in these instances. Similarly, in his account of bee 
stings, there is a mix of similetic analogies which suggest description to aid the reader 
in picturing the phenomenon — ‘a sheath, […] shap’d almost like a Holster of a Pistol’ 
(p. 163), with barbed protuberences ‘which seem’d like so many Thorns growing on a 
briar, or rather like so many Cat’s Claws’ (ibid.) — and metaphoric ones, ‘this syringe-
pipe’ (p. 164) which are likely also a part of Hooke’s deductive reasoning about the 
function of the parts.  
Hooke’s analogies are, for the most part, stable ways of developing an 
understanding of the unknown in relation to what is already familiar. However there are 
also ways in which he uses analogy to explore the realm of uncertainty. When 
considering a moth, Hooke uses an analogy with bird feathers to describe the texture of 
tiny scales on the body and parts of the wings. However, he then writes:  
 
Whether the tufts of any or all of these small Feathers, consisted of such 
component particles as the Feathers of Birds, I much doubt, because I find 
that nature does not alwaies keep, or operate after the same method, in 
smaller and bigger creatures. (p. 196)  
 
Hooke’s recounting of his finding that nature isn’t always consistent in her methods 
between small and large creatures destabilizes the continuity between the micro and 
macro worlds which the analogy between bird feathers and the texture of moth wings 
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seems to rely on. Hooke thus draws attention to the much more metaphorical use of the 
analogy as a tool for exploring relationships rather than categorizing according to 
known principles. Immediately after admitting this doubt about the degree of likeness 
between bird feathers and moth wings, Hooke continues with his feather analogy, and 
then adds other analogies or comparisons, producing a network of ideas and images 
which include the membranous wings of dragon flies, the short bristles of flesh flies, the 
placement of tiles on a house, the lively colouring of butterflies, and the backbone of a 
herring (p. 197). This use of analogy seems to be more about creating a network of 
related thoughts which might act as stimulus for the reader and which record the mental 
process of the practitioner, rather than attempting to assimilate the microscopic image to 
a known pattern.   
Another deviation from the assimilative uses of analogy comes from the fact that 
as well as developing an understanding of the micro world by reference to the macro, 
Hooke also uses internal analogies, that is, references to other parts of the micro world. 
These references appear to be of limited utility to the reader; unless he or she were one 
of the few other contemporary microscopists, the reader would have no first-hand 
experience of these supposed referents. The knowledge requisite for this sort of analogy 
comes either from reading other microscopical texts, from reading other sections of the 
Micrographia, or from the reader’s imagination. In Observation 23, on sea-weed, 
Hooke writes:  
 
I found, that each of the Branches or Figures of it, did, by the range of its 
pores, exhibit just such a texture, the rows of pores crossing one another, 
much after the manner as the rows of eyes do which are describ’d in the 
26. Scheme. (pp. 140–41) 
 
The eyes in Scheme 26 are those of the blue fly described in Observation 42. This is not 
only an analogy to an object of the micro world, it is one that the reader has yet to 
encounter in the book (presuming the observations are being read in their published 
order).61 This technique of referencing the unfamiliar reveals that Hooke’s analogies 
                                                
61 The order in which the observations appear in Micrographia is not representative of the order in which 
Hooke made his observations or presented them to the Royal Society, however the observation of 
seaweed was made two months before the observation of the drone fly so chronology of observation does 
not account for the inclusion of the comparison to the fly. For a table showing ‘Chronology of Hooke’s 
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and comparisons are not always illustrative or operating wholly in an explanatory way. 
These moments feels more exploratory with Hooke making comparisons between his 
microscopical observations as if he were drawing up a map of relations between objects 
(even only partially understood objects) in this new world. For the reader this is a 
revelation of Hooke’s process of understanding and a record of his mental associations. 
It also has the effect of helping the reader take a step up the ladder of understanding by 
letting go of the reliance on macro references; the reader is being trained in scientific 
encounters with the unknown. Hooke steps further into the microscopical world, and we 
go with him. 
In another method whereby Hooke eschews reference to the macro world, 
Hooke — as well as the positing of his own hypothetical underlying structure for 
crystals in Observations 12 and 13 discussed above — notes that the pores of Kettering 
stone ‘minded me of the pores which DesCartes allow[s] his materia subtilis between 
the aethereal globules’ (p. 94), and compares the size of the pores in cork to ‘the Atoms 
which Epicurus fancy’d’ (p. 114). As well as internal micro-world comparisons, Hooke 
goes a step further and makes connections between his microscopical observations and 
theoretical subvisible imagery. This reiterates the inclusivity of his epistemology, which 
allows theories and hypotheses to be a sort of knowledge, and also traces the 
associations of ideas, which may in turn lead to new theories.  
In the same way that the microscope forced a re-evaluation of the understanding 
of macro objects such as the needle, and the relational context of qualities such as 
sharpness, Hooke’s use of analogy does not only work in one direction. He does not 
simply use the familiar to understand the unfamiliar, but also forges explanatory 
relationships between different unfamiliar objects, and between unfamiliar objects and 
hypothetical ideas. The questioning of direct correspondence between micro and macro 
in the observation on moths allows analogy to be used in a less rigid, more exploratory 
and metaphorical way. As such it becomes a tool for developing thought and 
understanding rather than just a tool for categorizing new discoveries according to 
existing principles.  
                                                                                                                                          
Observations’, see John T. Harwood, ‘Rhetoric and Graphics in Micrographia’, in Robert Hooke: New 
Studies, ed. by Hunter and Schaffer, pp. 119–47 (pp. 124–25, Table 1). 
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Fig. 1.6. Robert Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), Scheme 26. Photo: RS.9445  
© The Royal Society. 
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To understand this further we must consider Hooke’s portrayal and experience 
of the scale relationship between micro and macro objects. As Fournier notes, there was 
no agreed method amongst the new scientists to indicate the actual size of microscopical 
objects in illustrations, which hampered the growth of a coherent body of knowledge.62 
Jardine also notes that practitioners experienced and remarked on the loss of a sense of  
scale in making observations with the microscope.63 Hooke’s own methods of 
portraying scale are inconsistent. While he does attempt accurate and numerical 
measurements of scale in his verbal descriptions, of the thirty-eight illustrated plates in 
Micrographia only eight bear a graphical scale, and more than half have several figures 
of different scales on the same plate with no means of visual distinction. Even in those 
schemes with graphical scales it is not always clear to which figures they refer. In 
Scheme 26, an illustration of a blue fly (Figure 1) overlaps an illustration of its wing at 
a larger magnification (Figure 2) in such a way as to suggest that the two objects are 
interacting, that the fly is perched on its own enlarged wing (see Fig. 1.6). Although 
Hooke’s manuscript sketches of microscopically observed insects in the Covel notebook 
contain scale references — drawings or marks alongside the magnified image to 
indicate the ‘real bignesse’ — and although this was a known method used in published 
works by other microscopists such as Stelluti, Hooke includes this sort of scale 
reference in just one of his published engravings (Scheme 21).64 This is particularly 
provoking in its potential pun on the word scale: the plate contains three illustrations of 
fish scales all drawn to different scales of size, which are not indicated by the image in 
any way (see Fig. 1.7).  
                                                
62 Fournier, p. 38. 
63 Jardine, p. 107. It was not just the microscope that distorted the sense of scale; Jardine also describes 
the misleading effects of the camera obscura.  
64 For a detailed examination of Hooke’s work in the Covel manuscript and demonstration that this was 
preparatory work for the Micrographia, see Neri, pp. 123–38, particularly p. 127 where she describes the 
references to actual size. For an example of the inclusion of an actual size reference in a published work, 
Stelluti’s Persio Tradotto includes an engraving of a curculio beetle seen through a microscope, alongside 
the beetle at its real, unmagnified size, and an anatomical detail, reproduced in Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt, 
‘The Microscope and the Book’, in Festschrift für Claus Nissen, ed. by Guido Pressler and Elisabeth 
Geck (Wiesbaden: Guido Pressler Verlag, 1973), pp. 471–502 (p. 480). 
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Fig. 1.7. Robert Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), Scheme 21. Photo: RS.9441 
© The Royal Society. 
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Neri claims of Micrographia that ‘Not only did the title of the book clearly state 
the subject matter and the text include detailed descriptions of the microscope, but the 
illustrations themselves almost always announced their status as magnified images’, 
highlighting the illustrations presented in a round frame or as large format foldouts to 
support her claim.65 However, just thirteen of the thirty-eight schemes include images in 
round frames (and most of these schemes also contain unframed figures) and only ten 
schemes require folding plates, less than a third in each case and certainly a stretch for 
Neri’s ‘often’. Considering the lack of scale referencing in the images themselves (i.e.  
without the support of the textual description), and indeed the confusion of having 
different scales within the same plate, I argue that these microscopic objects are 
presented much more ambiguously. Even the scale references included in the textual 
descriptions are not without ambiguity. While I think Hooke makes a genuine effort to 
record this data as accurately as he can (microscopical measurement was still highly 
imperfect), the dizzying mental effect of reading Hooke’s calculation that 1 inch of cork 
contains 1,259,712,000 cells is undeniable and I think there is a certain amount of what 
we would now call ‘blinding with science’ going on here. Hooke uses this large number 
to dazzle as well as to inform, his very next phrase, ‘a thing almost incredible, did not 
our Microscope assure us of it by ocular demonstration’ (p. 114), inspiring wonder and 
support for the instrument as much as the phenomenon. 
The effects of the ambiguity of scale are manifold. In some ways the potential 
for misreading the illustrations does strengthen the idea of a continuum between micro 
and macro, which supports the idea behind corpuscularian philosophy of a unified 
underlying structure. However, as we found with Hooke’s use of analogy, the effects 
are not as simple as interpreting the micro in terms of the macro. The ambiguity of 
Hooke’s illustrations position the reader to share the microscopist’s experience of 
confronting the unknown in the decontextualized image, before applying the salve of 
Hooke’s explanatory text. This decontextualization heightens our awareness of the 
relational nature of human knowledge. As Constantijn Huygens wrote in his 
autobiography on the subject of the dislocation of man as the measure of the universe 
brought about by new optical technologies such as the microscope and telescope, ‘Let 
                                                
65 Neri, p. 128. 
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us in short be aware that it is impossible to call anything ‘little’ or ‘large’ except by 
comparison.’66 
The use of ambiguity, particularly in the illustrations, allows an event to take 
place for the reader: a confrontation. Frédérique Aït-Touatì also notes the confusion of 
scales and the decontextualization in Hooke’s pictorial technique, and describes Scheme 
24 — the image of the head of a drone fly which both Aït-Touatì and Harwood observe 
to be the size of a human head — as a ‘frightening encounter’ which occurs ‘face to 
face’ (see Fig. 1.2).67 These encounters create moments of potential unity but also 
uncertainty between the two worlds, and foster an awareness of the roles of the relative 
and referential in building new knowledge. These effects of encounter all help the 
reader to get a sense of actually entering into the microscopic world. Bachelard, in 
considering the miniature, writes that ‘the process of imagination [...] poses a problem 
that must be distinguished from the general problem of geometrical similarities’ (i.e. 
that a geometrician sees the same thing in two similar figures drawn to different 
scales).68 In exploring this problem of imagining the miniature he considers the 
possibility that ‘in order to enter into the domain where we imagine, we are forced to 
cross the threshold of absurdity’, and describes a fairy tale in which, like the fly perched 
on its own wing (see Fig. 1.6), a hero gets into a coach the size of a bean whilst carrying 
a large bag of beans on his shoulder.69 Bachelard concludes that ‘one must go beyond 
logic in order to experience what is large in what is small’.70 I think the ambiguity of 
scale and absence of context in Hooke’s images allows the reader to access something 
of this nature, to go beyond logic and cross the threshold of ambiguity, for example in 
his or her face to face encounter with a human sized fly.  
                                                
66 J. P. Worp, ‘Fragment einer Autobiographie’, Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch 
Genootschap, 18 (1897), 1–122 (p. 120), quoted and translated in Alpers, p. 18. The Latin reads, ‘Tandem 
hoc sciatur, nihil usquam parvi aut magni extare nisi ex parallelo’. Huygens’s autobiography was started 
in 1629, he died in 1687. 
67 Frédérique Aït-Touatì, Fictions of the Cosmos: Science and Literature in the Seventeenth Century, 
trans. by Susan Emanuel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), pp. 146, 148; Harwood, p. 144. 
Although the smaller scale modern facsimile editions are incredibly useful, they do not preserve the 
spectacular visual impact of the original folio edition. The image of the fly’s head measures 28.7 x 25.9 
cm. 
68 Bachelard, p. 148. 
69 Bachelard, p. 149. 
70 Bachelard, p. 150. 
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We also find this idea of encounter, or of going into the micro world, in Hooke’s 
use of verbal microscopy. In Observation 38 on the wings of flies, as well as using a 
deductive analogy to come up with his hypothesis, he uses a rhetorical microscopy to 
add support to his hypothesis by helping the reader cross the threshold into the micro 
world: 
 
The wing being suppos’d placed in the upmost limit, seems to be put so 
that the plain of it lies almost horizontal, but onely the forepart does dip a 
little, or is somewhat more deprest; in this position is the wing vibrated or 
mov’d to the lower limit, being almost arrived at the lower limit, the 
hinder part of the wing moving somewhat faster then the former, the Area 
of the wing begins to dip behind, and in that posture seems it to be mov’d 
to the upper limit back again, and thence back again into the first posture, 
the former part of the Area dipping again, as it is moved downwards by 
means of the quicker motion of the main stem which terminates or edges 
the forepart of the wing. (pp. 172–73) 
 
There is a microscopic effect in the level of attention paid and in the minuteness of the 
description of a phenomenon that has been described as ‘exceeding swift’ (p. 173), 
which not only makes us imagine the movement as larger and thus visible, but which 
slows it down sufficiently for us to understand or mentally experience it by enacting a 
suitable re-proportioning of perception to create not just a visual encounter, but one of 
experience. This effect is heightened by Hooke pulling back to the macro scale in the 
next line, ‘And these vibrations or motions to and fro between the two limits seem so 
swift’. As well as reminding us that these motions are swift, the increased pace of the 
description enacts the wing beats much more succinctly in the reader’s mental image of 
the action. Hooke then goes on to give a numerical estimate of the number of beats per 
minute to give us a more concrete context for these different mental experiences.  
In his digression on perception and proportion in the final of his Lectures of 
Light (a series of lectures read to the Royal Society between February 1680 and May 
1682), Hooke contemplates the experience of man in relation to the experience of more 
minuscule creatures, figuring both in terms of granularity — an idea that he clearly 
developed from his work on microscopy. Hooke reasons that sensible moments are 
composites of infinite other discrete moments, comparing the quick movement of a coal 
of fire at night which appears to the senses as a glowing line, to the slow movement of 
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the same coal which reveals it to be a body being moved through space. Hooke argues 
that our perception is dependent not only on time but on our size, and compares human 
perception with the experience of smaller creatures: 
 
And I do not at all doubt but that the sensible Moments of Creatures are 
somewhat proportion’d to their Bulk, and that the less a Creature is, the 
shor[t]er are its sensible Moments; and that a Creature that is a hundred 
times less than a Man, may distinguish a hundred Moments in the time 
that a Man distinguishes one. [...] So that many of those Creatures that 
seem to be very short lived in respect of Man, may yet rationally enough 
be supposed to have lived, and been sensible of and distinguished as 
many Moments of time as a Man; because within that space of time it has 
lived, it has had as many distinct Moments of time, and has had as many 
distinct Differences of Moments, as a Man hath in the Age he lives.71  
 
That this digression is prompted by Hooke’s experiments with the microscope is in no 
doubt. In his next paragraph he writes:  
 
Now we are sensibly informed by the Microscope, that the least visible 
Space (which is that which appears under an Angle of half a Minute of a 
Degree) may be actually distinguished into a thousand sensible Spaces: 
And could we yet further improve Microscopes, ’tis possible we might 
distinguish even a thousand more Spaces in every one of those we can 
now see by the help of those Microscopes we have already. (Ibid.) 
 
The idea of infinite (or at least greater) visual granularity that the microscope offers — 
the blowing up of space — is integrated into Hooke’s notion of experience. And 
although in this essay Hooke does not try to disrupt the presumed continuity between 
the macro and micro worlds, he does create a sense of encounter, zooming in and indeed 
bringing the micro world alive, giving it its own inner consistency by considering the 
experience and the visual and aural perceptive faculties of those tiny creatures 
themselves. 
Another important aspect of the concept of scale as presented in Micrographia is 
its relationship to the idea of value. In the prefatory material Hooke highlights the 
metaphorical values of size in a show of false modesty. In his dedicatory epistle to the 
                                                
71 Posthumous Works, p. 134. 
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king, he contrasts the ‘small Present’ and ‘the meanness of the Author, and of the 
Subject’ with ‘the greatness of your Mercy and your Knowledge’ (sig. A1r). However, 
Hooke destabalizes this common rhetorical trope at the close of his dedication by 
suggesting a different assignment of value. He closes: 
 
Amidst all those greater designs [of the Royal Society], I here presume to 
bring in that which is more proportionable to the smallness of my 
abilities, and to offer some of the least of all visible things, to that Mighty 
King, that has establisht an Empire over the best of all Invisible things of 
this World, the Minds of Men. (sigs a1v–a2r)  
 
While it holds the outward forms of modesty, this statement also allows Hooke to 
elevate the value of his offering of ‘the least of all visible things’. Hooke takes 
advantage of the connection forged between the least of visible things and the invisible 
by the revelatory function of the microscope (and indeed Micrographia), to associate 
his microscopical offering with ‘the best of all Invisible things’ (emphasized by the use 
of parallel phrases), ‘the Minds of Men’. This associates microscopical observation with 
the whole project of knowledge and learning. In his preface, Hooke also makes an 
analogy between Micrographia and the widow’s mite, ‘I have at length cast in my mite, 
into the vast treasury of A Philosophical History’ (sig. g2v), using the pun on ‘mite’ 
(Observation 50 is on mites) to make a serious claim for the value of both his work and 
his microscopic subjects. As with the question of the sharpness of the needle, and his 
multifarious uses of macro-, micro-, and theoretical analogies, Hooke’s reapportioning 
of value creates a dialectic of subjective relativity and re-evaluation between the micro 
and macro worlds. 
 
 
The Constructed Presentation of Data 
 
In the preface to Micrographia, Hooke outlines a method for natural history and 
philosophy that places a high level of importance not only observation and experiment 
for producing knowledge, but also on the acts of recording and presenting data. The 
‘sincere hand’ is just as necessary as the ‘faithful eye’ (sig. a2v), and Hooke praises the 
inventors of ‘Printing, Etching, Graving’ (sig. b2r) in the same list as the inventor of 
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Microscopes, associating methods of transcribing and circulating information with 
instruments to aid observation, and placing equal weight on both. In Observation 1, 
discussed above, Hooke compares the process of learning how to make observations in 
natural history to the process of learning to write or draw: ‘We must first endevour to 
make letters, and draw single strokes true, before we venture to write whole Sentences, 
or to draw large Pictures’ (p. 1). Here, recording and transcribing are presented as 
analogous with observing and experimenting. The spatial concepts of proportion and 
organization are also recurring themes in Hooke’s epistemology. Hooke recommends 
the ‘ranging and registring its [natural history’s] Particulars into Philosophical Tables, 
as may make them most useful for the raising of Axioms and Theories’ (sig. b1v). This 
outsources the memory to a more reliable and more easily comparable repository, but 
also organizes the data spatially in a way that actively helps in producing knowledge 
(axioms and theories). In this section I consider Hooke’s principles of transcribing, 
organizing, and communicating data, and the contribution this makes to knowledge as 
shown by his illustrations, tables, and other mise en page effects. I also show how these 
principles of spatial organization are related to Hooke’s conception of the mental 
processes of acquiring and developing new knowledge with reference to his ideas about 
experience and memory.  
Hooke was particularly interested in the layout of records and suggests in the 
preface that it is the arranging of particulars in tables that make them useful to 
knowledge. Adrian Johns, who suggests the diverse systems of commonplacing still in 
vogue at the time as a possible inspiration, comments on the importance to Hooke of the 
visual layout of the book for registering experiments with the Royal Society. Johns 
writes, ‘Only if recorded in a correct manner, pictorially and typographically, could 
experimental matters of fact help in his project to “rectify the mind”.’72  
In the ‘General Scheme’, Hooke continues his discussion of the recording of 
natural history, repeating and expanding on the ideas expressed in the preface to 
Micrographia. He describes: 
 
a Method of collecting a Philosophical History, which shall be as the 
Repository of Materials, out of which a new and sound Body of 
Philosophy may be raised. This is to comprize a brief and plain Account 
                                                
72 Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 433, 433n.  
 62 
of a great Store of choice and significant Natural and Artificial 
Operations, Actions and Effects, ranged in a convenient Order, and 
interwoven here and there with some short Hints of Accidental Remarks 
or Theories, of corresponding or disagreeing received Opinions, of 
Doubts and Queries and the like, and indeed until this Repository be 
pretty well stored with choice and sound Materials, the Work of raising 
new Axiomes or Theories is not to be attempted, lest beginning without 
Materials, the whole Design be given over in the middle, for out of this 
are to be taken the Foundation Stones, on which the whole Structure 
should be raised, and those ought to be proportioned according to the rest 
of the Materials.73 
Much more than the recording of individual pieces of observational data and other 
information, there is a sense that the value of this data is in considering it as a whole. 
The data must be ‘ranged in a convenient Order’, and anything built on it, ‘proportioned 
according to the rest of the Materials’; these are relational tactics which allow natural 
philosophers to see patterns in the overall enterprise. As Wilding suggests, ‘The great 
advantage of external Memory over internal is that it can employ reason itself, rather 
than chronology, to order its contents.’74 
This emphasis on order and proportion is repeated throughout the essay, and is 
also linked to the use of the senses. In a discussion of assisting the faculties of sense, 
memory, and understanding (again a development of the preface to Micrographia), 
Hooke writes, ‘the Senses are helped by Instruments, Experiments, and comparative 
Collections, the Memory by writing and entering all things, ranged in the best and most 
Natural Order.’ Hooke continues that the reasons for this are ‘to make them material 
and sensible’, to prevent their being lost or forgotten, and to relieve the mind of the 
drudgery of recalling particulars to memory ‘or ranging them in Order, […], or in 
transposing, jumbling, ranging, methodizing, and the like’.75 By listing the making of 
data ‘material and sensible’ as a reason for this method, and including ‘comparative 
Collections’ as an aid to the senses, Hooke confirms that the senses are not just for 
gathering data but for processing and understanding it visually as well. It is important 
that data ‘are all presented at once to the View: Their Order, Congruity, Disagreement, 
                                                
73 Posthumous Works, p. 18. 
74 Wilding, p. 130. 
75  Posthumous Works, p. 34. 
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Similitude, &c. are all manifest to the Eye’.76 The list of processes of which Hooke 
seeks to relieve the mind by the physical ordering of data on the page also confirms that 
spatial arrangement is a part of understanding data, forming new knowledge, and 
finding the way of proceeding in further scientific enquiry.  
Hooke employs various techniques to achieve the visual ordering of information. 
Johns notes Hooke’s use of colour coding in different inks ‘to aid immediate 
perception’, and Mulligan comments on the formatting techniques used in Hooke’s 
diary to aid memory and categorization, such as columns for different subjects, 
underlining, capitalizing, bracketing, colour, and symbols.77 These techniques are 
perhaps echoed in the frequent use of italics to highlight key words in the printed text of 
Micrographia.78  
Hooke also gives instructions about the arranging or ordering of data. On pages 
22 to 26 of the ‘General Scheme’ are lists of various subject headings by which to group 
data. As well as listing, some of these distributions are also laid out with branching lists 
and brackets, spatially denoting the relations between classifications. Carl Selkin — 
writing of the cataloguing style of the poet Thomas Traherne, whose poems and 
thanksgiving often include bracketed lists — observes that Traherne’s catalogues act as 
‘spatial metaphors for simultaneity’. There is a ‘departure from horizontally linear to 
vertical movement, the actual “stacking” of language’, and the reader, as well as 
accepting that each element in the catalogue can fill the same grammatical slot in a 
sentence, seems to be led to ‘accept them as filling that slot at the same time’.79 This 
effect is present in the layout of Hooke’s data and contributes to the sense that, although 
language is linear, this data is presented ‘at one view’ and somehow exists outside of 
the temporal experience of reading in an experience that is much more spatial. Hooke 
also discusses brevity of language and effective use of space on the page so that data is 
not only clear and unbiased, but is comprised ‘in as little room as possible, so as to 
                                                
76  Ibid. 
77 Johns, p. 433; Lotte Mulligan, ‘Self-Scrutiny and the Study of Nature: Robert Hooke’s Diary as Natural 
History’, Journal of British Studies, 35 (1996), 311–42 (pp. 321, 323–24). 
78 The preface is printed with the fonts reversed; italic used for the main text and a plain font used for 
emphasis. In quoting from Micrographia I have normalized the fonts so that italic is used for emphasis 
throughout. 
79 Carl M. Selkin, ‘The Language of Vision: Traherne’s Cataloguing Style’, English Literary 
Renaissance, 6 (1976), 92-104 (pp. 96–97). 
 64 
appear and come under View all at once that the Eye may the more quickly pass over it 
from one Particular to another’.80 He further explains that the contracting of natural 
history into ‘as little Space as is possible’, ‘is of huge Use in the Prosecution of 
Ratiocination and Inquiry, and is a vast help to the Understanding and Memory, as in 
Geometrical Algebra, the expressing of many and very perplex Quantities by a few 
obvious and plain Symbols’.81 Hooke’s method of bringing together data and ordering it 
appropriately serves to render it in a visually simultaneous form, thematically grouped 
and abbreviated, the perusal of which will reveal patterns and suggest axioms and 
theories. While no account of Hooke’s mysterious ‘Philosophical Algebra, or an Art in 
directing the Mind in the search after Philosophical Truths’, is found in the essay, this 
method of aggregating, reducing to symbols, and ordering data seems very suggestive 
of his intentions to provide a method for Philosophical Algebra, ‘which explains the 
way of making use of the Penus Analytica, of raising Axiomes, and more general 
Deductions from a sufficient Stock of Materials collected according to the Method of 
this first part, with Integrity, Judgment, and Care.’82 
Lorraine Daston’s recent work on early modern weather watching explores these 
ideas as they appear in practice in weather tables. Her thesis is that: 
 
Positioned midway between text and image, the table was a device of 
synopsis, of “seeing together”, which, it was hoped, would reveal subtle 
correlations between all manner of variables: the fluctuations of the 
barometer; the phases of the moon; the outbreaks of diseases; the advent 
of storms.83 
 
Daston considers the recording practices of early Royal Society and Académie Royale 
des Sciences members who were engaged in weather watching. Hooke was a driving 
force of this effort and provided instructions both for conducting observations and for 
the recording of data in tables, his own exemplary table, which fit on one page, entitled, 
                                                
80 Posthumous Works, p. 63. 
81 Lotte Mulligan, ‘Robert Hooke and Certain Knowledge’, p. 156; Posthumous Works, p. 64. Note the 
contradictory values in the metaphors ‘huge’ and ‘vast’ in describing the use of this ‘little’ space. As in 
the prefatory material to Micrographia, Hooke reassigns the comparative values of size. 
82 Posthumous Works, pp. 6, 61. 
83 Lorraine Daston, ‘Super-Vision’. This quotation is taken from the abstract; other references in this 
paragraph are to Daston’s talk. 
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‘A Scheme At one View representing to the Eye the Observations of the Weather for a 
Month’ (see Fig. 1.8).84 Hooke’s idea appears in Sprat’s History: 
 
Now that these [particulars] [...] may be registred so as to be most 
convenient for the making of comparisons, requisite for the raising 
Axioms, whereby the Cause or Laws of Weather may be found out; It will 
be desirable to order them so, that the Scheme of a whole Moneth, may at 
one view be presented to the Eye.85 
The use of such tables enabled practitioners to test correspondences and to gather 
together information from across space and time. Daston connects the use of tables to 
the urge of early modern science to make the invisible visible (by means of the 
microscope amongst other methods). Particularly focussing on the idea of presenting 
data ‘at one view’, she describes the table as a method of discovery, a technique of 
visualization aimed at assisting the mind’s eye. The primary function of the table is to 
help the practitioner to see. Similarly, Mulligan writes that she believes it likely that 
Hooke ‘envisaged his “Philosophic Algebra” literally as an “instrument” of 
discovery’.86 
 
                                                
84 Hooke presented two papers on making a history of the weather (the first undated, the second from 
October 1663), see London, The Royal Society, Classified Papers, 20/2 and 20/24. A version of this 
content appears in Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal-Society of London, for the Improving of 
Natural Knowledge, (London: J. Martyn and J. Allestry, 1667), pp. 173–79. 
85 Sprat, p. 175. 
86 Mulligan, ‘Robert Hooke and Certain Knowledge’, p. 163. 
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Fig. 1.8. Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal-Society of London (London, 1667), p. 179 (cropped).  
Photo: © The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.  
Image published with permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission. 
 
 
In Micrographia there are no tables, but there are mise en page effects and 
illustrations, which can be understood in terms of visual arrangement being used as a 
tool or method for understanding data and developing knowledge. In particular I wish to 
consider the illustrations from the point of view of collating and organizing data ‘at one 
view’.  
The first question that needs to be asked is what are the illustrations doing? 
What is their status and purpose? In his essay on early modern illustrations of natural 
philosophy, Willem Hackmann describes five categories of image: 1) allegorical title-
pages and frontispieces; 2) ‘illustrations of the actual experimental configurations 
described in the text which produced the phenomena in question’; 3) ‘actual observed 
phenomena produced by the instruments’; 4) diagrams of the supposed underlying 
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structure of phenomena; and 5) graphs.87 Bizarrely, the single image from Micrographia 
considered in Hackmann’s paper — the head of the drone fly in Scheme 24 (see Fig. 
1.2) — is categorized as being a type 2 illustration, despite there being no depiction of 
the experiment, the apparatus, or the conditions of the observation (it is not even 
obvious that we are looking at an illustration of a severed head rather than the face of an 
intact insect unless we read the corresponding text of page 175 which tells us this is so). 
Hackmann refers back to the image when discussing type 3 illustrations: ‘As was the 
case with Hooke’s microscope observations, the phenomena made visible by the 
instruments had to be interpreted and made accessible to a larger audience’.88 However, 
he does not consider the image to fall into the third category of observed phenomena, 
which would be its more obvious assignment. This suggests some confusion regarding 
the status of Hooke’s illustrations. Hackmann does not explain his categorization 
explicitly but he quotes the passage from signature f2v of the preface, which describes 
the process of making the illustrations, and observes that ‘The artist remained of 
necessity closely involved in this process’, and that ‘The techniques of the artist were 
used to make the image representational’.89 There seems to be a closeness between the 
acts of observation and representation which blurs the line between them in 
Hackmann’s interpretation; representation or recording is co-opted as a part of the 
experiment itself. This confusion is perhaps compounded by elements of visual rhetoric 
in Micrographia that seek to reproduce the experience of microscopical use and 
encounter for the reader, such as the use of the largest type faces for the phrases 
‘MICROGRAPHIA’ and ‘MINUTE BODIES’ on the title-page, the fold-out plates of 
hyperbolically enlarged specimens, and the round frames used for some of the images.  
Hackmann’s unusual categorization would be unremarkable as more than a quirk 
of modern criticism if it were not for its coincidence with the status Hooke’s 
microscopical illustrations seemed to have amongst his contemporary Royal Society 
members. As Curator of Experiments, Hooke was expected to set up experiments to be 
performed in front of the other members at the Society’s weekly meetings. And yet, 
when he was ordered to undertake the project of producing a collection of microscopical 
observations, and ‘to bring in at every meeting one Microscopical observation at least’, 
                                                
87 Willem D. Hackmann, ‘Natural Philosophy Textbook Illustrations 1600–1800’, in Non-Verbal 
Communication in Science, ed. by Mazzolini, pp. 169–233 (pp. 171–72). 
88 Hackmann, p. 186. 
89 Hackmann, pp. 182, 183. 
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he never (and never seems to have been asked to) set up a sample under a microscope 
for members to view, but rather brought with him his drawings.90 The checks of 
communal witnessing and discussion were not performed by members viewing the 
microscopical slides themselves, but by their communal viewing of Hooke’s 
illustrations alone. On the rare occasions where the Society’s approval was withheld, 
this seems to have been based on internal evidence of the drawings themselves rather 
than comparison with a microscopical sample. Neri describes a picture of a six-eyed 
spider that was rejected as it ‘was not yet perfectly drawn’.91 In this way, the images 
take on some of the status of the experiment or act of observation (Hackmann’s type 2) 
in themselves, at the same time as being a record of data, of observed phenomena 
produced by the instrument (Hackmann’s type 3). This echoes Hooke’s incorporation of 
recording and reviewing data into the method of developing knowledge as outlined in 
the preface to Micrographia and the essay on the ‘General Scheme’, as well as his 
analogy between learning to write and draw and learning to observe nature in 
Observation 1. This is perhaps not just a pretty metaphor. In the preface, Hooke 
describes the difficulties in determining the truth of what is seen through the 
microscope: ‘For it is exceeding difficult in some Objects, to distinguish between a 
prominency and a depression, between a shadow and a black stain, or a reflection and a 
whiteness in the colour’ (sig. f2v). This is reminiscent of Galileo’s great discovery of the 
uneven surface of the moon in 1610. Galileo was able to interpret the spotted 
appearance of the moon as the shadows caused by protrusions on an irregular surface in 
part because of his experience as a draftsman and drawing teacher.92 Perhaps the act of 
drawing the microscopical image itself played a part in understanding what was being 
observed, and conversely if a microscopical sample wasn’t properly seen and 
understood it could not be adequately drawn. 
Thinking about the status of Hooke’s illustrations as being a part of experiment 
or observation and having a role in knowledge production (as opposed to just 
dissemination), suggests that Hooke’s methodological principles of ordering data and 
presenting it ‘at one view’ may also apply to his microscopical illustrations. To think 
                                                
90 Thomas Birch, The History of the Royal Society of London for Improving of Natural Knowledge […], 4 
vols (London, 1756–57), I, 215. 
91 Birch, I, 231, quoted in Neri, p. 109.  
92 Samuel Y. Edgerton, The Mirror, the Window, and the Telescope: How Renaissance Linear 
Perspective Changed our Vision of the Universe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), pp. 9–10. 
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about the images in this way, one must acknowledge that the notion of Hooke as the 
amanuensis of the microscope is an illusion. There is an astounding difference between 
the clearly defined illustrations of Micrographia and Brian Ford’s modern photographic 
reproductions of the unclear, distorted, partial views of insects through the sorts of 
microscopes used by Hooke and his contemporaries.93 Although Hooke presents 
himself as ‘peeping in at windows’, this is an idealized vision of the gathering of 
knowledge and does not accurately describe his practice.  
Neri’s work in particular reveals the layers of interpretation and conscious 
presentation in Hooke’s images. She notes discrepancies between Hooke’s notes and his 
published work, which suggest the reframing of experience for rhetorical ends. She 
writes of the disjunction between the textual description of dissections and 
dismemberments in Hooke’s observations, and the illustrations of perfectly intact 
specimens. Neri describes how Hooke, in order to ennoble the blue fly specimen of 
Scheme 26 (see Fig. 1.6), ‘carefully conceal[s] the destruction of its body that was 
necessary to observe it’, and, describing the illustration of the louse in Scheme 35 (see 
Fig. 1.1), writes: ‘In the engraving, Hooke uses the transparent membrane of the insect’s 
body as a window to its internal structures, thereby uniting in a single image 
information gained through dissection with observations of the creature’s external 
appearance.’94 Neri uses her shrewd observations to further an argument about the 
othering of insects as specimens and the role this commodification of nature played in 
the constructing of the esteemed persona of the scientist as gatekeeper. I think her 
observations about the constructedness of Hooke’s illustrations can also be used to 
support a reading of those images being a part of Hooke’s method of developing 
knowledge by presenting aggregated data ‘at one view’. 
In creating the images for Micrographia, Hooke employed engravers whom, he 
assures the reader, ‘have pretty well follow’d my directions and draughts’ (sig. f2v). 
Hooke describes his drafting practice thus: 
 
In making of them, I indeavoured (as far as I was able) first to discover 
the true appearance, and next to make a plain representation of it. This I 
mention the rather, because of these kind of Objects there is much more 
difficulty to discover the true shape, then of those visible to the naked 
                                                
93 Ford, Images of Science, pp. 182, 183.  
94 Neri, pp. 120, 136. 
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eye, the same Object seeming quite differing, in one position to the Light, 
from what it really is, and may be discover’d in another. And therefore I 
never began to make any draught before by many examinations in several 
lights, and in several positions to those lights, I had discover’d the true 
form. (Ibid.) 
  
Hooke’s conception of a ‘plain representation’, i.e. what he conveys in the illustration, 
is not actually the same as his view through the microscope. Hooke acknowledges the 
difficulty of discerning the ‘true appearance’ of a microscopic subject and so resolves to 
discover its ‘true form’ by comparing different views under different lighting conditions 
and creating a composite of this information. As noted above, Neri demonstrates that 
these multiple views can include observations of both whole and dissected creatures, 
and as Aït-Touatì points out, observations of both live and dead specimens.95  
In his illustrations, Hooke does not just include data from his own multiple 
observations, but even includes information from other sources — although he does not 
always admit to such practice. Ford shows that Hooke’s illustrations of snowflakes in 
Scheme 8 (and indeed Hooke’s original drawing which, unlike most of the others, has 
survived amongst his papers at the Royal Society) were not all based on observations 
from nature, but that five of the snowflakes depicted in Figure 2 were plagiarized from 
Thomas Bartholin’s De Nivis usu Medico Observationes Variae (1661).96 Ford’s 
confidence in his assertion of plagiarism comes from the fact that at least one of the 
images from De Nivus echoed in Micrographia was the product of Bartholin’s 
imagination, being too fanciful to have been observed from nature. As with his practice 
of dissection, Hooke disguises his aggregation of information from various sources, 
claiming on page 91 that the snowflakes of Scheme 8, Figure 2 are drawn from 
observation without any mention of Bartholin’s book. Harwood notes that in Scheme 
27, Figure 3, Hooke reproduces Gulielmus Piso’s illustration of an aquatic beehive.97 In 
this instance Hooke cites and discusses his source, which perhaps explains why 
Harwood mistakenly believes this to be the only reproduction of an object Hooke hadn’t 
seen himself. Neri notes similar external influences on the development of Hooke’s 
                                                
95 Aït-Touatì, p. 151. 
96 Ford, Images of Science, pp. 170–72. 
97 Harwood, pp. 142, 142n. The source is Gulielmus Piso/Willem Pies, Indiae Utriusque Re naturali et 
Medici (Amsterdam, 1658), p. 113. 
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illustration of the crablike insect in Scheme 33. In Hooke’s sketch of this creature in the 
Covel notebook, the insect has only six legs, but although the accompanying text in 
Micrographia asserts that Hooke had only ever seen the one example ‘and so could not 
make so many examinations of it as otherwise I would’ (p. 208), the insect in the 
published illustration is depicted with eight legs. Neri suggests that Hooke may have 
included the extra legs, and supplied additional surface detail not recorded in the sketch, 
based on his knowledge of other insects, such as spiders. She also suggests Piso as a 
possible source, citing an illustration of an eight-legged crab that has a very similar 
positioning of the claws in his Historia Naturalis Brasiliae (1648).98 In the text of 
Micrographia Hooke occasionally includes reference to the experiments, publications, 
and theories of other practitioners. While his sources are not always explicitly 
acknowledged, it is clear that this practice of aggregating information from the wider 
scientific community to present it in a composite form occurs in the construction of his 
illustrations as well.  
As well as gathering together data ‘at one view’ there are also ways in which 
Hooke’s illustrations follow his principles of ordering or organizing data: Hooke’s 
illustrations employ grouping strategies. Harwood has produced a wonderful table 
giving an approximate chronology of fifty-one of Hooke’s observations, showing either 
a recorded date of observation or the date of presentation to the Royal Society.99 
Harwood uses his table to draw conclusions about the social influences on the evolution 
of the project, but it also allows him make comments on the organization of the volume. 
Harwood notes that the order of the observations throughout the book does not follow 
the chronological order in which the observations occurred, however he also claims that 
‘similar topics were not always grouped together, unrelated topics (particularly in the 
earlier schemata) appeared on the same plate’.100 Harwood does not offer any 
satisfactory explanations for his observations of ‘apparent randomness’, suggesting 
without substantiation that the organization of the volume represents an ‘early, data-
                                                
98 Neri, p. 130–31. Cf. p. 132 (Fig. 4.12) for a reproduction of the image from Gulielmus Piso, Historia 
Naturalis Brasiliae (Amsterdam, 1648), p. 185.  
99 Harwood, Table 1, pp. 124–25, cf. p. 123 for an explanation of the table. 
100 Harwood, p. 137. Harwood also complains that prints were often widely separated from their 
commentary, but this is irrelevant as the placement of the engraved plates varies in existing copies, most 
likely at the caprice of the binder or customer. 
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gathering stage’ and was partially determined by the time of year.101 He focuses instead 
on Hooke’s use of verbal rhetoric to encourage coherence.102 However, if one 
rearranges the data from Harwood’s table so it is ordered by schema number rather than 
date, obvious thematic grouping predominates (as it does for the observations which are 
not datable and thus do not appear on the table). In fact, Harwood’s remark about the 
disruption of chronology actually lends credence to the idea of non-random 
organization, as it appears observations on related subjects were grouped into one 
schema even when they occurred months or years apart. For example, the sensible plant 
and cork, which are both described in Observation 18 and appear in Schema 11, were 
observed in August 1661 and April 1663 respectively, and two illustrations of petrified 
wood appear in Schema 10, observed in May 1663 and August 1664.103 Like the 
gathering of textual or numerical data under specific subject heads, Hooke presented 
related figures together in one plate or scheme. The grouping across time suggests that 
the organization of Micrographia was not an ‘early, data-gathering stage’, but rather a 
product of a later stage of sifting and organizing according to such heads.  
This grouping did not just occur in a top-down fashion according to pre-existing 
notions of what should constitute a set. The blue mould of Observation 20 (see Fig. 1.9) 
is illustrated in Schema 12 alongside the parasites of rose leaves of Observation 19, 
depicted in the same plate or scheme (see Fig. 1.10). Mould and leaf parasites might not 
seem like an obvious grouping, but their illustrations bear a striking visual similarity. 
As with the use of analogy based on visual comparisons internal to the micro world 
considered in the previous section, Hooke lets the new data speak to each other and 
form relations on their own terms instead of forcing assimilation to preconceived ideas 
from the macro world. This is another way in which visuality is a part of the production 
of knowledge and not just a conduit for information that is then to be processed 
separately from the senses. 
                                                
101 Ibid. 
102 Harwood, p. 138. 
103 As well as multiple observations resulting in multiple illustrations as with the samples of petrified 
wood, there are also examples where multiple observations contribute to a single image, as in the two 
observations of male gnats on the 6 and 27 May 1663, represented in an illustration of a solo insect in 
Schema 28 which substantiates the point above about composite images.  
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Fig. 1.9. Robert Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), Scheme 12 (cropped). Photo: RS.5095  
© The Royal Society. 
 
 
Fig. 1.10. Robert Hooke, Micrographia (London, 1665), Scheme 12 (cropped). Photo: RS 5098 
© The Royal Society. 
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Another sort of grouping is also evident in the technique of labelling parts of the 
images. As well as allowing for a correspondence between image and text, Hooke also 
groups parts of the image by using the same letter to show correspondence between like 
parts of the specimen, such as is seen in the illustration of blue mould (see Fig. 1.9) in 
which there are six A types, four D types, and one each of types B, C, and E. As Aït-
Touatì notes, this technique is even used to demonstrate kinetic logic by signifying the 
coordination of two elements performing a single movement.104 This last in particular 
demonstrates how the technique of grouping or ordering contributes to the 
understanding of how things work. The use of letters again suggests the metaphor of 
observation as an act of reading.  
In the ‘General Scheme’ essay, Hooke describes the reasons for including 
pictures and also issues some warnings about their use: 
 
Now because oftentimes much more may be expressed in a small 
Picture of the thing, than can be done by a Description of the same 
thing in as many words as will fill a Sheet; it will be often necessary to 
add the Pictures of those Observables that will not otherwise be so 
fully and sensibly exprest by Verbal Description: But in the doing of 
this, as a great Art and Circumspection is to be used in the 
Delineation, so ought there to be very much Judgment and Caution in 
the use of it. For the Pictures of things which only serve for Ornament 
or Pleasure, or the Explication of such things as can be better describ’d 
by words is rather noxious than useful, and serves to divert and disturb 
the Mind, and sways it with a kind of Partiality or Respect: Besides 
that, it fills up room, and occupies the Mind with the Ideas of things 
which are little significant in the present Inquiry.105 
 
When he considers pictures, Hooke is governed by the same priorities as in the rest of 
his method for recording information and forming knowledge. He suggests the use of 
pictures when it will furnish better or more information than a description, particularly 
where doing so pictorially will take up less room. The importance of observations being 
‘sensibly exprest’ echoes the idea of presenting information to the eye, or indeed 
‘materially and sensibly’. Hooke’s illustrative practices, his inclusion of a high level of 
                                                
104 Aït-Touatì, p. 156. 
105 Posthumous Works, p. 64. 
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detail, the aggregation of information from multiple views, the thematic grouping, all 
suggest that he was following his method, his scientific tool, of recording data ‘at one 
view’. This approach both follows and embodies Hooke’s epistemological method of 
collation and comparison of carefully gathered data in order to produce a best guess. 
 
These principles of spatial ordering are not just something that happens on the page 
though. This practice is, for Hooke, not only integrated into his epistemology, but into 
his theory of mind. In 1682, Hooke gave a lecture to the Royal Society offering a 
hypothetical and mechanical explanation of memory, which he conceives as a material 
organ. As Douwe Draaisma notes, Hooke is the first to quantify and spatialize memory 
processes (memory having previously been conceived of as non- or quasi-spatial).106 
Hooke uses the metaphor of a ‘Repository’ to describe memory, thus linking it to ideas 
of physical storage space — in particular to the Royal Society’s own ‘Repository’ or 
collection of objects — and to other less concrete uses of the word repository in 
Hooke’s ouvre to mean the gathering together of data in the natural philosophical 
enterprise.107 Hooke also uses the image of the memory as a chain of links and the idea 
of the mind as a microcosm of the universe. Draaisma shows how these models allow 
Hooke to quantify the memory and to give the individual ideas within that storehouse a 
specific location, thus bringing time and memory under ‘the Consideration of Geometry 
and Mensuration’.108 Wilding observes that Hooke at no point employs writing (in its 
usual sense) as a model for memory.109 Memory is a collection of things — as we 
learned of Hooke’s theory of perception, an assemblage of moments — and functions 
entirely by order, by spatial arrangement, which (as we have seen) is a core tool for the 
production of knowledge in Hooke’s epistemology. As Draaisma writes, ‘Hooke 
ordered mental processes by acting as if they were spatial. Metaphors were the tools he 
used to create space in a memory that otherwise would have remained closed to the 
imagination.’110 
 
                                                
106 Douwe Draaisma, ‘Hooke on Memory and the Memory of Hooke’, in Robert Hooke: Tercentennial 
Studies, ed. by Cooper and Hunter, pp. 111–21 (pp. 111, 115).  
107 Posthumous Works, p. 138. 
108 Draaisma, p. 115; Posthumous Works, p. 141. 
109 Wilding, p. 126. 
110 Draaisma, p. 120. 
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Conclusion 
 
Hooke was engaged in a programme of natural philosophical investigation with the 
intention of ‘rectifying the operations of the Sense, the Memory, and Reason’. He 
looked to instruments to aid him in this. This included not only instruments such as 
lenses to widen the scope of the senses, but also graphic technologies and data gathering 
standards and methodologies to externalize and reliably collectivize memory as data, 
and to order it in such a way that from it knowledge could be produced. Hooke’s 
epistemological principle of incremental knowledge — which acknowledged 
uncertainty and admitted hypotheses on a contingent basis — allowed knowledge to 
grow more rapidly, but without weakening its certainty, and also allowed for a more 
genuine exploration of the new worlds his microscope discovered, on their own terms.  
The centrality of space and spatiality to his quest is without doubt. Hooke’s 
methods are empirical and rooted in observation, particularly visual observation. 
However these views are not innately comprehensible in the sense of being able to just 
see and know. The microscopist is not an amanuensis for his scope, but must read 
nature in the sense of interpreting it with experience and judgement. As such the 
spatiality of Hooke’s epistemology becomes more than the simple translation of 
visuality at different levels of magnification, it becomes relational and schematic, 
making patterns, those connections of reason, across time and space. By considering the 
spatiality of Hooke’s natural philosophy at this meta level and in this more structural 
way, we can understand better the ways in which he creates relations between — and 
indeed within — the macro and micro worlds. Hooke uses existing knowledge to 
approach and understand the unknown by means of various analogies, but also resists 
an assimilative approach by reflecting new knowledge back onto the old to disrupt 
existing assumptions, by looking for internal patterns within the unknown, and by 
allowing uncertainties to remain. He creates a dialectic of relativity between the worlds 
that relies on connection and pattern. Finally, in the way in which Hooke presents his 
data on the page — in tables, lists, themed groups, and composite illustrations — he 
uses spatial ordering to gather data together, across time and space, and at one view, to 
aid the natural philosopher in seeing patterns and reading axioms from it, and thus 
producing knowledge.  
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Robert Boyle and Air 
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Fig. 2.1. Robert Boyle, New Experiments Physico-Mechanicall, Touching the Spring of the Air 
and its Effects (London, 1660), plate 1. Photo: RS.9913 © The Royal Society. 
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Introduction 
 
On turning to the works of Boyle after considering Hooke’s Micrographia, one cannot 
help but be aware of the comparative lack of visual impact Boyle’s oeuvre offers. In the 
fourteen volumes that make up Michael Hunter and Edward Davis’s edition of The 
Works of Robert Boyle, just twenty-eight plates and in-text illustrations are to be found 
amongst the entire corpus of Boyle’s publications.1 And yet the themes of visuality and 
spatiality in Boyle’s work on air, while more subtle, are of no less interest in 
understanding his methods and epistemology. In Hooke’s work we saw the 
reconceptualizing of the everyday experience of macro space to include a subvisible 
micro world newly discovered by lenses — a new space at a different scale within the 
old space. In Boyle’s work on the particulate air we find a similar zooming in to 
concentrate on space at a more minute scale, however this zooming is not optical, but 
mental; Boyle does not accommodate a newly visible world, but rather an invisible and 
indeed hypothetical one — an idea of space.  
In Micrographia, all but one scheme (see Fig. 1.3 detailing the microscope) 
offered the reader face-to-face encounters with the scientific object itself. Across 
Boyle’s ouvre, by contrast, almost all of the illustrations are of, or at least feature, the 
instruments used in his experiments, such as the air pump and other related apparatus 
illustrated in New Experiments Physico-Mechanicall, Touching the Spring of the Air 
and its Effects (1660)2 (see Fig. 2.1). The exceptions are an illustration of the 
‘Monstrous Head’ of a deformed colt accompanying an observational description in 
Philosophical Transactions (3 July 1665); two marginal diagrams showing barometric 
readings in The General History of the Air, Designed and Begun by the Honourable 
Robert Boyle Esq. (1692);3 and two figures (in a plate with four others depicting 
apparatus) in A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air and 
An Examen of Mr T. Hobbes his Dialogus Physicus De Natura Aeris (1662)4 illustrating 
atomic and mathematical concepts, but referring to a part of the text written by Hooke 
                                                
1 The Works of Robert Boyle, ed. by Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis, 14 vols (London: Pickering & 
Chatto, 1999–2000). Further references are to this edition and are given by volume and page number 
parenthetically in the text.  
2 Hereafter Spring of the Air.  
3 Hereafter General History of Air. 
4 Published as a pair and sharing a plate. Hereafter Defence and Examen. 
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(see Fig. 2.6).5 Of the instrumental illustrations, only a third (seven plates from A 
Continuation of New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Touching the Spring and 
Weight of the Air, and their Effects. The First Part. (1669)6) depict actual experimental 
set ups rather than generic apparatus. As is suggested by this illustrative interest, and as 
I explore in the rest of this chapter, in Boyle’s work, it is not magnification, but rather 
the demarcation of experimental spaces, both physically and mentally, which allows 
access to and the study of a new world that yet remains invisible.  
In Hooke’s work we also saw that the visual and spatial presentation of natural 
philosophical data played an important role in the development of knowledge: from the 
detailed composite illustration of new phenomena, to the gathering ‘at one view’ of 
other types of data in tables or under headings to understand systemic relationships. 
These impulses to visualize and aggregate are also to be found in Boyle’s method, but 
in quite different ways. Boyle’s visual instincts lean more towards creating mental 
imagery rather than pictorial illustrations of the phenomena under examination. This 
allows for more malleable images capable of both capturing the motions required for 
understanding the subvisible mechanical world, and of accommodating Boyle’s 
insistence on the hypothetical nature of his imagery. Similarly, while he also aggregates 
information with a view to understanding nature as a whole and makes some attempts at 
ordering such information — including use of tables for numerical data (including 
weather data) in his published works and attempts at common placing in his notes — 
there is also a degree of chaos to Boyle’s work and presentation that seems to reflect a 
resistance to the imposition of an artificial order or system. As I explore in this chapter, 
Boyle’s primary use of spatiality is about creating spaces in which to experiment, 
observe, and think. In this introductory section, I briefly outline some of Boyle’s key 
views on the capacities, remit, and purpose of human knowledge and natural philosophy 
before considering some of the epistemological questions raised by the study of air and 
the roles of visuality and spatiality in Boyle’s response to this quandary. As in the 
previous chapter, this prepares the ground for a consideration of Boyle’s conception of 
the legibility of nature, how he depicts the relationship between the visible and invisible 
worlds, and his methods of verbally and visually presenting his findings.  
 
                                                
5 The illustrations are reproduced in Works, V, 498; XII, 89; XII, 91; III, 16.  
6 Hereafter Spring, 1st Continuation. 
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In A Discourse of Things above Reason. Inquiring Whether a Philosopher Should Admit 
There Are Any Such (1681),7 Boyle authors a debate between four characters as to ‘how 
far, we may employ our reasonings about things that are above our Reason’ (IX, 365). 
The dialogue has a particular focus on the mysteries of the Christian religion but often 
uses images and ideas from natural philosophy and mathematics, and reveals much of 
Boyle’s thought on the capacities of human knowledge in general. Sophronius, Boyle’s 
mouthpiece, advocates that human reason is limited, but that it can comprehend its 
limits. Boyle defines three categories of things that are above reason: the 
‘Unconceivable’ where the mind is too limited to have a ‘clear and full comprehension 
of them’; the ‘Inexplicable’, for things ‘which we cannot perceive to depend upon [i.e. 
be caused by] the Idœas we are furnished with’; and the ‘Unsociable’, for things which 
seem to result in incongruities or inconsistencies with our existing knowledge (IX, 388). 
He illustrates the limitedness of human reason by demonstrating its lack of capacity to 
comprehend mathematical or physical truths, such as the infinite divisibility of a line 
(IX, 378). As Jan Wojcik subtly observes, Boyle does not in this text commit himself to 
the exact nature of the limitedness of human reason, but he most often appeals to the 
difference between God’s infinite and man’s finite reason to support his argument.8  
There is a spatiality to the difference between the reason of God and that of man, 
which (as we saw in Hooke’s depiction of the defects in fallen human understanding) is 
framed by Timotheus in the language of proportion: 
 
the means or measures which are furnished us to employ in the 
searching or judging of Truth, are but such as are proportionable to 
Gods designs in creating us, and therefore may probably be supposed 
not to be capable of reaching to all kinds, or if you please of Truths, 
many of which may be unnecessary for us to know here, and some 
may be reserved, partly to make us sensible of the imperfections of 
our Natures, and partly to make us aspire to that condition, wherein 
our faculties shall be much enlarged and heightned. (IX, 371) 
 
                                                
7 Hereafter Things above Reason. 
8 Jan W. Wojcik, ‘The Theological Context of Boyle’s Things above Reason’, in Robert Boyle 
Reconsidered, ed. by Michael Hunter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 139–55 (p. 
141). For a full analysis of this complex work, see also Jan W. Wojcik, Robert Boyle and the Limits of 
Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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The language used to express the comparison between divine and human reason 
(measures, proportionable) is the language of geometry and invokes a metaphor of 
visual proportion (enlarged, heightned) to illustrate the comparison. This metaphor also 
opens up possibilities beyond a strict binary of human and divine, spatiality allowing 
the idea of a continuum along which we can progress. Although enlarged and heightned 
are in the passive voice suggesting the expansion of the faculties is at the hand of God, 
aspire is active and captures a sense of human endeavor as part of the process.  
It is also interesting to note that although our faculties are proportional to God’s 
design for us, and thus limited — perhaps not even capable of reaching to Truths — we 
are still furnished ‘for the searching and judging of Truth’. This quotation expresses 
some of the purpose of limited human knowledge: to make us aware of what we do not 
know and to make us aspire beyond that, which fits both with a rhetoric of wonder and 
worship of God, and with a language of measurability and active natural philosophical 
enquiry. It suggests both humility and possibility at the same time, and like the 
conceptual difficulty of the infinite divisibility of a line, expresses the sense of wonder 
at the unknown within a framework that offers some related structure for approaching it.  
This sense of aspiration and the worth of contingent knowledge is also found in 
Boyle’s approach to practical matters of experiment. For example in Experiment 6 of 
Spring of the Air, Boyle writes: 
 
And though we were not provided of Instruments fit to measure the 
dilatation of the Air any thing accurately, yet because an imperfect 
measure of it was more desireable then none at all, we devis’d the 
following Method as very easily practicable. (I, 176) 
 
An imperfect measure is still of value, and in this way knowledge is treated as 
cumulative and progressive. In Spring of the Air Boyle quotes Horace: ‘Est quoddam 
prodire tenus, si non datur ultra’ (‘It is worthwhile to go so far, even if we cannot go 
further’) (I, 243).9 Like the Horatian couplet on the title page of Micrographia, this tag, 
again cast in terms of spatial metaphor, emphasizes the relative value of even limited 
knowledge. 
In Things above Reason, when Sophronius explains how reason works he also 
uses a language of measurement: 
                                                
9 Hunter and Davis’s translation. 
 83 
 
Reason operates according to certain Notions or Ideas, and certain 
Axiomes and Propositions, by which, as by Prototypes or Models, 
and Rules and Measures, it conceives things, and makes estimates and 
judgments of them. (IX, 375) 
 
Reason works empirically, by measurement, by cataloguing, by judging the new 
experience against existing knowledge, which although potentially requiring of 
certainty (the use of certain is here ambiguous) does include ‘Notions’, ‘Ideas’, and 
‘Propositions’, as well as ‘Axiomes’. There is also a sense in which this is spatial. Boyle 
defines philosophical reason in the Appendix to The Christian Virtuoso,10 ‘not as a 
faculty [...] but as she manages a frame or system of ideas and propositions’, the image 
of a frame or system suggesting a map of relations (determined by reason) between 
objects (XII, 422). However, in Things above Reason Boyle’s protagonist also considers 
that such rules and notions may be ‘useless or deceitful to us’ if we ‘stretch them 
beyond their measure, and apply them to the infinite God, or to things that involve an 
Infiniteness either in multitude, magnitude, or littleness’ (IX, 375). So although there is 
both a horizontal sense of spatial structure to knowledge and reason, and a vertical one 
with increasing levels of knowledge and a value placed on upward progression and 
aspiration, there is also a sense in which proportionality breaks down as a concept when 
applied to ideas — both spiritual and mathematical — beyond measure. Boyle’s work 
on air sits somewhere along this boundary, requiring a mental zooming in of space to 
conceive of tiny particles that are sometimes depicted as finite and fixed of size, and at 
others as infinite and infinitely small. 
The disproportion between God’s reason and human measure offers a challenge 
to the value of human knowledge, and by extension the natural philosophical project. 
For example in Some Considerations touching the Usefulnesse of Experimentall 
Naturall Philosophy. The First Part (1663),11 Boyle asks why God, ‘whose Knowledge 
infinitely transcends ours, and who may be suppos’d to operate according to the 
Dictates of his own immense Wisdom’, should, in his creation, ‘have respect to the 
measure and ease of Humane Understandings’? Boyle concludes, ‘that way may often 
                                                
10 Ed. by Henry Miles, first published in The Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. by Thomas 
Birch, 5 vols (London: A Millar, 1744). 
11 Hereafter Usefulness, I. 
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be fittest or likeliest for Nature to work by, which is not easiest for us to understand’ 
(III, 257). However, in Things above Reason, Sohpronius asserts that ‘it is not an injury 
to reason to think it a limited faculty’ and demonstrates the high esteem he holds for 
human reason: ‘I assign Reason its most noble and genuine Exercise, which is to close 
with discovered Truths’ (IX, 371). Humanity might not be the measure of Godly 
wisdom, but it is furnished to close with discovered truths. Similarly, Timotheus says of 
natural philosophy: 
 
Thus we usefully study the nature of Bodies, which make up the 
Object of the Excellent Science of Natural Philosophy; though the 
true Notion of Body in general be a thing so difficult to frame, that 
the best of our Modern Philosophers can by no means agree about it. 
(IX, 391) 
 
There is a ‘true notion of body’ that is elusive to philosophers, but the enterprise is still 
useful and excellent. While Boyle does hold that human knowledge is limited, he does 
not diminish the value of seeking knowledge, nor does he question the capacity of man 
to know things of a mechanical nature, even if he may not presume to understand their 
ultimate cause.  
 
I now wish to consider the specific difficulties faced by Boyle in one of his major 
experimental concerns — the natural philosophical study of the air. When thinking of 
air, one immediately runs into conceptual difficulties to do with its transparency. How 
do we conceive of it? Do we imagine air to constitute or to be located in space? Do we 
think of it as matter? As nothing? Even in our post-Newtonian world where we know 
the air to be made up of atoms and where we commonly adopt the atomic position when 
the make up or pressure of the air comes under discussion, we default to a mode that 
forgets the existence of this invisible, imperceptible, ubiquitous substance, as testified to 
by the use of the word empty which rarely includes the idea of being empty of air. The 
seeming unnaturalness of the idea of the substantiality of air is captured in Evangelista 
Torricelli’s famous assertion in a letter to Michelangelo Ricci of 11 June 1644: ‘Noi 
viviamo sommersi nel fondo d’un pelago d’aria’ (‘We live submerged at the bottom of 
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an ocean of air’).12 Some of this strangeness is perhaps felt in Boyle’s frequent use of 
the term ‘Ambient Air’, which seems to express a need for an assertion of its environing 
quality.  
Boyle in Spring of the Air offers his corpuscularian hypothesis for its make up: 
 
That our Air either consists of, or at least abounds with, parts of such 
a nature, that in case they be bent or compress’d by the weight of the 
incumbent part of the Atmosphere, or by any other Body, they do 
endeavor, as much as in them lies, to free themselves from that 
pressure, by bearing against the contiguous Bodies that keep them 
bent; and, assoon as those Bodies are remov’d or reduced to give 
them way, by presently unbending and stretching out themselves, 
either quite, or so far forth as the contiguous Bodies that resist them 
will permit, and thereby expanding the whole parcel of Air, these 
elastical Bodies compose. (I, 165) 
 
The hypothesis is by no means certain and Boyle offers the either/or of the air 
consisting of or abounding with particles, but, although unseen, it is clear that he is 
thinking of air — or the parts of air — in material and mechanistic terms. When Boyle 
writes of ‘the whole parcel of Air, these elastical Bodies compose’, he is explicit in 
thinking of the particles of air themselves as bodies, and the phenomenon of elasticity 
or spring is explained in terms of the interaction between such bodies — either air 
particles and other air particles, or air particles and other compressing bodies.  
It is in this idea of mechanical interaction that we find the means to observe the 
air. Although the increased granularity of the microscopical view offered analogous 
ways of conceiving of the air as tiny particles, it could not make the components of air 
visible. Practitioners instead followed a different process. They conducted experiments 
on visible objects and made observations on phenomena such as inflated bladders or 
extinguished candles. From these observed effects, they could then make inferences 
about the behavior of air, and thus hypothesize about its nature.  
In Things above Reason, Boyle’s antagonist, Pyrocles, uncomfortable with 
Sophronius’s notion that human reason is limited (and indeed that Sophronius uses 
                                                
12 Quoted and translated in Gabrielle Walker, An Ocean of Air: A Natural History of the Atmosphere 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2008), p. 18. Hooke also uses this metaphor in ‘General Scheme’, see Hooke, 
Posthumous Works, p. 63. 
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reason to argue for this, i.e. using reason to limit reason), challenges: 
 
’tis strange to me, how you would have our Reason comprehend and 
reach things, that you your self confess to be above Reason, which is 
methinks, as if we were told that we may see things with our eyes that 
are invisible. (IX, 371) 
 
Pyrocles frames his dilemma about the seeming incongruity of comprehending things 
above reason in terms that echo the paradox of the natural philosopher attempting to 
observe the invisible air. However, Pyrocles’s sceptical comment appears in a work that 
follows two decades of publications by the author that address precisely that dilemma. 
Several pages later, Sophronius’s response returns to Pyrocles’s analogy: ‘we do not 
pretend that the Eye of the Mind should see Invisibles, but only that it shall discern the 
limits of that Sphere of Activity, within which Nature hath bounded it, and 
consequently that some Objects are disproportionate to it’ (IX, 383). There is a 
spatialized and suggestively airy quality to Boyle’s imagery of invisibles discernible by 
bounds and limits. There is a subtle distinction between see and discern. Like the object 
air in his experiments — separated and demarcated by the glass of the air pump’s 
receiver, its motions discerned by its effect on visible bodies, and the skin of a bladder 
marking in negative its invisible boundaries — reason and the non-specific image of 
‘Invisibles’ are discerned by inference from their bounds and limits, at the same time as 
recognizing the sense of disproportion implicit in this discernment. There is also the 
intriguing image of the ‘Eye of the Mind’; the sphere of activity, of vision, has moved 
from the bodily eyes into the mind, and yet we are told this eye does not see, it only 
discerns. The metaphorical sight of the visual imagination itself becomes a metaphor for 
a subtly different form of perception, emphasizing how imbricated vision is with 
knowledge, and evoking the mental ‘seeing’ that occurs in Boyle’s experimental 
practice.  
The other key component in making air or the effects of air ‘visible’, is space. 
More specifically: demarcated, controlled, experimental space. As Steven Connor 
observes, studying the air turns it into — indeed depends on it being — an object. In 
order to achieve this it must be partitioned: ‘In order to be seen and known as itself, air 
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had to be divided from itself.’13 After all, ‘How was the air to be picked out of its 
surroundings, when air was ambience itself? [...] An object [...] must exist in a space of 
observation.’14 Boyle achieved this partitioning and objectification with his air pump 
(see Fig. 2.1), a device that marked off the air of the experimental space from the 
ambient air in a hermetically sealed glass receiver, out of which air could be sucked in 
order to rarefy the contained air or create a vacuum (or an approximation thereof). The 
sense of demarcation is felt in Boyle’s language:  
 
But it seem’d that in so little a Receiver, the Air about the Viol being 
suddenly drawn out, the Air Imprison’d in the Vessel, having on it the 
whole pressure of the Atmosphere […] and not having on the other 
side the wonted pressure of the Ambient Air to ballance that other 
pressure, […], the external Air might rush in with violence. (I, 181–
82, my emphasis.) 
 
Boyle takes pains to make it clear to which portion of air he is referring at each 
moment.  
 There is an extensive concern in Boyle’s works on air with the integrity of the 
observational, experimental space. This concern is manifest in the focus of the 
illustrations and the prolix descriptions of the apparatus, which help conjure a secure 
image of the experimental space in the reader’s mind, and of the extensive discussion of 
attempts to counter the common problem of leakage. The problem of leakage was not 
just a practical problem, but an epistemological one as well. As Steven Shapin and 
Simon Schaffer note, ‘the physical integrity of the machine was vital to the perceived 
integrity of the knowledge the machine helped to produce.’15 
There are two kinds of knowledge that are produced by this sort of 
experimentation: data (the observations made and recorded) and hypothesis (theoretical 
explanations for the observed phenomena). Like Bacon and Hooke, Boyle values 
observational data as the foundation of natural knowledge. Boyle shows his confidence 
in producing evidence for his hypotheses from experimental procedures by making no 
                                                
13 Steven Connor, The Matter of Air: Science and the Art of the Ethereal (London: Reaktion Books, 
2010), p. 16. On the objectification of air, see also idem, ‘Next to Nothing: The Arts of Air’ (2007), 
<http://www.stevenconnor.com/airart/airart.pdf> [accessed 2 November 2009] (p. 8). 
14 Connor, 2010, p. 17. 
15 Shapin and Schaffer, p. 30. 
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apology in Spring of the Air for omitting the authority of other philosophical authors, 
‘the Experiments of our Engine being themselves sufficient to hint such Notions as we 
build upon them’ (I, 145). Also like Hooke, Boyle views hypothesis as an important 
tool in the development of knowledge, but even more than Hooke, he emphasizes the 
contingent and uncertain status of such ideas, cleaving firmly to an epistemology of 
nescience. As mentioned above, in Things above Reason, Boyle warns against the 
deceitfulness of applying our own measure to ‘things that involve an infiniteness either 
in multitude, magnitude, or littleness’, an idea which may well apply in some degree to 
the concept of atoms which were conceived of variously as infinitely small and as the 
smallest parts of nature.  
In Spring of the Air, Boyle describes both his own theory for the elasticity of the 
air and the competing theory of Descartes, saying: ‘I am not willing to declare 
peremptorily for either of them, against the other’ (I, 166). He acknowledges that 
neither hypothesis ‘gives us a sufficient account of its Nature’ (I, 167) — that is, 
although mechanical observations can be made, the underlying cause is still unknown. 
As such, he refuses to declare for either, even though one is his own and clearly as such, 
his preferred theory. In the conclusion to the same work, Boyle applies the words of 
Augustine’s nescience regarding biblical exposition to the certainty of knowledge in his 
own natural philosophical endeavours: 
  
Mallem quidem (says he) eorum que à me quœsivisti, habere 
scientiam quam ignorantiam: sed quia id nondum potui, magis eligo 
cautam ignorantiam confiteri, quam falsam scientiam profiteri. 
 
(I should certainly prefer to have knowledge than ignorance of the 
things you have asked me. But since I have not yet attained it, I 
choose rather to confess cautious ignorance than to profess false 
knowledge.) (I, 295)16 
 
This humility is characteristic of Boyle’s position on knowledge. 
Boyle’s nescience, his reticence in making too strong a claim for as yet uncertain 
knowledge, is related to his aversion to system building and his ideal of a thoroughly 
comprehensive base of observational and experimental data on which to found our 
                                                
16 Hunter and Davis’s translation. 
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understanding of nature. He argues in the ‘Proemial Essay’ of Certain Physiological 
Essays, Written at Distant Times, and on Several Occasions (1661)17 that if men were 
more concerned with advancing natural philosophy rather than their own reputations 
then they would do mankind a great service. They should: 
 
set themselves diligently and industriously to make Experiments and 
collect Observations, without being over-forward to establish 
Principles and Axioms, believing it uneasie to erect such Theories as 
are capable to explicate all the Phænomena of Nature, before they 
have been able to take notice of the tenth part of those Phænomena 
that are to be explicated. (II, 14) 
 
He criticizes the overzealousness of systematizers, at the same time as offering a more 
humble model in his own nescient practice. In his preface to Spring of the Air, Boyle 
writes ‘Of my being wont to speak rather doubtfully, or hesitantly, then resolvedly, 
concerning matters wherein I apprehend some difficulty’, and paraphrases Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, asserting: 
 
That to seem to know all things certainly, and to speak positively of 
them, is a trick of bold and yong Fellows: Whereas those that are 
indeed intelligent and considerate, are wont to imploy more wary and 
diffident Expressions. (I, 144) 
 
Boyle betrays a sense of responsibility over the relationship between rhetoric and 
epistemology, always striving to hold himself in reserve from bold statements of 
certainty.  
J. J. MacIntosh argues that as Boyle believed the reasons of God’s creation to be 
‘à priori undiscoverable by us’, he did not hold a priori speculation and global theories 
to be useful.18 MacIntosh writes that Boyle believed, ‘As far as the deep structure of the 
world goes, we should be content with plausible hypotheses, so long merely as they are 
                                                
17 Hereafter Certain Physiological Essays. 
18 London, The Royal Society, Boyle Papers (hereafter BP), 9/60r, quoted in J. J. MacIntosh, ‘Robert 
Boyle’s Epistemology: The Interaction between Scientific and Religious Knowledge’, International 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 6 (1992), 91–121 (p. 112).  
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intelligible, i.e. mechanical.’19 He observes that Boyle was ‘quite happy to leave things 
unexplained.’20 MacIntosh’s readings against system building are consistent with the 
idea of different levels of understanding from Things above Reason and the belief that 
the development of useful and real knowledge within our sphere of limits (i.e. the 
mechanical world) was not incongruent with acceptance of the idea that there is also 
knowledge beyond human reason. However I think it is also important to note that the 
notion of different levels of knowledge is not quite as static as MacIntosh perhaps 
implies. Rose-Mary Sargent, while agreeing that Boyle consciously avoided what he felt 
were ‘premature theoretical speculations’ believing that this sort of system building 
closed the door to future lines of enquiry, also suggests that: 
 
while Boyle was cautious in his acceptance of corpuscular 
explanations, many passages in his work indicate that he did not 
believe that they would remain hypothetical forever. The 
experimental philosophy, as a method of discovery, was clearly 
meant to disclose truths about the world’s hidden processes.21 
 
The aversion to system building is not because hypothesis is the only possibility for 
limited human knowledge. As Peter Anstey observes, Boyle’s objection is not to 
systematization in and of itself, but to the erection of systems which lack an 
observational foundation and which are supposedly impervious to correction or error, 
pointing out that, while not a systematizer himself, Boyle did promote a form of 
systematization in his advocacy of the collaborative and cumulative construction of 
Baconian histories of natural knowledge.22 As I have shown above, Boyle’s nescience is 
an aspirational one. Sargent similarly points out that Boyle’s famous attitude of 
scepticism is not actually that of a Sceptic but is proposed in the hope of improving 
human knowledge.23 Boyle writes in Experiments and Notes About the Producibleness 
                                                
19 MacIntosh, ‘Robert Boyle’s Epistemology’, p. 112. 
20 J. J. MacIntosh, ‘Perception and Imagination in Descartes, Boyle and Hooke’, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 18 (1983), 327–52 (p. 341). 
21 Rose-Mary Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist: Robert Boyle and the Philosophy of Experiment 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 206, 42. 
22 Peter R. Anstey, The Philosophy of Robert Boyle (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 4–5. 
23 Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, p. 29. For a description of Boyle’s scepticism as a rhetorical mode 
rather than a philosophical doctrine, see Jan V. Golinski, ‘Robert Boyle: Scepticism and Authority in 
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Of Chymicall Principles (1680), ‘I propose doubts not only with designe, but with hope, 
of being at length freed from them by the attainment of undoubted truth; which I seek 
that I may find it’ (IX, 27–28).24  
In Things above Reason, Sophronius claims: 
 
though I am very willing to believe, as well as I both desire and hope 
it, that this inquisitive Age we live in, will produce discoveries that 
will explicate divers of the more hidden mysteries of Nature, yet I 
expect that these discoveries will chiefly concern those things, which 
either we are ignorant of for want of a competent History of Nature, 
or we mistake by reason of erroneous Prepossessions, or for want of 
freedom and attention in our speculations. But I have not the like 
expectations as to all Metaphysical difficulties, (if I may so call them) 
wherein neither matters of Fact, nor the Hypothesis of subordinate 
parts of Learning, are wont much to avail. (IX, 373) 
 
Boyle offers hope for the human knowledge of nature, but at the same time 
acknowledges the complexity of the world and of the structure and truth status of 
limited human knowledge. As Michael Hunter astutely comments, the emphasis on the 
generation of ‘matters of fact’ in Boyle scholarship obscures the true sophistication of 
Boyle’s thinking on these issues.25 The epistemological concerns reflected in Boyle’s 
experimental programme, which he used to address the ‘want of a competent History of 
Nature’, reveal him, as he writes in Certain Physiological Essays, to be content: 
 
to contribute ev’n in the least plausible Way to the Advancement of it 
[experimental learning], and had rather not only be an Underbuilder, 
but ev’n dig in the Quarries for Materials towards so useful a 
Structure as a solid body of Natural Philosophy, than not do 
something towards the Erection of it. (II, 20)  
 
The increasingly popular metaphor of the Underbuilder fits Boyle’s epistemological 
                                                                                                                                          
Seventeenth-Century Chemical Discourse’, in The Figural and the Literal: Problems of Language in the 
History of Science and Philosophy, 1630–1800, ed. by Andrew Benjamin, G. N. Cantor, and J. R. R. 
Christie (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), pp. 58–82 (p. 61).  
24 Appended to the second edition of The Sceptical Chymist: or Chymico-Physical Doubts & Paradoxes. 
25 Robert Boyle Reconsidered, ed. by Hunter, ‘introduction’, p. 10. 
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position well.26 The sense of working within a preparatory stage for natural 
philosophical knowledge makes sense of Boyle’s acknowledgement of the complexity 
of nature, his resistance to systematization at the level of cause, and the aspirational 
quality of his nescience.  
 
In the rest of this chapter I consider visual and spatial aspects of Boyle’s work and how 
they relate more widely to his epistemology. As with Hooke, I will consider three main 
themes. I start with the legibility of nature, examining Boyle’s use of the metaphor of 
reading the book of nature as a means of understanding the significance of the visible 
appearance of nature in his epistemology. I then consider the relationship between the 
visible and invisible worlds, detailing Boyle’s theory of the make up of the air and the 
acts of inference and demarcation that allow for its observation, and considering the role 
of thought in moving beyond the visible. In the final section on the presentation of data 
to Boyle’s reader, I consider the use of illustrations and figurative language in 
describing air, the concept of virtual witnessing, and, briefly, Boyle’s practice of 
aggregation and attempts at ordering information, in terms of the production of the 
physical, textual, and mental spaces in which natural philosophy could take place. 
 
 
The Legibility of Nature 
 
In this section I consider the metaphor of the book of nature and the correlation between 
visibility and understanding in Boyle’s philosophy, with a view to understanding how 
the study of invisible substances like air fits in with this. Although Boyle makes use of 
the book of nature metaphor, I find that his position is actually more complex than an 
idea of meaning — and indeed the word of God — being visually encoded in nature. 
Like Hooke, Boyle urges empirical observation but also insists on a layer of rational and 
experienced interpretation between sensory information and meaning. He also embraces 
the experimental method, taking a step beyond pure empirical observation to a more 
constructed form of generating knowledge. Boyle repeatedly distinguishes between a 
                                                
26 On Boyle as an under-builder, see Rose-Mary Sargent, ‘Learning from Experience: Boyle’s 
Construction of an Experimental Philosophy’, in Robert Boyle Reconsidered, ed. by Hunter, pp. 57–78 (p. 
58), and Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, p. 38. Sargent notes that the under-builder motif was growing 
in popularity, citing uses by Bacon, Galileo, and Locke. Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, p. 38, n. 103. 
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childlike admiration of visible stimulus and the skilled and learned understanding of the 
specialist that goes beyond this. However he also acknowledges the contingency and 
relativity of this skill or this capacity for knowledge, and distinguishes between the 
mechanics of nature, which can be read, and the divine causes of nature, which cannot. 
He insists that the message conveyed by the book of nature is one that should inspire 
wonder, and that the purpose of it is not necessarily to reveal God’s secrets, which are 
reserved for heaven. Boyle’s resistance to the idea of nature as a symbolic language 
leaves far greater room for a more genuine appreciation of its complexity and a more 
honest assessment of the difficulty of the natural philosophical task — an honesty that is 
also felt in his nescience. This leads him to seek ways of being able to faithfully 
interpret nature and thus to the experimental method, the artificiality of the controlled 
and demarcated experimental setting allowing Boyle to move beyond the superficiality 
of merely seeing and interpreting by instinct, to a deeper understanding of nature. 
 
The book of nature is a pervasive metaphor in Boyle’s oeuvre. In Usefulness, I, Boyle 
asserts that, ‘each Page in the great Volume of Nature is full of real Hieroglyphicks, 
where (by an inverted way of Expression) Things stand for Words, and their Qualities 
for Letters’ (III, 232). Similarly in his manuscript writings, Boyle says that, ‘there are 
certain Hints [...] which to discerning Eyes (as Plants do to Physitians by their 
Signatures reveale their Propertys;) discloze much of what they conceale.’27 Both 
quotations suggest a visible language of things that can be read. More specifically, the 
ideas of real Hieroglyphicks and signatures are suggestive of Paracelsian theories about 
reading the invisible properties of nature in their outward appearances.28 
Boyle proposes that not only do these inscriptions manifest the goodness of God 
in his provision of instruction to man (III, 232), they also communicate God’s attributes 
and wisdom. He claims that attributes of God are ‘visibly display’d in the Fabrick of the 
World’, and that ‘many of Gods Attributes are legible in his Creatures’ (III, 220). He 
further claims that ‘In some of these [creatures] the Wisdom of God is so conspicuous, 
and written in such large Characters, that it is legible even to a vulgar Reader’ (III, 222). 
                                                
27 BP, 7/285r, quoted in J. R. Jacob, Robert Boyle and the English Revolution: A Study in Social and 
Intellectual Change (New York: Burt Franklin, 1977), p. 101. 
28 On Paracelsus and the ars signata, see James J. Bono, The Word of God and the Languages of Man: 
Interpreting Nature in Early Modern Science and Medicine (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1995), pp. 129–40. 
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Boyle cites Plato: ‘the World is Gods Epistle, written to Mankinde’ (III, 233), and riffs 
on the psalmist’s assertion that the heavens declare the glory of God (III, 232). Even 
more than displaying God’s attributes, the language of nature is seen to bear a direct 
communicative trace from God. Boyle gives scriptural precedent for communication by 
‘things’ in God’s rainbow after the flood and likens this sort of communication to 
Augustine’s description of the sacraments as ‘Verbum visibile’ (III, 233). 
However, there is also a more sceptical — perhaps more practical — thread 
running through Boyle’s works, which suggests that any interpretation which accepts 
that Boyle believed in a real and legible language of nature is overly simplistic. There 
are two strands to this reticence: one is related to Boyle’s insistence on nescience and 
the distinction between what man is and is not able to know and thus read in nature; the 
other strand is about more practical issues of how much we are able to comprehend of 
nature visibly. Towards the end of Usefulness, I, Boyle, in line with his beliefs about the 
limits of human reason, warns his addressee, Pyrophilus, to expect great satisfaction 
from the ‘Contemplation of Nature’ but not as much ‘as you may entirely acquiess in’ 
(III. 274), which can only be satisfied wholly by God. He writes: 
  
the Creatures being as well uncapable to afford us a compleat Felicity 
by our Intellectual Speculations of them, as by our sensual Fruitions 
of them; for though the knowledge of Nature be preferrable by odds 
to those other Idols we have mention’d, as inferior to it, yet we here 
attain that knowledge, but very imperfectly. (III, 274–75) 
 
The knowledge obtained from the contemplation of nature is better than that from other 
sources, but still obtained ‘very imperfectly’. It does not afford us a ‘compleat Felicity’. 
Also, Intellectual Speculations and sensual Fruitions are presented as parallel but 
separate modes of knowing; the visual (and other sensual) cues do not necessarily 
equate to knowledge without a layer of interpretation. And yet, Boyle does not aim to 
discourage the contemplation of nature, only to ensure that Pyrophilus is not 
disappointed with the limited knowledge it yields. The true felicity of the knowledge of 
God is reserved for a later revelation: ‘we seek for that on Earth, which is not to be 
found but in Heaven’ (III, 275). 
The purpose Boyle attributes to the language of nature fits his idea of the limited 
knowledge of mankind. Boyle claims that there are two types of message: the informing 
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of man of God’s being and attributes, and the instructing of man in his own duties. 
These messages are not framed in the context of understanding God, but of inspiring 
humility before him. Boyle presents the world as a ‘School of Virtue’ and the benefit to 
man in contemplating creatures as ‘promoting his [man’s] Piety’ (III, 234). Boyle 
writes: 
 
though many of Gods Attributes are legible in his Creatures, yet those 
that are most conspicuous there, are his Power, his Wisdome, and his 
Goodnesse, in which the World, as well as the Bible, though in a 
differing, and in some points a darker way, is designed to instruct us. 
(III, 220) 
 
The attributes of God that man may read in creation are his greatness, not his reason or 
his methods. This suggests that the contemplation of nature is more to promote a level 
of knowledge of creation that inspires wonder and worship, rather than to achieve a true 
understanding of God and his ways. The idea of the language of nature being ‘in some 
points a darker way’ than the Bible also suggests that knowledge derived from the 
observation of nature will not be absolute, nor as easy to interpret. Emphasis is placed 
on the difference between the two types (literal and metaphorical) of reading. In a 
similar manner to the idea of God’s communications inspiring wonder, Boyle (citing 
Psalms) asserts that one of the ways by which God communicates his power is the fact 
that ‘his greatness is unsearchable’ (III, 221). Nescience points to God. Boyle comes to 
this conclusion by considering both the vastness of the firmament using even the most 
modest computations, and also the technical difficulty encountered by natural 
philosophers in measuring and calculating celestial distances (ibid.). Both the advances 
and limits of science point to the greatness of God, but not necessarily to his methods.  
Boyle separates the idea of mechanical knowledge of the creation from 
knowledge of the reasons and methods of God by pointing out man’s inability to mimic 
God in the act of creation: ‘as highly as some Naturalists are pleased to value their own 
knowledge, it can at best attain but to understand and applaud, not emulate the 
Productions of God’ (III, 222). In an adaptation of the image of Descartes’s clockwork 
universe, Boyle compares this relationship to that of a novice admiring the skill of a 
watchmaker. Boyle extends this idea in a meditation on physiology: 
 
an Anatomist, though when by many and dexterous Dissections of 
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humane Bodies, and by the help of Mechanical Principles and Rules 
[...] he has learn’d the Structure, Use and Harmony of the parts of the 
Body, he is able to discern that matchless Engine to be admirably 
contriv’d, in order to the exercise of all the Motions and Functions 
whereto it was design’d: And yet [...] could never have imagin’d or 
devis’d [such] an Engine. (Ibid.) 
 
Boyle acknowledges the high level of learning and knowledge the anatomist possesses, 
but also the shortfall between the anatomist’s knowledge and that of the Creator of the 
human body. Understanding at a mechanical level is not the same as being able to 
imagine or devise the creation of a being. And yet, limited as it is, mechanical 
knowledge is still presented as a relatively esteemed and valuable knowledge. 
This sense of distinction between what is knowable and unknowable, and the 
idea of relative value is also found in Boyle’s use of the theological trope of the via 
negativa. In Some Motives and Incentives To the Love of God. Pathetically Discours’d 
of, in a Letter to a Friend (1659)29 Boyle meditates on the inadequacy of language for 
describing God: 
 
our Words being but the Representations of our Notions, and they 
being necessarily Finite, as our Being; few men are (me-thinks) more 
likely to be mistaken in the Nature of what’s Infinite, (and 
consequently of Gods Attributes) than those that think Descriptions 
can comprize it. (I, 90) 
 
The disproportion between finite representations and infinite natures makes human 
language inadequate to the task. Boyle thinks ‘Silence the properest Language’ (ibid.) 
when speaking of God’s perfections, ‘for ’tis Silence that best expresses our wonder 
[...]; A prostrate Veneration being the safest Apprehension of Him, that is 
Incomprehensible’ (I, 90–91). Boyle, in his description of the sorts of expressions that 
would be hyperbole when applied to anything other than God, writes that even these 
superlative expressions, ‘do but express our Devotion, not the Divine Object of it, and 
declare How much we honour Him, rather than What He is’ (I, 137–38).30 In so doing, 
                                                
29 Written in 1648. Hereafter Seraphic Love. 
30 This quotation is taken from ‘An Occasional Reflection upon a Letter, (Receiv’d in April, 1662.)’, 
which was added to the third edition of Seraphic Love, published in 1663. 
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Boyle makes a subtle distinction between man’s understanding and objective truth and 
also emphasizes the relativity of both value and comprehension. 
At the same time as emphasizing the inadequacy of human language to 
understand or express God, Boyle continues to use the metaphor of literacy to describe 
the knowledge of creation available to mankind. In a complex exploration of 
comparative knowledge across the hierarchy of beings, Boyle ponders the difference 
between the ‘Clear and Radiant Light’, ‘Nearer Access’, and ‘more Illuminated 
Intellects’ of angels, and ‘the dim Twi-light of Human Intellects in this Life’ (III. 136–
37). Again deferring to the image of the anatomist, Boyle uses a comparison between a 
natural philosopher and an illiterate man as an analogy for the contrast between angels 
and men: 
 
how much more Advantageous Conceptions of the Wisdom displayed 
in the Universe, and particularly in the Contrivance of a Human 
Body, one that is a true Philosopher, and a skilful Anatomist may 
have, in comparison of a man illiterate, and unacquainted with 
Dissections. (I, 136) 
 
In this network of relations, literacy has relative value. Compared to angelic or divine 
knowledge, even educated men are like the illiterate man to the philosopher, the 
illiteracy of mankind echoing the inadequacy of even hyperbolic language discussed 
just a few lines before. And yet, the anatomist is still figured as having a more 
advantageous conception of the wisdom of the universe compared to the illiterate man 
unacquainted with dissections. Again the metaphorical nature of literacy is highlighted 
by the contrast between illiteracy and the ability to ‘read’ anatomy and dissections, 
rather than the ability to read text.  
I now turn to the second strand of resistance to a direct and simple interpretation 
of the metaphor of the language of nature: the practical difficulty in reading it. In 
discussing the potential for new discoveries in nature in Usefulness, I, Boyle describes 
the virtues hidden in, ‘even those which daily obtrude themselves upon our careless 
Eyes, or are trampled under our regardlesse Feet’ (III, 231), suggesting that the way 
man sees nature does not in fact easily comprehend visible signatures, as the 
Paracelsians suggest. Boyle also compares the pleasure of understanding the ‘admirable 
Architecture and skilfull contrivance’ of nature to that of simply seeing it visibly: 
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For the Book of Nature is to an ordinary Gazer, and a Naturalist, like 
a rare Book of Hieroglyphicks to a Child, and a Philosopher: the one 
is sufficiently pleas’d with the Odnesse and Variety of the Curious 
Pictures that adorne it; whereas the other is not only delighted with 
those outward objects that gratifie his sense, but receives a much 
higher satisfaction in admiring the knowledg of the Author, and in 
finding out and inriching himselfe with those abstruse and varied 
Truths dexterously hinted in them. (III, 200–01) 
 
There is a layer of skill, knowledge, and interpretation required in order to be able to 
properly appreciate and understand (to some degree) the book of nature. Merely seeing 
is not enough. The index to the work offers the following description for this portion of 
the text: ‘That the knowledg of the inward Architecture and contrivances of Nature is 
more delightfull then the sight of the outward shapes’ (III, 286). It mentions nothing of 
signatures or the language of nature, and in fact contrasts the inner knowledge of nature 
with its outward shape instead of considering them to be causally related. This suggests 
that the simile of hieroglyphics is merely a figurative illustration rather than a 
substantive description of a model of epistemology. It also uses comparison to highlight 
the relativity of insight and knowledge.  
In Usefulness, I, Boyle explores a related metaphor of atoms as letters. He 
expresses his scepticism for the Epicurean notion that creation occurred by chance, by 
means of a comparison to an accident in a printing house: 
 
And really it is much more unlikely, that so many admirable 
Creatures that constitute this one exquisite and stupendous Fabrick of 
the World should be made by the casual confluence of falling Atoms, 
justling or knocking one another in the immense vacuity, then that in 
a Printers Working house a multitude of small Letters, being thrown 
upon the Ground, should fall dispos’d into such an order, as clearly to 
exhibit the History of the Creation of the World, describ’d in the 3 or 
4 first Chapters of Genesis. (III, 253) 
 
Boyle uses the popular Epicurean analogy between atoms and letters, in conjunction 
with the unlikely idea of chance disposing of the fallen letters into their biblically 
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ascribed places, to imply the necessity of an author to order the letters meaningfully.31 
Although Boyle rejects Epicurean chance causality, the analogy between atoms and 
letters suggests a relationship between the idea of a language of nature and the idea that 
corpuscular arrangement is significant to the properties of a body. However, 
corpuscular arrangement is of course not visible, even to the assisted eye, so this would 
be a language requiring a more complex means of interpretation than mere sight.  
Richard Kroll describes the analogy between atoms and letters as being 
‘arguably Robert Boyle’s most pervasive simile’.32 However, it does not appear in any 
of the experimental writings consulted for this study, perhaps suggesting that while the 
idea of the language of nature is used as a metaphor for natural philosophy, it does not 
play any part in its experimental or interpretative practices in any literal sense — that is, 
the idea of an inscribed code is not an epistemological model. In Spring of the Air there 
is a reference to letters written in the dust at the top of Mount Olympus that over the 
passage of time have not been disturbed by the winds, but despite the metaphoric 
potential of this image, Boyle considers it only as an observed phenomenon offering 
evidence about the presence and behaviour of air up a mountain (I, 285). The only other 
occurrences of letters found throughout the experimental works, are when they are used 
to label illustrations or to denote wind direction in weather tables, uses which are self-
consciously arbitrary.  
When Boyle considers the mechanics of language use, particularly in the context 
of natural philosophy, he expresses a view of language as contingent. In An Account of 
Philaretus during his Minority (an autobiographical account written in 1648 or 1649), 
Boyle describes his younger self: ‘for he was so addicted to more reall33 Parts of 
Knowledge, that he hated the study of Bare words, naturally; as something that relish’t 
too much of Pedantry’.34 Boyle distinguishes between reall or solid knowledge and 
                                                
31 For the simile used by the ancient atomists, see Lüthy, ‘The Invention of Atomist Iconography’, p. 131. 
Boyle also uses Aquinas’s image of a philosopher writing with a pen as an analogy for the necessity of 
the guidance of an intelligent agent of creation (III, 259), see Timothy Shanahan, ‘God and Nature in the 
Thought of Robert Boyle’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 26 (1988), 547–69 (pp. 561–64). 
32 Richard W. F. Kroll, The Material World: Literate Culture in the Restoration and Early Eighteenth 
Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 106–07. 
33 ‘Solid’ is given as an alternative to ‘reall’ above the line. 
34 Robert Boyle, Robert Boyle by Himself and his Friends, ed. with introduction by Michael Hunter 
(London: William Pickering, 1994), p. 10. 
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Bare words, emphasizing the rootedness of his study in things rather than texts. The 
older Boyle urges language reform as a part of the new philosophy, expressing 
frustration with the language of the chemists who use multiple names for the same thing 
and the same name for different things.35 These ideas suggest a view of language as 
arbitrary and conventional rather than inherently meaningful, which distances Boyle 
from the literal idea of a symbolic language of nature. As he writes in The Origine of 
Formes and Qualities, (According to the Corpuscular Philosophy) (1666–1667), Boyle 
believes it more appropriate ‘to alter Words, that they may better fit the Nature of 
Things’, than to try to yoke the understanding of nature to words, ‘that were probably 
devis’d, when the things themselves were not known or well understood, if at all 
thought on’ (V, 344). 
James Bono argues that in the seventeenth century, in contrast with those, like 
the Paracelsians, who embraced an exegetical or emblematic approach to nature, there 
were also philosophers who believed in the estrangement of man from the pre-lapsarian 
understanding of the word of God. Bono writes:  
 
Some students of nature refused to read the Book of Nature as a text 
written in symbolic, veiled language mirroring the Word of God [...]. 
Rather, they began to read nature as a text in which God had 
inscribed, not His deepest mysteries, but merely His scheme for the 
order and functioning of created things.36 
 
This results in a language of ‘things’ not of ‘symbols’, and a focus on ‘works’ rather 
than ‘Word’.37 As Bono describes, this approach relies on a divine author who has 
inscribed but distanced himself from his text, rather than one who has stamped a 
fragment of his own image upon things. This language of things: 
 
Characterizes the natural order as humans come to experience, 
manipulate, and know it. But it is always a contingent language 
bespeaking a contingent natural order wholly dependent upon God’s 
will.38 
                                                
35 Golinski, p. 64. 
36 Bono, p. 83. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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This contingent, inscribed, distant language of things expressing an internal order and 
scheme fits well with Boyle’s presentation of the language of nature trope. Similarly, 
the experimental mode captures well Bono’s notion that the contingent language of 
things ‘characterizes the natural order as humans come to experience, manipulate, and 
know it’. 
As well as the rainbow after the flood, the other examples Boyle gives for the 
precedent of God’s communication through ‘things’ are Solomon’s stricture to the 
sluggard to learn from the ant, and Christ’s instruction to his disciples to learn prudence 
and inoffensiveness from serpents and pigeons. This sort of ‘reading’, based in 
observational learning, is much more Baconian. It is less about the decoding of symbols 
or signatures and more about observing the scheme of order present in creation on its 
own terms (much like Hooke’s networks of relations which resist the temptation to read 
the known macro world into the unknown micro one). When Boyle describes the 
wisdom of God as conspicuous and written in ‘such large Characters, that it is legible 
even to a vulgar Reader’ (III, 222), he continues with the following caveat: ‘But in 
many others the Lineaments and Traces of it are so delicate and slender, or so wrapt up 
and cover’d with Corporeity, that it requires an attentive and intelligent Peruser’ (ibid.). 
As with the consideration of the behaviour of ants, serpents, and pigeons, the 
requirement for an intelligent peruser as well as an attentive one suggests the need for a 
more interpretive and inferential approach to the language of nature than the simple and 
direct reading of visible signs. It is a call for natural philosophy. 
The idea of a language where words perfectly express things is often associated 
with man’s dominance over other creatures, as related in Genesis at Adam’s naming of 
the animals. However, when discussing how God’s goodness is apparent by his 
provision for man’s needs, Boyle describes: 
 
God’s liberality at once bestowing on him all those Creatures by 
endowing him with a Reason enabling him to make use of them; so 
that even those Creatures which he is not able to subdue by his Power, 
he is able to make serviceable to him by his Knowledg. (III, 229) 
 
In Boyle’s interpretation of God’s bestowal of dominion over creatures, man’s relation 
to and power over other creatures is dependent on his reason, his ability to figure out 
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how best to utilize their properties, not on his command of language and knowledge of 
their true names. In fact, the dependence indicated by so that, suggests that for Boyle 
this sort of reason is man’s knowledge. 
Sargent observes that because of the complexity of the book of nature, our 
understanding, ‘will depend upon knowledge of a vast number of particulars and upon 
our ability to reason correctly about the relations that hold between them.’ She 
emphasizes the need for a method of proof which has the ‘flexibility exhibited by moral 
demonstration’ in order to assure the progression of knowledge and its revision and 
refinement as it is increased. She holds that for Boyle, it was the experimental method 
that accommodated these needs and offered a means of interpreting the book of 
nature.39 Sargent elsewhere asserts that experiments provide Boyle with a way to avoid 
what he describes as ‘the superficial account given us of things by their obvious 
Appearances and Qualities’ (III, 204).40 The passage in Usefulness, I from which this 
quotation is taken also speaks of the importance of going further than the ‘unurg’d [...] 
slight, reflections on the Information of the Senses’ that creatures possessing reason 
make by instinct (ibid.). Boyle urges that these impressions be not only received by 
means of our nature, but improved on by means of our industry, if we are not to settle 
for the said superficial account. As Sargent argues, ‘As the level of artificiality in an 
experiment increases, the level of superficiality decreases.’41 Like the demarcated space 
of the printing house in the thought experiment against chance creation, the artificiality 
of experiment allows for the containment, control, and measurement of variables so that 
facts and (mechanical) causes can be isolated. It also allows for the investigation of 
properties and information that are not immediately obvious to the senses.  
 
 
  
                                                
39 Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, pp. 111–12. Note that this relies on understanding experimental 
philosophy as a method of interpretation rather than just observation, which is one of the key 
contributions of Sargent’s work to Boyle scholarship. 
40 Sargent, ‘Learning from Experience’, p. 68. 
41 Ibid.  
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Visible and Invisible Worlds 
 
In this section, I consider the relationship between the visible and invisible worlds in 
Boyle’s thought on the nature of air. I consider how the air is conceived of by Boyle; 
the acts of inference which allow the observation and collection of data on this invisible 
substance; the role of instruments, both in practical experimentation and as a way of 
thinking about the mechanics of bodies beyond sight and the mechanics of thinking 
itself; the concept of corpuscularian structure; and the roles of wonder, imagination, and 
metaphor in thinking and working beyond the visible.  
 
The ridicule and satire the new philosophers faced for their investigations into the 
nature of air rely on its invisibility being equated with immateriality and thus 
inconsequentiality. Pepys’s diary entry for 1 February 1664 recounts Charles II 
laughing at the members of Gresham College, ‘for spending time only in weighing of 
ayre, and doing nothing else since they sat.’42 Similarly in Shadwell’s The Virtuoso 
(1676), Gimcrack cuts a ludicrous figure with his collection of country airs and his out-
of-water swimming lesson, the spectacle of invisibility on the stage reducing the value 
of his investigations to nothing. Gimcrack’s descriptions of air send up the ideas of 
Boyle and Hooke as the fantastical ravings of an over-inflated buffoon who is out of 
touch with common-sense reality: 
 
The whole air is full of living creatures a thousand times less visible 
than those living creatures mistaken for motes in the sun. I know most 
of ’em distinctly by my glasses.43 
 
These lines conflate microscopical natural history with corpuscularian philosophy, the 
comparison to motes in the sun being a reference to Lucretius’s famous analogy for 
atoms in the air in De Rerum Natura. As well as the confusion of ideas, the extreme 
levels of instrumental vision bragged of by Gimcrack undermine his claims. After 
describing his microscopical investigations, Gimcrack tells his sceptical audience, 
                                                
42 The Diary of Samuel Pepys, ed. by Robert Latham and William Matthews, 11 vols (London: Bell & 
Hyman, 1970–83), V (1971), 33. 
43 Thomas Shadwell, The Virtuoso, ed. by Marjorie Hope Nicolson and David Stuart Rodes, (Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), IV. 3. 214–17. 
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Bruce and Longvil, of his vault full of country air: ‘I employ men all over England, 
factors for air, who bottle up air and weigh it in all places, sealing the bottles 
hermetically.’44 As Anstey points out, Gimcrack’s brag of a consignment of air from the 
peak of Tenerife is possibly a direct reference to Boyle, who describes weighing air 
from Tenerife in Tracts Written by the Honourable Robert Boyle Containing New 
Experiments, touching the Relation betwixt Flame and Air (1672).45 The superlative 
extent of the operation, ‘They send me loads [...]. That vault is full’,46 emphasizes its 
disproportionate lack of utility in the amount of space taken up by the collection. Indeed 
it is a collection that has only the most self-indulgent of uses: 
 
Now if I have a mind to take country air, I send for maybe forty 
gallons of Bury air, shut all my windows and doors close, and let it 
fly in my chamber.47 
 
As well as belittling the purpose of the natural philosophical programme, Gimcrack’s 
practice of letting the air fly about his chamber undermines the idea of carefully 
demarcated experimental spaces, ridiculing the efforts of practitioners like Boyle to 
assure their integrity. These satirical presentations rely on taking the concept of 
invisible and subvisible matter out of the context of strict experimental environments in 
which philosophers can perceive such phenomena, and into a realm whose 
epistemology operates at a macro level and relies on a close relationship between 
visibility and reality (emphasized by the romantic farce of disguise, mistaken identity, 
and dark and secret rooms in Shadwell’s play). This associates invisibility with 
nothingness, and the idea that the invisible air could be teeming with subvisible bodies 
(creatures or atoms) is dismissed as ludicrous. Longvil’s question ‘To what purpose do 
you weigh air?’ is left unanswered.48 Gimcrack’s practices are deemed to have no 
valuable purpose. 
In General History of Air, Boyle acknowledges this common way of thinking 
                                                
44 Shadwell, The Virtuoso, IV. 3. 256–58. 
45 Peter Anstey, ‘Literary Responses to Robert Boyle’s Natural Philosophy’, in Science, Literature and 
Rhetoric in Early Modern England, ed. by Juliet Cummins and David Burchell (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007), pp. 145–62 (p. 146). Cf. The Virtuoso, IV. 3. 261. 
46 Shadwell, The Virtuoso, IV. 3. 258–59. 
47 Ibid., IV. 3. 264–66. 
48 Ibid., IV. 3. 268. 
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about the air:  
 
the Generality of Men are so accustomed to judg of things by their 
Senses, that not finding the Air to be a visible Body, they ascribe less 
to it than even the School-men do; and what is invisible, they think to 
be next Degree to nothing. (XII, 132). 
 
Such men consider the Air, ‘only as a Receptacle’ (ibid.) and do not show any 
awareness of actions of the air on bodies harboured within it, beyond perhaps heat and 
moisture. But Boyle sees the air differently. As outlined in the introduction to this 
chapter, he believes it to be populated with or comprised of particulate bodies, and turns 
it from a receptacle into an object in its own right. He acknowledges the difference in 
his way of looking, ‘But for my part, who look upon the Air under another Notion’ 
(ibid.), and describes his opinion that the air may alter as well as contain bodies — an 
idea which has a sense of thingness, of mechanical activity and potency. In Boyle’s 
work, while he acknowledges the air’s invisible and ethereal qualities, air is never 
treated as nothing, but always as a real and material presence. The overall effect of this 
zooming in and considering substantiality at such a micro level is one of denseness.  
General History of Air opens with a definition of ‘What we understand by the 
AIR’: 
 
By the Air I commonly understand that thin, fluid, diaphanous, 
compressible and dilatable Body in which we breath, and wherein we 
move, which envelops the Earth on all sides to a great height above 
the highest Mountains; but yet is so different from the Æther [or 
Vacuum] in the intermundane or interplanetary Spaces, that it refracts 
the Rays of the Moon and other remoter Luminaries. (XII, 12)49 
 
The air is thin and diaphanous, but it is contrasted with aether or vacuum, and the 
inclusion of the adjectives compressible and dilatable give the air a real sense of 
resistance and weight by triggering a mental image of the acts of compression and 
dilation. The idea of enveloping creates an exaggerated sense of its substantiality which 
helps redefine how we think of the air ‘in which we breath, and wherein we move’, 
activities whose effect is to draw attention to that presence and ubiquity which is taken 
                                                
49 The square brackets are Boyle’s. 
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for granted.  
Boyle continues to Title II, ‘Of the constant and permanent Ingredients of the 
Air’, in which he lists three kinds of corpuscles which make up what he calls the 
atmospherical air or ‘the common Air we breath and move in’ (ibid.) — as opposed to 
the purely elemental, ethereal, or celestial substances supposed by other philosophers. 
These three kinds are: vapours or exhalations from earth, water, minerals, creatures etc.; 
‘Magnetical Steams’ (XII, 13) and the subtle material particles that allow the 
transmission of light; and the ‘Perennial Air’ (XII, 14), that is, particles that are 
permanently air. These perennial air particles are the ones that are elastical. Boyle 
details four different analogies for this quality (springs of watches, hairs of wool, 
slender wires, shavings of wood) and acknowledges that other comparisons can also be 
made. The densely detailed descriptions, combined with the listing of multiple types of 
particle and multiple analogies for their qualities, have the effect of densely populating 
the invisible air with these ideas and images, and creating a sense of intricacy in how 
we think about the air. 
In Things above Reason, Boyle clearly outlines the difficulty in knowing of 
invisibles: 
 
To our confused, and often also to our inadequate conceptions, 
belong many of those that may be called Negative, which we are 
wont to imploy when we speak of Privations or Negations, as 
Blindness, Ignorance, Death, &c. We have a positive Idea of things 
that are square and round, and black and white, and in short of other 
things, whose shapes and colours make them the objects of our sight: 
But when we say, for instance, that a Spirit or an Atome is invisible, 
those words are attended with a negative conception, which is 
commonly but dark and confused because ’tis indefinite, and 
removes or lays aside those marks, by which we are wont clearly to 
perceive and distinguish visible substances. (IX, 385) 
 
As with his apophatic descriptions of God in Seraphic Love, Boyle distinguishes 
between visible things that allow us a positive idea of them, and invisible things that 
only allow us a negative conception. Although Boyle treats atoms as material, and 
creates tangible mental images for them (such as the analogies for the elastical qualities 
of air), he here refers to them as invisible, listing them in the same breath as immaterial 
spirits. This does not seem to be a dilemma of observation that will be solved with more 
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powerful microscopes. Boyle shortly after continues:  
 
of some things we have a knowledge, that for want of a fitter term 
may be called primary or direct, and of some other things the 
knowledge we have is acquired but by inferring it from some more 
known or clearer truth; and so may be called inferr’d or illative 
knowledge. (Ibid.) 
 
The way Boyle finds for obtaining knowledge of invisibles is by inference from what is 
‘more known or clearer’. One of the benefits of investigating nature by means of 
experiments is the ability to control the environment and its variables, and to limit the 
unknowns, to make this process of inference more systematic and reliable. 
Even for Boyle who ‘sees’ the air differently to the generality of men who see 
invisibles as the next degree to nothing, it is the relationship of air to other bodies that 
allows it to become perceivable. In General History of Air, Boyle writes: ‘I am apt to 
allow it [air] in reference to some Bodies, certain other Faculties and Powers’ (XII, 132, 
my emphasis). There are numerous examples in Boyle’s works detailing experiments 
and their interpretation of the perception of the behaviour of air by means of its 
interactions with other visibly observable bodies, such as inflated bladders and 
extinguished flames. In the indexical summary of Spring of the Air, the second 
experiment is described as ‘touching the pressure of the Air against the sides of the 
Bodies it invirons’ (I, 150). The air is demarcated in negative by the positive boundary 
of visible objects. Boyle also uses the perception of the other senses, for example, on 
the turning of the key to allow air into the receiver he notes, ‘there is immediately 
produced a considerably brisk noise’ (I, 165), and in A Continuation of New 
Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, and their 
Effect. The Second Part (1682),50 which comprises a large number of experiments on 
the rotting of food items, the effects of air and vacuum are inferred from observations 
on the change of appearance, taste, and smell.  
An important condition for making inference is the ability to control and know 
the experimental space. This is predominantly achieved by the knowledgeable use and 
description of instruments. In the first experiment, Boyle gives the following 
explanation of the pumping out of the air from the receiver to the cylinder and out of the 
                                                
50 Hereafter Spring, 2nd Continuation. 
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apparatus: 
 
This you will easily perceive, by finding, that you still force less and 
less Air out of the Cylinder; so that when the Receiver is almost 
exhausted, you may force up the Sucker almost to the top of the 
Cylinder, before you will need to unstop the Valve to let out any Air: 
And if at such time, the Valve being shut, you let go the handle of the 
Pump, you will finde the Sucker forcibly carryed up to the top of the 
Cylinder, by the protrusion of the external Air; which, being much 
less rarified then that within the Cylinder, must have a more forcible 
pressure upon the Sucker, then the internal is able to resist: And by 
this means you may know how far you have emptyed the Receiver. (I, 
164–65) 
 
Boyle is addressing himself to the possible ambiguity as to whether the receiver is full 
or empty of air. By means of a detailed instruction in the use of the air pump and the 
way in which the equipment behaves through the different stages of the process he 
allows the reader to understand how the experimental space — and thus the objectified 
air or vacuum — is demarcated, and how the air is moved through it.  
In the seventeenth experiment of Spring, 1st Continuation, Boyle details a 
device he has invented to measure the rarity of the air in the receiver to further abate 
this problem: 
 
Because the Air being invisible, it is not always easie to know 
whether it be sufficiently pump’d out of the Receiver that was to be 
exhausted; we thought it would be very convenient to have some 
Instrument within the Receiver, that might serve for a Gage, or 
Standard; whereby to judge whether or no it were sufficiently 
exhausted. (VI, 78) 
 
He lists various considerations and then offers detailed making instructions for the 
gauge, which can calculate specific volumes of air, either by calculation or by empirical 
comparison with water volumes. As with the description of using the air pump, this 
detailing of instrumental technology helps the reader mentally trace the movement of 
air, as well as providing the practitioner with a means for visually observing changes in 
pressure.  
The use of inference to make invisibles perceptible to the senses is not all Boyle 
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relies on though. As Sargent details, Boyle’s experimental method relies on a notion of 
experience that is more than just simple sense perception.51 Sargent demonstrates that, 
like a jury trying to discover and justify the facts of a case from the evidence presented 
before them, Boyle’s method relies on standards of rational assent, and demonstration 
on a balance of probabilities.52 As Boyle describes in Usefulness, I, William Harvey 
makes inferences from the valves in the heart about the circulatory function of the 
whole system, which are then subsequently proven by experiment (III, 222).53 Like 
Harvey, Boyle uses a mixture of observation and reason for making inferences about 
unobservable phenomena. Sargent explains that this use of teleological reasoning is not 
inconsistent with the rejection of appeals to final causes, and that as long as such 
conjectures are tested and proven by experiment, ‘then they have a positive heuristic 
role and can indeed be seen as necessary adjuncts to the mechanical philosophy’.54 This 
dynamic allows for a progressive and self-refining model of knowledge in which reason 
and observation influence and test each other to produce knowledge that is reliable in its 
probability. 
This method is useful in the case of invisibles, but can also have the effect of co-
opting the conditions of observation to phenomena itself, for example when Boyle 
suggests that being able to see further in different conditions is because of changes in 
the density of the air (I, 204). This is not unreasonable, but it does highlight a tendency 
to circularity inherent in this mode of thinking and explanation. There are also instances 
in Boyle’s work where the phenomena from which hypotheses of invisibles is inferred 
is itself assumed or implied by figurative language rather than plainly reported. For 
example in Spring of the Air, Boyle describes: 
 
For that still there remain’d in the capacity of the exhausted Cylinder 
store of little rooms, or spaces empty or devoid of Air, may appear by 
the great violence wherewith the air rushes in, if any way be open’d 
to it. (I, 244) 
 
That the air has rushed in we as readers assume to have been evident by means of sound 
                                                
51 Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, p. 50. 
52 Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, p. 54. 
53 See also Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, p. 80. 
54 Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, p. 81. 
 110 
or felt movement of the air, implied by the character which violence and rushes give the 
presumed movement. Another instance of the ambiguous or organic gauging of 
conditions is found in Spring, 1st Continuation, where Boyle defers to the experience of 
experimenters to assure the emptiness of the pump, ignoring the instrumental gauge and 
bypassing the usual anxiously detailed explanation of exsuction, merely writing: ‘it was 
easy for them that are well acquainted with the Pump, to estimate what Air is left in the 
vessel it should exhaust’ (VI, 75). On one level the deferral to familiarity is reasonable 
and practical, and the likelihood of an experienced practitioner being able to correctly 
match similar states is high, but in not using some external means of measurement it is 
circular in that it relies on the assumption that the previous experiences mean what we 
have always assumed them to mean. These examples demonstrate an imbrication 
between experience, reason, and inference, which is more complex than simple 
empirical observation.   
Much has been made of the idea that Boyle separates his descriptions of 
experiments from his more speculative discussion of their significance; an interpretation 
which is based on the fact that he tells us that he does this in his preface to Spring of the 
Air. His intention is that readers, ‘who desire onely the Historical part of the account we 
give of our Engine, may read the Narratives, without being put to the trouble of reading 
the Reflections too’ (I, 144). However in practice, Boyle does not always keep the two 
cleanly separated. Nor does his explanation include anything about keeping narrative 
and reflection separate for epistemological reasons; this is something that has been read 
into the text by subsequent critics, and assumed to be part of Boyle’s nescient 
approach.55 In the first experiment of Spring of the Air, Boyle writes: 
 
For the more easie understanding of the Experiments tryable by our 
Engine, I thought it not superfluous, nor unseasonable in the recital of 
this first of them, to insinuate that notion by which it seems likely 
that most, if not all, of them will prove explicable. (I, 165) 
 
As a means of making the experiments understandable, Boyle offers his hypothesis of 
their cause. As such, his readers share in the teleological approach described by Sargent 
above, reading the experiments through Boyle’s hypothesis of the spring of the air. 
Boyle does also describe the Cartesian hypothesis and assures the reader that while both 
                                                
55 See for example, Golinski, p. 387. 
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accounts are plausible accounts, neither ‘gives us a sufficient account of its Nature’ (I, 
167), but the experiments are framed and discussed through the lens of his own 
hypothesis. In fact, while there is a general distinction between passages that are mostly 
narrative and those that are mostly reflection, it is not uncommon for reflections and 
speculations to crop up within the narrative reports. For example, in Experiment 10 of 
Spring of the Air, Boyle writes:  
 
We took notice that when the Air was not drawn out, there did upon 
the extinction of the Flame a considerable part of the Week remain 
kindled, which (probably by reason of the Circulation of the Air in 
the Vessel, occasion’d by the heat) emitted a Steam. (I, 185) 
 
Although demarcated by a parenthesis, a speculative reason for the phenomenon is 
offered in the midst of the narrative account.  
That theory and hypothesis contribute to the development of experiment can be 
seen in the description of the air pump in Spring, 1st Continuation, where Boyle 
describes his addition of a plate of iron: 
 
which I added, not onely to keep the wooden Board the better from 
warping, but because I knew (what will perhaps be thought strange) 
that the pressure of the Atmosphere on one side of the Board, when 
there is no pressure or but very litle on the other side, will enable 
many Aerial particles to strain through the very wood. (VI, 37) 
 
This is asserted as certain, ‘I know’, and yet it still has the feel of a hypothetical 
explanation for the unobservable and unattributable phenomenon of the receiver not 
being airtight. This theory has influenced the experiment to the point of suggesting 
alteration to the instrument. 
When Boyle describes the bystander trying to remove the key or stopple from 
the exhausted receiver in Experiment 2 of Spring of the Air, he acknowledges the role of 
assumption in the bystander’s understanding of what is happening: 
 
men being unus’d to finde any resistance, in lifting things up, from 
the free Air above them, they are forward to conclude that that which 
depresses their hands must needs be some weight, though they know 
not where plac’d, drawing beneath it. (I, 171) 
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These men make a conclusion about weight due to their different theoretical 
preconceptions. For Boyle this appears to be an example of the superiority of thought 
and understanding of experimental philosophers — indeed Boyle is able to back up his 
explanation of the phenomenon with the further test of what happens when the air is 
returned to the receiver — but it also exemplifies the influence of any theoretical 
assumptions and the dangers, albeit on a more subtle scale, that Boyle himself faces in 
his own inferential thinking. 
The major hypothesis about invisibles underlying Boyle’s work is his 
corpuscularianism, which, while material, is a structure operating at a sub-microscopic 
level and effectively invisible. As Margaret Osler describes, Boyle leaves aside the 
metaphysical question of whether indivisible, Epicurean atoms exist and describes the 
microscopic structure of the material world in terms of minima naturalia, tiny particles 
below the threshold of sense, which, while divisible in principle, are hardly ever 
divided.56 Norma E. Emerton shows that Boyle makes inferences about atomic structure 
from the structural organization of matter at a macro level. Like the fallen letters in the 
printer’s working house, order is deemed necessary. Boyle questioned the scholastic 
notion of substantial form and the chemists’ salt principle as causes of crystallization, 
but felt that the specificity and constancy of the microscopic shapes found in crystals 
could not be the result of chance and inferred that the internal construction of crystals 
must also be geometrically regular, an idea supported by experiments which grew 
different shapes of crystals from different combinations of ingredients.57 This is 
different to the Aristotelian dismissal of atoms as a rude heap, or even ancient atomism 
itself, which does not define the shapes of its particles.58 
This thinking is likely connected to microscopy which, in allowing access to the 
subvisible world, provides an analogy for, and hence a way of visually imagining, the 
submicroscopic world. In Boyle’s microscopic observations on cheese mites he writes 
                                                
56 Margaret J. Osler, ‘The Intellectual Sources of Robert Boyle’s Philosophy of Nature: Gassendi’s 
Voluntarism and Boyle’s Physico-Theological Project’, in Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England 
1640–1700, ed. by Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, and Perez Zugorin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 178–98 (pp. 183–84). 
57 Emerton, pp. 43–44. 
58 Lüthy, ‘Atomist Iconography’, pp. 118, 121. 
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that they ‘seeme but [...] mouing Atome[s]’.59 He further ponders how ‘vnimaginably 
little’ must the hairs upon the legs be in their turn, and the animal spirits travelling in 
the nerves within those legs, and the ‘multitude of Atomes’ making up the creature’s 
several parts. Boyle’s microscopic view of the cheese mite gives his mind a trigger to 
imagine the scale of even smaller parts. Similarly in his experiments on air, Boyle uses 
descriptions of macro level phenomena to suggest not only the presence of air, but its 
particulate nature. Boyle describes the mist arising from a waterfall as water having 
been broken ‘into such minute Corpuscles’ (I, 218), allowing corpuscles here to mean 
visible water particles rather than strict minima naturalia. There are also numerous 
descriptions of the production of bubbles in water, which, while describing much larger 
packets of air than atoms, offer a suggestive corpuscularian imagery in their multitude 
of small globules. Boyle describes the bursting of the receiver and a bladder: 
 
upon the quick depressing of the Sucker, the external Air burst the 
Body of the Viol into above a hundred pieces, many of them 
exceeding small, and that with such violence that we found a wide 
rent, besides many holes, made in the Bladder it self. (I, 182) 
 
The resulting fragments of the body of the viol — above a hundred pieces, exceeding 
small — and the holes left in the bladder itself, are all suggestive of the particulate 
nature of the air that caused this, even though that itself cannot be pictured. Boyle 
suggests corpuscularity by the proximity of visible examples of fragmentation and 
particulate matter. 
When Boyle describes the microscopical cheese mite, he also calls it a ‘little 
Engine’.60 The use of the machine or engine analogy is crucial to Boyle’s understanding 
of invisibles, not just for its utility as a metaphor to help us conceptualize the workings 
of invisible or subvisible matter, but also for providing a basis for Boyle’s assumptions 
of the consistency of the natural world, which underpin his hypotheses about the 
workings of non-perceivable objects. As Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park observe, 
Boyle’s voluntaristic solution to the theological dilemma of the autonomy of nature is to 
                                                
59 BP, 26/169, quoted in J. J. MacIntosh, ‘Robert Boyle on Epicurean Atheism and Atomism’, in Atoms, 
Pneuma, and Tranquility: Epicurean and Stoic Themes in European Thought, ed. by Margaret J. Osler 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 197–219 (p. 200). 
60 BP, 26/169, quoted in MacIntosh, ‘Epicurean Atheism and Atomism’, p. 200. 
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see nature as an ‘artefact’, not an ‘artisan’; and indeed, an artefact of a specific nature, 
that of an ‘engine’ or ‘automaton’.61 Anstey explains that Boyle (and other natural 
philosophers contemporary to him) collapse the classical distinction between nature 
(physics) and mechanics by taking the step away from using the machine as an analogy 
to actually thinking of nature as a machine.62 As with Hooke, the idea of the machine is 
an intimate part of Boyle’s epistemology. Henry van Leeuwen argues that Boyle uses 
instruments to assist the senses but does not give the senses an autonomous role, 
quoting from the Boyle Papers: ‘the Organs of Sense are but the Instruments of Reason 
in the Investigation of Truth’.63 The human becomes machine and the machine becomes 
implicated in reason.  
As well as portraying sensory function as machinic and imbricated with reason, 
Boyle also portrays the mental act of reason in a similar way. In the Appendix to 
Christian Virtuoso, Boyle writes, ‘Philosophy does for the most part but more clearly 
display and expose the object’ (XII, 424), the acts of displaying, exposing, and 
objectifying serving a similar function to the use of instruments and controlled 
conditions in the demarcating of experimental spaces. However, it is not just rational 
thought that Boyle refers to here. As Lotte Mulligan shows, Boyle used not only reason, 
but ‘Right Reason’ which she defines in relation to Boyle’s thought as ‘reason seasoned 
with revelation’.64 Boyle continues: 
 
but divine revelation assisted by divine grace may serve both for a 
light, a telescope, and a collyrium; since it both illustrates the object, 
and furnishes the beholder with an excellent instrument of discovery, 
and clears the eye or visive faculty from those distempers, that render 
it unfit to exercise the best and difficultest acts of vision. (XII, 424)65 
 
                                                
61 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750 (New York: Zone 
Books, 1998), p. 298. 
62 Anstey, Philosophy of Robert Boyle, p. 3. 
63 BP, 9/25, quoted in Henry G. van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630–90 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. 94. 
64 Lotte Mulligan, ‘Robert Boyle, ‘The Christian Virtuoso’ and the Rhetoric of ‘Reason’’, in Religion, 
Reason and Nature in Early Modern Europe, ed. by R. Crocker (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2001), pp. 
97–116 (p. 98). 
65 See also Mulligan, ‘Robert Boyle, ‘The Christian Virtuoso’’, p. 110. 
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Not just philosophy, but revelation too functions as an instrument of discovery and an 
aid or salve for the senses. Boyle uses a similar instrumental analogy to describe the 
value of hermeneutic scholarship in the study of the Bible in Some Considerations 
Touching the Style of the Holy Scriptures (1661): ‘the Scripture being indeed like 
Heaven, where the better our Eyes and Telescopes are, the more Lights we discover’ (II, 
431). Telescopes and eyes, those organs of sense, are used as metaphors for the tools 
needed to read the Bible. They are instruments of right reason and right reason is an 
instrument. As in Things above Reason, religious ideas are figured and explored 
alongside natural philosophical ideas and contexts. Here, Heaven is not figured as a 
religious location — the seat of God — but as the object of scientific study, the analogy 
being between understanding scripture and discovering stars with the aid of telescopes.  
Instrumental metaphors are also used by Boyle for other acts of thought, 
including imagination and figurative description. In Certain Physiological Essays, 
Boyle describes the use of a florid writing style as akin to ‘paint[ing] the Eye-glasses of 
a Telescope’ (II, 16), and in the preface to The Christian Virtuoso: Shewing, That by 
Being Addicted to Experimental Philosophy, a Man is Rather Assisted, than Indisposed, 
to be a Good Christian (1690–1691),66 he writes: 
 
proper Comparisons do the Imagination almost as much Service, as 
Microscopes do the Eye; for, as this Instrument gives us a distinct 
view of divers minute Things, which our naked Eyes cannot well 
discern; because these Glasses represent them far more large, than by 
the bare Eye we judge them; so a skilfully chosen, and well-applied, 
Comparison much helps the Imagination, by illustrating Things 
scarce discernible, so as to represent them by Things much more 
familiar and easy to be apprehended. (XI, 287–88) 
 
Mulligan argues that for Boyle, similitude or metaphor is the key that reveals the secrets 
of nature.67 I agree with her reading and add that there is an important epistemological 
commonality underlying sensory data, reason or philosophy, knowledge, revelation, 
imagination, and representation (i.e. ‘proper comparisons’) in the shared use of 
instrumental metaphors. They all become experimental tools for the investigation of 
nature. This explains the frequency of recourse to thought experiments and imaginative 
                                                
66 Hereafter Christian Virtuoso, I. 
67 Mulligan, ‘Robert Boyle, ‘The Christian Virtuoso’’, p. 111.  
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comparisons — which otherwise sits uncomfortably with an interpretation of Boyle as a 
pure empiricist — in his seemingly practical and experimental works. 
As outlined in the introductory section to this chapter, Boyle, in his 
consideration of how man can know about things beyond his rational capabilities, 
makes a connection between invisibles and thoughts beyond our limits. In Things above 
Reason, Pyrocles questions knowing of the existence of things above reason ‘as if we 
were told that we may see things with our eyes that are invisible’ (IX, 371). 
Sophronius’s response includes the line, ‘we do not pretend that the Eye of the Mind 
should see Invisibles, but only that it shall discern the limits of that Sphere of Activity, 
within which Nature hath bounded it’ (IX, 383). Sophronius’s retort moves the question 
of visibles inside the mind so that it no longer becomes a question about literal, sensory 
seeing, but about metaphorical seeing or conceiving. Elsewhere in this work the notions 
of things being above reason and the inadequacy of our conceptions of such things is 
exemplified by examples of mathematical ideas too difficult for the mind to picture, 
such as the difference between the ideas of a myriagon and a chiliagon, or the infinite 
divisibility of a line (IX, 377–78). Sophronius also uses the atom as an example: 
 
So if you would imagine an Atome, of which perhaps ten thousand 
would scarce make up the bulk of one of the light particles of dust, 
that seem to play in the Sunbeams when they are shot into a darkned 
place, so extraordinary a littleness, not having fallen under any of our 
Senses, cannot truly be represented in our imagination. (IX, 377) 
 
Boyle sets up an image rich in detail, stating the number of atoms to a dust particle and 
specifying the circumstances of the sunbeam to enable the reader to picture it. However, 
he then undermines the reality, and even possibility, of this, or any specific 
representation by closing with the idea that something so small cannot be truly 
represented in the imagination. There is a subtle move from a spatiality that is visual 
(even if imaginary) to one that is purely conceptual.  
Boyle shies away from this sort of thinking when defining atoms more 
consciously, electing to use the idea of minima naturalia: 
 
The smallest particles of bodyes which they call Atomes not because 
they cannot be suppos’d to be divided into yet Smaller parts [...] but 
because tho they may be further divided by Imagination yet they 
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cannot by Nature.68 
 
Boyle elects for a more practical — and perhaps less controversial — definition here, 
but maintains a division between material and conceptual spatialities for the atom, 
perhaps even offering further levels of capability to the conceptual than he did in Things 
above Reason in the act of recursive mental division. 
In Boyle’s experimental works there is frequent invocation of what might, or 
indeed might not, be imagined. In Spring of the Air, Boyle describes the difficulty in 
keeping the pump tight to the external air: ‘which when the Vessel begins to be 
exhausted, is much more difficult to be kept out then one would easily imagine’ (I, 
162), again framing his observation in negative to the mental picture conjured. Boyle 
also uses thought experiments as a means of testing the likelihood of things that cannot 
be practically tried, for example when considering how to weigh the air, he considers 
the impossible fantasy image: ‘if we could lift a pair of Scales above the Atmosphere’ 
(I, 254).69 
As Sargent notes, Boyle ‘rejected the empiricist equation of ideas with images in 
the mind’; he held that it is possible to form ideas about the existence of an object 
without having had a sense experience of it.70 Although Boyle does use sensory data 
and visual imagery, he also accommodates other modes of conception, such as 
conception in negative relation to more concrete ideas. As seen in his use of the via 
negativa, the negative formulations have the ability to take man beyond the limit 
between the known and unknown, in some manner. Boyle connects this idea to the 
notion of visibility, which is so important for natural philosophical observations, in a 
way that accommodates the enrichment of experimental philosophy by what is not seen 
or what is beyond sight. In Usefulness, I, Boyle quotes from Augustine,  
 
Non debes uti oculis (says he) ut pecus, tantum ut videas, quæ addas 
ventri, non menti: utere, ut homo, intende Cœlum, & intende Facta, & 
quære Factorem; aspice quæ vides, & quære quem non vides, crede 
                                                
68 BP, 26/162–63, quoted in Antonio Clericuzio, Elements, Principles and Corpuscles: A Study of 
Atomism and Chemistry in the Seventeenth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2000), p. 117. 
69 On the similarity between this image and Milton’s image of the scales of justice in Book IV of 
Paradise Lost, see M. S. Berkowitz, ‘“With Balanc’t Air in Counterpoise”: Milton & Robert Boyle’, 
Milton Quarterly, 13 (1979), 15–17.  
70 Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, pp. 161–62. 
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in eum quem non vides, propter ista quæ vides. (III, 233) 
 
(You ought not to use your eyes as a Bruit, onely to take notice of 
Provisions for your Belly, and not for your Minde: Use them as a 
Man: Pry up into Heaven: See the things made, and enquire the 
Maker: Look upon those things you can see, and seek after Him 
whom you cannot see, and believe on Him you cannot see, because of 
those things you see.) (III, 282 (from ‘The Citations English’d’)) 
 
Man might be limited, but he is instructed to search beyond his limits and to have faith 
in what is unseen because of what is seen. This also relates Boyle’s method to his belief 
that natural philosophy serves to inspire wonder and faith in God. 
In Seraphic Love Boyle expands on the trope of the via negativa with the idea 
that visual stimulation is supposed to transport you beyond its limits in wonder. On the 
prettiness of creatures he writes:  
 
God did ne’re intend them to terminate our Love, but only by our 
Eyes to exalt our Faith above them, and by the beauties, our sight can 
apprehend, to raise us to a Confidence, that there is in their Author 
more than we can either see, or comprehend. (I, 87) 
 
The end point is not the creature but the Creator. Boyle also describes this way of 
looking by an analogy of looking at a picture of your mistress through its crystal cover. 
The glass is pure and lovely, but it is not the chief business of your eye, nor do you 
terminate your sight in it, but rather you look through and beyond to the image itself 
(ibid.). Boyle also expresses this with an instrumental analogy: 
 
Me-thinks, Seraphick and our common Lovers behold exteriour 
beauties with a Difference resembling that, wherewith Children and 
Astronomers consider Galileo’s Optick Glasses, [...] which th’one 
prizes most, for what they Appear; the other, for what they Discover. 
For Children contenting themselves to wonder at the Length, and fall 
in Love with the Workmanship, and Gildings of the Tube, do thus but 
Gaze Upon them, whereas Astronomers Look Through them; and, 
scarce taking notice of the unusuall Ornaments, or the shape, imploy 
them to find out unknown Lights in the Skie, and to descry in Heaven 
bright Stars, unseen before, and other Cœlestiall Novelties and 
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Beauties. (I, 88) 
 
Children settle their gaze on the decorative object that is the telescope, but astronomers 
look through it to discover new and unseen beauty in the heavens. The analogy is 
similar to his consideration of the difference between a child and a philosopher 
admiring a rare book of hieroglyphics, and incorporates the methods of the natural 
philosopher — methods of observation and examination — into his search for God. 
As Daston and Park so shrewdly observe, the passion of wonder ‘register[s] the 
line between the known and the unknown’. They (and numerous other scholars) note 
that there is a strong relationship between Boyle’s spirituality and his natural 
philosophical practices, particularly observing that the investigation of the natural world 
and the sense of wonder it provokes is for Boyle an act of worship in itself in that it 
affirms the existence of and our dependence on God.71 Other scholars suggest more 
methodological links between Boyle’s religion and his science. Hunter suggests that 
Boyle’s ‘obsessive practices’ as an experimenter are related to the fact that he was so 
‘assiduous in his spiritual exercises’.72 Lawrence Principe also argues convincingly that 
there are elements of Boyle’s essay writing style used in his natural philosophical works 
which show stylistic and pedagogic influence from his earlier interest in romance and 
his own exhortatory moral writings.73 Principe demonstrates a ‘clear progression’ from: 
 
The “Scripture Observations,” in which texts give rise to moral 
messages, through the early Occasional Reflections, in which daily 
events give rise to moral messages, to Boyle’s early chemistry, in 
which experimental results give rise to moral messages.74 
 
Whether it is of scripture, daily life, or experiment, observation and reflection contribute 
to moral understanding. 
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The influence of Boyle’s religious thought on his experimental practice is most 
clearly seen in the flexibility of his epistemology, his embracing of nescience, and his 
inference of unknowns in a similar manner to apophatic theology. As Anstey describes, 
Boyle’s corpuscularian philosophy was a middle way between contemporary 
metaphysical disputes, and allowed theory to proceed even though the debate was not 
yet settled.75 It also provided a middle way between the spiritual and corporeal: 
 
betwixt visible bodies and Spiritual Beings there is a middle sort of 
Agents, invisible Corpuscles; by which a Great part of the difficulter 
phænomena of Nature are produc’d, and by which may intelligibly be 
explicated those Phænomena, which ’twere absurd to refer to the 
former, and precarious to attribute to the latter.76 
 
Invisible corpuscles provide an ontological solution, existing in a continuum between 
visible and spiritual. But this is not their only role. In using them to avoid the absurdity 
or precariousness of competing hypotheses, Boyle also attributes to them an explicatory 
function.   
As we have seen, there is a complex relationship between the visible and 
invisible worlds that requires the experimental method and carefully controlled and 
demarcated experimental spaces to take natural philosophical knowledge beyond the 
limits of pure empiricism. But as well as practical experimental methods, Boyle also 
uses rhetorical and imaginative methods to think about and work on the invisible air. 
 
 
The Visual Presentation of Experiment and Data 
 
In this section I mainly focus on the use of illustrations in Boyle’s publications on air, 
and their relationship to his use of verbal imagery, paying particular attention to the 
work of Steven Shapin, Simon Schaffer, and Bruno Latour on this subject. I also briefly 
consider Boyle’s practices of aggregating and ordering information. 
 
                                                
75 Anstey, Philosophy of Robert Boyle, p. 9. 
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In Shapin and Schaffer’s influential work Leviathan and the Air Pump, the authors 
argue that, ‘Solutions to the problem of knowledge are solutions to the problem of 
social order.’77 They assert that ‘Robert Boyle sought to secure assent by way of the 
experimentally generated matter of fact’ and delineate the methodology they believe he 
implemented to achieve this:78 
 
The establishment of matters of fact in Boyle’s experimental 
programme utilized three technologies: a material technology 
embedded in the construction and operation of the air-pump; a 
literary technology by means of which the phenomena produced by 
the pump were made known to those who were not direct witnesses; 
and a social technology that incorporated the conventions 
philosophers should use in dealing with each other and considering 
knowledge-claims.79 
 
Shapin and Schaffer argue that ‘Boyle proposed that matters of fact be established by 
the aggregation of individuals’ beliefs’, and that ‘Matters of fact were the outcome of 
the process of having an empirical experience, warranting it to oneself, and assuring 
others that grounds for their belief were adequate’. For Shapin and Schaffer, a 
fundamental element of this process is the ‘multiplication of the witnessing 
experience’.80 They propose that as well as trying to increase the number of direct 
witnesses to experiments, in his use of literary technology Boyle appeals to ‘virtual 
witnessing’, going beyond mere reporting to create an experience in which the reader is 
a virtual witness to the experiments described.81 Shapin and Schaffer claim that this is 
achieved by the following methods: the use of modesty and inclusion of reported 
failures to build trust in the author and his accounts of experiments; and the use of 
naturalistic pictorial images of the air pump and a high level of circumstantial detail in 
the reports to recreate the scene for the reader.  
While the consideration of Boyle’s methods in terms of material, literary, and 
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social technologies provides a useful and valid structure for analysis, there are also 
several ways in which I believe the arguments of Leviathan and the Air Pump need to 
be challenged. For example, the importance to the argument of invoking actual 
witnesses seems disproportionate to the actual frequency of occurrence of this practice 
in Boyle’s experimental writings. Similarly, as Sargent has shown, the social status of 
such witnesses does not seem to receive the same emphasis in Boyle’s writings as it 
does in Shapin and Schaffer’s argument.82 The aspects of Shapin and Schaffer’s 
argument I question in this chapter are the details of Boyle’s literary technology, which 
I believe have been subtly misinterpreted. My reading results in a slightly different 
interpretation of the role of the reader or ‘virtual witness’, and of the underlying 
presumption of the degree to which Boyle was concerned with persuading assent to his 
hypotheses.  
The concept of virtual witnessing is sound. As Shapin and Schaffer describe it: 
 
The technology of virtual witnessing involves the production in a 
reader’s mind of such an image of an experimental scene as obviates 
the necessity for either direct witness or replication. [...] The 
validation of experiments, and the crediting of their outcomes as 
matters of fact, necessarily entailed their realization in the laboratory 
of the mind and the mind’s eye.83 
 
They also note that the ‘same linguistic resources’ could be used ‘to encourage the 
physical replication of experiments or to trigger in the reader’s mind a naturalistic 
image of the experimental scene’ (ibid.). These assertions hold up against Boyle’s 
statements of intention in the preface to Spring of the Air. Boyle acknowledges that 
while he thought his nephew, the wealthy Lord Dungarven to whom the work is 
addressed, might be able to repeat his experiments, he also foresaw that the expense and 
difficulty would likely prohibit most men from trying them. He writes: 
 
I thought I might doe the generality of my Readers no unacceptable 
peace of service, by so punctually relating what I carefully observ’d, 
that they may look upon these Narratives as standing Records in our 
new Pneumaticks, and need not reiterate themselves an Experiment to 
                                                
82 Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, p. 156. 
83 Shapin and Schaffer, p. 60. 
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have as distinct an Idea of it, as may suffice them to ground their 
Reflections and Speculations upon. (I, 144) 
  
Boyle hopes that his accounts will be sufficient to obviate the need for readers to 
perform the experiments themselves. The notion of ‘look[ing] upon these Narratives as 
standing Records’ contains within it a hope for a reclassification of the experimental 
accounts. Although they are near synonyms, Narratives places a greater emphasis on 
the subjective act of narration while Records, particularly as modified by standing 
which implies assent to factuality, is more detached from individual human agency. 
Boyle hopes that his punctilious relation and careful observation will elevate his 
narratives into a factual form with more authority and objectivity — a part of the trust 
element of Shapin and Schaffer’s literary technology. Because of the reliable nature of 
these standing Records, Boyle intends that his readers will not need to reproduce the 
experiment themselves in order to have a distinct idea of it. This is captured to some 
degree by Shapin and Schaffer’s description of the creation in the mind of ‘an image of 
an experimental scene as obviates the necessity for either direct witness or replication’. 
However, there is a silent slippage between thought and visual image in the move from 
Boyle’s ‘distinct [...] Idea’ to Shapin and Schaffer’s not quite synonymous ‘image of an 
experimental scene’, which implies a process in the reader’s mind that needs further 
investigation.  
There is a visual element to Boyle’s words, particularly in his lexical choices for 
the responsive thoughts of the reader: Reflections and Speculations. These words appear 
frequently throughout Boyle’s text with this same context and are both words for 
thought with striking visual connotations: a reflection being an image returned to the 
observer, particularly in a mirror, and speculation deriving from Latin speculari (to 
watch, observe, examine) and specere (to see or look). There are three points to note. 
First, while Boyle does not deny visuality to the distinct idea of the experiments, it is 
not the distinct idea itself, but the thoughts of the reader provoked by it that are couched 
in visual terms. Second, Boyle does not use a language of simple observation or seeing, 
but a language loaded with associations of the mediated visual access provided by 
instruments. Reflection and speculation both have catoptric associations (speculation is 
also related to speculum, the Latin for mirror), and the idea of grounding reflections and 
speculations, as well as being synonymous with the idea of basing further thoughts upon 
the secure experimental foundation provided by Boyle as a distinct idea, is also 
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potentially suggestive of the practice of grinding lenses and curved mirrors (such as 
those used in the reflecting telescopes built by Hooke and Newton). Third, and most 
significant, the purpose of creating the distinct idea of the experiment is not to persuade 
the reader to Boyle’s hypothesis, but to facilitate and stimulate the reader’s own 
thoughts about the experimental facts. These three points combine to suggest a process 
which is much more participatory than the rather passive feel of Shapin and Schaffer’s 
virtual witnessing. The idea of witnessing as it occurs in Boyle’s writing is not just in 
the distinct idea, but is also encapsulated in the spectative aspects of reflection and 
speculation, and thus thought itself is implicated in the act of witnessing the 
experiment. The semantics of instruments and the active nature of grounding also 
contribute to this participatory feel, echoing the ideas of the mind as an instrument 
discussed in the previous section, highlighting the interpretative act of the reader as 
observer, and placing him in command of the tools required for this act almost as an 
experimenter in his own right. 
Shapin and Schaffer observe that ‘We usually think of an experimental report as 
a narration of some prior visual experience: it points to sensory experiences that lie 
behind the text’, and suggest that we expand this notion: ‘we should also appreciate that 
the text itself constitutes a visual source.’84 It is not just the verbal text that forms the 
literary technology of Boyle’s method: the pictorial illustrations play an important role 
too. Shapin and Schaffer interpret Boyle’s images as ‘an attempt at detailed naturalistic 
representation’, which function as ‘mimetic devices’.85 They claim that:  
 
By virtue of the density of circumstantial detail that could be 
conveyed through the engraver’s laying of lines, they imitated reality 
and gave the viewer a vivid impression of the experimental scene. 
The sort of naturalistic images that Boyle favoured provided a greater 
density of circumstantial detail than would have been proffered by 
more schematic representations. The images served to announce, as it 
were, that ‘this was really done’ and that ‘it was done in the way 
stipulated’; they allayed distrust and facilitated virtual witnessing.86 
 
The authors refer to the use of cut away sections and shadowing in the illustration of the 
                                                
84 Shapin and Schaffer, p. 61. 
85 Shapin and Schaffer, pp. 61, 62. 
86 Shapin and Schaffer, p. 62. 
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air pump in Spring of the Air (see Fig. 2.1), and the inclusion of details such as a dead 
mouse in the receiver and depicted experimenters (presumably referring to plates 1 and 
5 of Spring, 1st Continuation, although this is not clearly stated), as the sort of 
circumstantial detail that helps recreate the scene for the reader. They write: ‘This is not 
a picture of the ‘idea’ of an air-pump, but of a particular existing air-pump.’87 Shapin 
and Schaffer connect this use of pictorial illustration to Boyle’s verbal methods of 
prolixity and circumstantial detail as being necessary for creating trust and facilitating 
virtual witnessing. 
This argument for the function of the pictorial elements of the text is persuasive 
to some degree, and certainly I agree that we need to consider the text as a visual 
artefact as well as a verbal one. However, I think Shapin and Schaffer’s analysis is too 
simplistic and their claims too widely applied. There are three questions I wish to raise: 
the question of the paucity of pictorial illustration in Boyle, the question of the subject 
matter, and the question of whether the function of the illustrations is mimetic and its 
purpose persuasive.  
Shapin and Schaffer do not directly address the fact that Boyle’s works were not 
extensively illustrated. Spring of the Air contains just one illustrated plate depicting the 
air pump and other equipment, gathered as a collection of sixteen figures on one page. 
There are no other illustrations and no illustrations at all of experiments or phenomena 
in this work, and yet Spring of the Air is one of the main texts supporting Shapin and 
Schaffer’s argument about illustration. This paucity is alluded to in their statement, 
‘Producing these kinds of images was an expensive business in the mid-seventeenth 
century and natural philosophers used them sparingly’ but is otherwise ignored. 
Dismissing the absence of further plates as a cost saving exercise is rather disingenuous 
considering Boyle’s extensive wealth, the astronomical cost of the air pump itself, and 
the ‘great attention’ Shapin and Schaffer otherwise attribute to Boyle’s role in the 
‘manufacture of these images’.88 Similarly, while extensively illustrated natural 
philosophical works may not have been de rigueur they were not unheard of. As well as 
Hooke’s Micrographia, examples include the first edition of William Gilbert’s De 
Magnete (1600), which contained thirty-two illustrations across a two hundred and forty 
page work, not including inhabited initials and printers’ ornaments. On the continent, 
                                                
87 Shapin and Schaffer, p. 61. 
88 Ibid. 
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Otto von Guericke’s Experimenta nova (ut vocantur) magdeburgica de vacuo spatio 
(1672) contained twenty illustrations (see for example Fig. 2.2) across a two hundred 
and forty-three page work, as well as an illustrated title page and an author portrait. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Otto von Guericke, Experimenta nova (ut vocantur) Magdeburgica de vacuo spatio  
(Amsterdam: J. Jansson à Waesberge, 1672), plate 11.  
 
 
The plate from Spring of the Air does render the depicted apparatus 
naturalistically in its use of shadowing, and indeed in its use of linear perspective, 
which Shapin and Schaffer do not mention. However, there are also many aspects about 
the plate that are not naturalistic. I would argue that the use of cut-away sections (see 
Fig. 2.1, Boyle’s figure 15) is in fact a move away from naturalistic representation 
(although it does of course add circumstantial detail) and, like the exploded multipart 
piece depicted in Boyle’s figure 2, is more to do with facilitating an understanding of 
the apparatus and its workings than recreating its actual visual appearance in the 
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experimental scene. It is also notable that the items are all floating in white space — 
only one (figure 8) casts any background shadow. None of the items are to scale (figure 
2 for example is a magnified view of a part in figure 1) nor do they bear any locational 
relation to the other figures in the plate. Compared to the engravings of experimental 
scenes more popular on the continent, which, even when they also included schematic 
illustrations of apparatus, were often naturalistically represented (see for example Fig. 
2.2); or to the illustration in Boyle’s own New Experiments and Observations Touching 
Cold, or an Experimental History of Cold, Begun (1665) in which a cross section of the 
experimental apparatus is depicted within its naturalistically illustrated outdoors setting 
of earth and trees (IV, 362); or the frontispiece to his Medicina Hydrostatica: or, 
Hydrostaticks Applied to the Materia Medica (1690)89 in which the equipment depicted, 
although still schematic in its labeling, is shown laid out on a table with the legend on a 
banner backdrop (see Fig. 2.3), the plate from Spring of the Air does not appear to be 
naturalistic or mimetic at all. It might be three dimensional, but it is still schematic and 
the items depicted are generic. The way the figures are used by Boyle in his lettered 
cross-reference to them in detailed passages explaining the apparatus in the text, also 
supports this assertion by suggesting that the verbal and visual information supplied is 
intended to facilitate the understanding or recreation of the equipment. This does in turn 
help the reader to accurately visualize what happens in the experiments, but it is 
different to naturalistically recreating the experimental scene.  
Another important consideration related to the paucity of illustration, is the 
subject matter. In Spring of the Air, Boyle chooses to illustrate the apparatus only. He 
does not show any of the experiments (there is nothing in the receiver depicted in 
Boyle’s figure 1 of Fig. 2.1) or any of the resultant phenomena, and neither does he 
provide any visual aids to help the reader understand his hypothesis about the spring of 
the air.  
                                                
89 Hereafter Medicina Hydrostatica. 
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Fig. 2.3. Robert Boyle, Medicina Hydrostatica (London, 1690), plate 1 (cropped). Photo: © British 
Library Board. Image published with permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without 
permission. 
 
 
On examination of the other images published in Boyle’s works we find similar 
tendencies throughout his oeuvre, with some small variation. On the whole illustration 
is sparse. The most extensively illustrated work is Spring, 1st Continuation, which 
contains nine plates, most made up of groups of figures. This is one of the most 
‘naturalistic’ collections of images (in Shapin and Schaffer’s sense) with extensive use 
of body shadowing to create depth and weight to the depicted figures. However, in 
some cases the text that labels the figure and gives the page reference is found ‘inside’ 
the body of the depicted receiver. Where this occurs, the text is obscured by this body 
shading, possibly suggesting that the images were originally drawn up and labelled 
without shading and that this was added at a later stage in the process (see Fig. 2.4, 
particularly figure 2 in the bottom right).  
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Fig. 2.4. Robert Boyle, Spring, 1st Continuation (London, 1669), plate 6.  
Photo: © The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.  
Image published with permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission. 
 
 
The majority of the figures in the nine plates of Spring, 1st Continuation include 
some gesture towards background, denoted either by shading to indicate a floor or 
surface, or by cast shadows from the object, or both. In some cases, multiple figures are 
placed on the page as if they were on the same surface. However with one exception — 
figure 1 of plate 5, which depicts a practitioner working with equipment on the roof of a 
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building in order to show the set up of a singularly large experiment (see Fig. 2.5) — 
these still do not depict actual scenes that might help the reader imagine the laboratory 
setting. Even the naturalism of the image of the building is distorted by the inclusion in 
the same plate of figures 2–4, a collection of barometers at a different scale that appear 
on the page at the same height as the building, suspended in mid-air by disembodied 
hands, and decorated with an elaborate bow. 
 
 
Fig. 2.5. Robert Boyle, Spring, 1st Continuation (London, 1669), plate 5.  
Photo: RS.9473 © The Royal Society. 
 131 
Apart from the first plate of Spring, 1st Continuation, which depicts the air 
pump, most of the plates show groups of figures gathered artificially into one scheme 
(as in Fig. 2.4). The focus is still on depicting apparatus, but while the second plate is 
generic — depicting details of the air pump — the other plates depict specific setups 
inside the receivers for specific experiments, cross-referenced with the text. However 
we are still not shown any results or visual interpretations of hypotheses, and there is 
still a sense of disconnection because, apart from the first plate (showing the air pump 
with a dead mouse in the receiver as discussed by Shapin and Schaffer), the receivers 
are divorced from the pumps that give them their experimental context. Four of the 
figures include parts of apparatus held by disembodied hands (see figures 3 and 5 of 
Fig. 2.4 and figures 3 and 4 of Fig. 2.5), but unlike the inclusion of the experimenter in 
figure 1 of plate 5 (Fig. 2.5), these are very disjointed from the reality of the scene, not 
least because the hands are distinctly female hands and while some of the witnesses 
were women, all of the practitioners of Boyle’s experiments were men. The other works 
with multiple plates — Hydrostatical Paradoxes, Made out by New Experiments, (For 
the Most Part Physical and Easie) (1666) and Spring, 2nd Continuation — contain only 
detailed images of equipment, which, while three dimensional, have a very schematic 
rather than naturalistic feel. 
In terms of the subject matter of the illustrations associated with the air pump 
and pneumatic experiments, it is intriguing that there are no illustrations of phenomena, 
or of the hypothesized movement or make up of the air. I suggest that the decision not 
to depict such things relates to Boyle’s nescience about causes and his desire for the 
reader to ground their own reflections and speculations. Aside from a diagrammatic 
illustration of the passage of light through a prism in Experiments and Considerations 
Touching Colours (1664), none of Boyle’s illustrations contain visual representations of 
this sort of physically explanatory phenomena, and although the lines of the prism 
diagram record the movement and behaviour of light, the lines also reproduce what can 
be simply and visibly observed as beams of light (IV, 103). 
In Spring of the Air, although Boyle provides no illustration for his hypothesis, 
the verbal description is in fact very visual. Boyle describes his notion that there is a 
spring or elastical power in the air, giving a corpuscular description of the air as made 
up of or abounding with particles which can be bent or compressed by the weight of the 
atmosphere or other bodies and which try to resist that pressure by unbending 
themselves as much as possible (I, 165). This is consolidated by use of analogy: 
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This Notion may perhaps be somewhat further explain’d, by 
conceiving the Air near the Earth to be such a heap of little Bodies, 
lying one upon another, as may be resembled to a Fleece of Wooll. 
For this (to omit other likenesses betwixt them) consists of many 
slender and flexible Hairs; each of which, may indeed, like a little 
Spring, be easily bent or rouled up; but will also, like a Spring, be 
still endeavouring to stretch it self out again. (Ibid.) 
 
Boyle continues in this vein, expounding further similarities, again very visual, between 
‘both these Haires, and the Aerial Corpuscles to which we liken them’ (ibid.). The 
image of a heap of particles, or little springs would be easy to illustrate but instead the 
verbal analogy takes on the role of a pictorial illustration, rather than being 
supplemented by one.  
 Cristoph Lüthy describes the paucity of early modern atomic illustration more 
widely, pointing out that Gassendi’s thousands of pages of Epicureanism remain 
pictureless, despite many attempts to describe atomic shapes verbally, and that of the 
seventy-nine editions of Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura printed between 1473 and 1725, 
many with lavish illustrations and frontispieces, only one edition — the third edition of 
Thomas Creech’s English translation of 1683 — had anything even approaching a 
graphic representation of atoms, depicting the motes of dust in a sunbeam that are used 
by Lucretius as an analogy for atoms in Book 2.90 Lüthy does however describe 
Descartes’s graphical representations of otherwise invisible elementary particles in 
publications going back to 1637, giving a notable precedent for this sort of pictorial 
illustration.91 
In the Defence and Examen, published in response to criticisms of Spring of the 
Air made by Franciscus Linus and Thomas Hobbes, we find the only conceptual images 
in Boyle’s oeuvre (see Fig. 2.6). On a single plate at the beginning of the work are 
gathered six figures. Four of these depict equipment in Boyle’s usual fashion, 
corresponding to the text and his debate with Linus and Hobbes. Figures 4 and 6 
however are notably different. Figure 6 is a diagram that offers a visual explanation for 
the mathematical problem of the Rota Aristotelica, and figure 4 depicts the idea of air 
                                                
90 Lüthy, ‘Atomist Iconography’, p. 122. 
91 Christoph Lüthy, ‘Where Logical Necessity Becomes Visual Persuasion: Descartes’s Clear and Distinct 
Illustrations’, in Transmitting Knowledge, ed. by Kusukawa and Maclean, pp. 97–133 (p. 101). 
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particles as coiled springs. Both are referred to in the separate section, ‘An Explication 
of Rarefaction’, which is actually authored by Hooke and not Boyle.92 It is Hooke in 
Micrographia who is the first person to visually depict a hypothetical arrangement of 
atomic particles (see Fig. 1.4).  
 
 
Fig. 2.6. Robert Boyle, Defence and Examen (London, 1662), plate 1 (cropped). Photo: © British Library 
Board. Image published with permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without 
permission. 
 
 
The absence of any such image of the hypothetical structure of the air in Spring 
of the Air (and indeed any of Boyle’s other works bar Hooke’s illustration) does have a 
                                                
92 On authorship, see Boyle, Works, III, 83, note a. For a more detailed consideration of Hooke’s 
contribution to the explanation of the elasticity of the air in Defence and Examen, see Antonio Clericuzio, 
‘The Mechanical Philosophy and the Spring of the Air: New Light on Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke’, 
Nuncius, 13 (1997), 67–75. 
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particular effect on the way in which the work operates as persuasion, in particular on 
the relationship between the distinct idea and the reflection and speculation grounded 
upon it. The detailed and highly visual nature of the textual descriptions of the 
hypothesized spring of the air and the use of analogy and image as detailed above, 
suggest Boyle wants the reader to be able to visualize his hypothesis. It also proves that 
the idea has a clear form in Boyle’s mind, and that it could therefore be pictorially 
illustrated if he wished (indeed as Hooke does two years later in the Defence and 
Examen). As Shapin and Schaffer assert, the engravings of apparatus give the readers 
images that can be duplicated in the mind, but without such pictures, the visualization of 
the hypothetical description of the nature of the air requires different processes. By 
using verbal description and analogy Boyle makes the reader engage the imagination 
and contemplate the way in which the relationship holding the analogy together works. 
This is much closer to the act of inference Boyle himself undergoes to arrive at his own 
hypothesis from observed experimental phenomena, which don’t reveal the air itself but 
merely its effects on visible bodies. Boyle uses the difference between the visuality of a 
picture and the visuality of verbal description to add something to the reader’s 
experience beyond just being a passive witness. In the preface Boyle states his hope, 
‘that the various hints to be met with in the following Letter, will (at least) somewhat 
awaken mens thoughts, & excite them to new speculations’ (I, 146). 
The co-opting of the reader as a participant in the work of natural philosophy, as 
a thinker and interpreter of experimental outcomes rather than a mere witness, sits well 
with the sense found throughout Boyle’s work of it being a wider, and indeed 
collaborative project. He frequently makes reference to ways in which the work may be 
developed, for example by use of better instruments, different conditions, or by people 
with different specialities such as mathematics. Boyle’s term ‘the Invisible College’ is 
particularly provocative here. He uses it in letters of the late 1640s to refer to the 
network of natural philosophers with whom he was in contact, but it is tempting to 
extend the idea of invisibility beyond the fact that these scientists were not at that time 
united by a formal affiliation, to include notions about the methods of developing 
knowledge through the work that could take place in the sort of mental laboratory that 
this extended conception of virtual witnessing facilitates. In Spring of the Air Boyle 
establishes the reader as a virtual witness to what is attestable and picturable fact, that 
is, the equipment and execution of the experiments, and then within that same mental 
space encourages the reader to reflect for him or herself, not just as a witness, but as an 
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intellectual participant. The reader is presented with Boyle’s ideas, but not constrained 
by their pictorial depiction, and the processes of imagination required to visualize 
Boyle’s verbal descriptions and hypotheses provide the reader with the imaginative 
tools to respond to, and indeed reflect and speculate on, the observed phenomena itself. 
The lack of pictorial illustration also allows Boyle to accommodate the 
movement and change of the corpuscles, and furthermore of his own imagery. Boyle’s 
aerial corpuscles aren’t static, and while an engraved image might have made more 
immediately accessible the particles he was describing, it would have struggled to 
capture the dynamic nature Boyle’s descriptions ascribe to them, for example in the 
continual battle between compression and unbending and stretching, or the air’s 
anthropomorphic efforts to insinuate itself into every gap in the stop. Boyle’s images 
also change according to his descriptive needs, for example at the end of the analogy 
between air and a fleece of wool, he admits that in one aspect — the air’s powers of 
self-dilation — it is more like a dry sponge than wool, but that the latter comparison 
was used ‘on this occasion’ because of its particulate structure. Similarly, the flexibility 
afforded when the image is held in the imagination rather than on the page allows Boyle 
to entertain other possibilities or potential objections to his theory, understand them, and 
then return to his original idea, allowing images to form, transform, and reform in the 
mind. Around ten pages after the fleece of wool analogy, Boyle considers an objection 
against the compactness and pressure of the air: 
 
That we finde this very Air to yield readily to the motion of little 
Flies, and even to that of Feathers, and such other light and weak 
Bodies; which seem to argue, that the particles of our Air are not so 
compress’d as we have represented them. (I, 169) 
 
This new image allows the particles to relax in our mind’s eye as we imagine this 
different potential state, but Boyle soon returns to his fleece of wool analogy and the 
original image is restored to the mind. 
Bruno Latour uses Shapin’s essay, ‘Pump and Circumstance’, to support his 
argument for ‘immutable mobiles’.93 For Latour, changes in scientific thinking occur 
not because of large conceptual shifts in thinking, but because of ‘simple modifications 
in the way in which groups of people argue with one another using paper, signs, prints 
                                                
93 Latour, p. 7. 
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and diagrams.’94 However, he also recognizes the potential for this deflating strategy to 
rid us of one great mystical divide, only to replace it with another kind of mysticism if 
the researcher dealing in prints and images believes in the power of signs and symbols 
isolated from anything else. He seeks a way of holding the focus to make this strategy 
useful, insisting that we must first consider, ‘in which situations we might expect 
change in the writing and imaging procedures to make any difference at all in the way 
we argue, prove and believe.’95 He achieves this by limiting the scope of enquiry to the 
construction of hard facts, which he figures with a model of competitive assent: 
 
Who will win in an agnostic encounter between two authors, and 
between them and all the others they need to build up a statement S? 
Answer: the one able to muster on the spot the largest number of well 
aligned and faithful allies. [...] My contention is that writing and 
imaging cannot by themselves explain the changes in our scientific 
societies, except insofar as they help to make this agnostic situation 
more favorable. [...] We need, in other words, to look at the way in 
which someone convinces someone else to take up a statement, to 
pass it along, to make it more of a fact, and to recognize the first 
author’s ownership and originality.96 
 
With the prioritization of these concerns, Latour — with a strongly Eisensteinian 
outlook — ascertains that the most important factors for visualization, print, and writing 
are the mobilization and stability of the things one is attempting to convey: ‘you have to 
invent objects which have the properties of being mobile, but also immutable, 
presentable, readable and combinable with each other’, denoting such objects as 
‘immutable mobiles’.97 
Latour is of course correct that this is one element, but his argument limits itself 
with its narrow focus on the construction of hard facts and also limits the scope of 
scientific texts with its focus on the mustering of assent. Science is advanced, not just 
by proofs, but also by the posing of questions and highlighting of uncertainties, which 
stimulates further enquiry. Indeed, if we are looking for moments of change in the way 
                                                
94 Latour, p. 3. 
95 Latour, p. 4. 
96 Latour, p. 5. 
97 Latour, p. 7. 
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we argue, prove, and believe, then surely, while the assertion of facts may be a part of 
the process of establishing a new scientific idea, it will not be the whole process. This 
emphasis on hard fact in the context of the idea of immutable mobiles confuses two 
types of certainty: the certain immutability of the inscription (be it writing, image, or 
printed text), and the factual certainty of the content inscribed. As is also found in the 
argument of Shapin and Schaffer, there is a silent slippage between the distinct idea 
formed by the text and assent to the hypothesis. Depending on its physical inscription, a 
list of questions, unknowns, or hypotheses could just as easily be considered an 
immutable mobile as a statement of fact or set of assertions. By limiting his discussion 
in this way, Latour misses the fascinating interplay between hard fact and hypothesis 
that reveals some of the subtleties of the role of the imagination in cutting-edge science 
of any period, and which is certainly to be found in Boyle’s work on air. 
In his discussion of Boyle — which leans heavily on Shapin’s essay — Latour, 
like Shapin and Schaffer, limits the role of the reader, writing of Boyle’s ‘disciplining’ 
of his (virtual) witnesses.98 If scientific writing is entirely persuasive and only about 
mustering allies to a particular position, then the reader’s function as an interpreter, 
thinker, and (as I believe) intellectual participant in the development of knowledge is 
seriously curtailed to merely agreeing or disagreeing with the author.  
Latour observes the staging qualities of Boyle’s work, the creation of the ‘new 
laboratory’. However he fails to distinguish the certainty of the setting from the (far 
lesser) certainty of the phenomena to be considered. He writes: 
 
it is possible to overestimate the inscription, but not the setting in 
which the cascade of ever more written and numbered inscriptions is 
produced. What we are really dealing with is the staging of a 
scenography in which attention is focused on one set of dramatized 
inscriptions. The setting works like a giant ‘optical device’ that 
creates a new laboratory, a new type of vision and a new 
phenomenon to look at. [...] The earlier we go back in history of 
science, the more attention we see being paid to the setting and less to 
the inscriptions themselves. Boyle, for instance, in the fascinating 
account of his vacuum pump experiment described by Shapin (1984), 
had to invent not only the phenomenon, but the instrument to make it 
visible, the set-up in which the instrument was displayed, the written 
                                                
98 Latour, pp. 10, 19. 
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and printed accounts through which the silent reader could read 
‘about’ the experiment, the type of witnesses admitted onto the stage, 
and even the types of commentaries the potential witnesses were 
allowed to utter. ‘Seeing the vacuum’ was possible only once all 
these witnesses had been disciplined.99 
 
Latour’s emphasis on the setting as an optical device resonates with my point about the 
demarcation of experimental spaces as necessary to be able to ‘see’ phenomena. 
However, although he observes that less attention is paid to the inscriptions themselves;  
tantalizingly writes of Boyle’s invention of phenomena; and places ‘Seeing the vacuum’ 
inside quotation marks, Latour — like Shapin — switches the focus to the assent of 
witnesses and fails to note or discuss the fact that the phenomenon of particulate air is 
not actually made visible anywhere other than in the reader’s imagination, and that the 
verbal presentation is that of a tentative hypothesis, not hard fact. Boyle may be 
persuasive as to the factual nature of the setting and empirical data presented, but this is 
not the whole story and the distinction between the two modes of factual account and 
hypothetical explanation needs to be maintained. That Latour fails to maintain this 
distinction is made clear when he asks: ‘Can we summarize why it is so important for 
Brahe, Boyle, Pasteur or Guillemin to work on two-dimensional inscriptions instead of 
the sky, the air, health, or the brain?’100 What has been inscribed by Boyle is not the air, 
but some factual observations about experiments performed on the air and some 
hypotheses about the nature of air based on these observations. The contrast between 
the factual description of the setting and observations (aided by the material 
representations of apparatus) and the hypothetical explanations offered (aided by non-
material verbal descriptions), does not so much discipline the reader as create an 
experimental environment in which he or she can think. The development of the sorts of 
images found in Boyle’s work (and in seventeenth century natural philosophy texts 
more widely) with their absence of conventional Renaissance framing devices such as a 
present human figure or an eye, emphasizes the growing importance of the reader and 
supports the notion of the reader as a participant. Without these devices, the reader 
becomes the witnessing figure or eye himself, with the material text becoming the 
apparatus for viewing the observed phenomena. 
                                                
99 Latour, p. 19. 
100 Latour, p. 20. 
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As I show with Hooke, the idea that the text can operate as a piece of apparatus to help 
a practitioner ‘see’ is strongly felt in the methods Boyle uses to gather and order 
information on the page. In Boyle there is an impulse towards collection and 
aggregation, of gathering information together so it is, as Hooke recommends, ‘at one 
view’. Much of Boyle’s published works on air, in particular Spring of the Air and its 
two continuations, are collections of a vast array of Boyle’s experimental reports, and 
General History of Air is a gathering together of experiments, observations, and 
testimonies from various sources. Even the more discursive works such as the Defence 
and Examen incorporate and aggregate various experimental accounts in the 
marshalling of evidence for their arguments. This accretive approach is also seen at a 
meta-level in Boyle’s practice of utilizing methods from a range of different traditions 
and sources. As Sargent describes, his method is ‘an eclectic synthesis of the best 
elements of what have come to be known as various empiricist, rationalist, and 
pragmatist traditions’.101  
Sargent describes Boyle’s repeated stress on the importance of collation and the 
orderly presentation of data. For example in The Sceptical Chymist: or Chymico-
Physical Doubts & Paradoxes (1661), Carneades is praised for the way he ‘laid them 
[the experiments] together in such a way, and apply’d them to such purposes, and made 
such Deductions From them, as I have not Hitherto met with.’102 The deductions are 
implied to be a result not just of the experiments, but of how those experiments are laid 
together and applied, the imagery of laying them together suggesting at the least a visual 
metaphor for a verbal or mental gathering together of data, and possibly a literal and 
practical application. This sense of gathering information at one view is also seen in 
Boyle’s use of tables and lists for numerical data and quantifiable experimental results 
(such as in Medicina Hydrostatica and General History of Air) and his creation of 
indexical summaries for his published works.  
Although the Boyle archive is well known for its disarray, often presumed to be 
at the hands of subsequent scholars, Hunter, in his extensive work on Boyle’s 
manuscript papers, suggests that its confusion is perhaps ‘due less to depredations 
                                                
101 Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, p. 10. 
102 Boyle, Works, II, 374. See also Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, p. 182. 
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suffered by the archive after Boyle’s death than to his own way of keeping it’.103 He 
presents a convincing case that the chaos ‘may have been more apparent than real’ and 
that the data he was collecting was, to Boyle’s mind, ‘only useable if given a shape’. 104 
Boyle uses lists, inventories, mnemonics, and colour coded stationery to systematize his 
writings.105 However, the intention to deploy or arrange data thematically is not always 
fulfilled and remains untranscribed in his work-diaries in which notes are made by date 
rather than under heads.106 One of his work-diaries is entitled, ‘Philosophicall Entrys & 
Memorialls (of all sorts,) Here confusedly throwne together; to be Hence transferr’d to 
the Severall Treatises whereto they belong’.107 Hunter writes that the ‘the archive had 
an ordering which bore a significant relationship to Boyle’s intellectual aims and 
methods’ and argues that those aims were not towards the establishment of matters of 
fact (as much scholarship suggests) but for the interpretative use to which empirical 
findings are put.108 Hunter notes that there is a tension found in Boyle’s writing between 
clarity and accessibility and the need to represent adequately the complexity of his 
subject. This can be seen in the revisions made to his draft material, which rarely add to 
clarity and are not always even added in the most appropriate places.109 I think we also 
see Boyle’s struggle to manage his data in his frequent apologies in the prefaces to his 
published works for the inadequacies of his writing and for organizational problems 
such as misplacing certain notes. Richard Yeo argues that certain members of the 
Hartlib circle — in particular John Beale who corresponded with Boyle on the subject 
— ‘sought to condense knowledge and information into an ordered structure that 
facilitated learning and recollection’. Boyle however, was ‘far less interested in placing 
the facts and ideas thus acquired [i.e. from observations and experiments] in a sequence 
within some mnemonic grid’, and Yeo further describes his ‘refusal to condense and 
arrange material in the way they [Hartlib and Beale] demanded’. Yeo suggests that 
Beale’s suggestions, which relied on memory techniques using ‘highly structured 
                                                
103 Michael Hunter, Robert Boyle (1627–91): Scrupulosity and Science (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 
2000), p. 121. 
104 Hunter, Scrupulosity and Science, pp. 121, 133. 
105 Hunter, Scrupulosity and Science, p. 132. 
106 Hunter, Scrupulosity and Science, p. 131. 
107 BP, 22/1, quoted in Hunter, Scrupulosity and Science, p. 131.  
108 Hunter, Scrupulosity and Science, pp. 121, 214. 
109 Robert Boyle Reconsidered, ed. by Hunter, ‘introduction’, p. 12. 
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arrangements of units’, may have ‘aggravated Boyle’s existing suspicion of premature 
systems’.110 Exploring a related idea, Ernan McMullin in his work on the place of 
hypothesis in Boyle’s natural philosophy asserts that Boyle recognized the role of 
experiment in ‘sorting between theoretical alternatives’.111 I think that Hunter’s, Yeo’s, 
and McMullin’s observations and arguments can be productively combined to give a 
holistic understanding of the tension between order and chaos in Boyle’s work. Boyle 
tries to balance the need for clarity against the threat of reductiveness to his desire to 
recognize the true complexity of nature; to balance the need for order to give his 
thoughts shape against the nescient resistance of definitive structure; and to balance the 
possibilities of competing theories against each other without precluding any 
prematurely. Perhaps the issue of one of scale; Boyle’s urge towards 
comprehensiveness is reminiscent of the maps of Jorge Luis Borges’s ‘Del rigor en la 
ciencia’ (‘On Exactitude in Science’). 
Ann Moss describes the use of ‘more random’, non-alphabetical systems of 
common-placing such as those constructed by Erasmus on chains of affinity or 
contrariety, writing that, ‘The motivation behind apparently free ordering of this kind 
was the production of persuasive discourse, rhetorical invention, rather than a mapping 
of the known places of the universe of knowledge’.112 This interpretation of Erasmus 
and systems of free, or perhaps freer, ordering can perhaps be applied to Boyle, whose 
nescience and resistance to artificial systematization is reflected in his reluctance to 
write or present his work in the ordered way suggested by Beale and Hartlib. We 
perhaps see it in Spring, 2nd Continuation where Boyle’s initial attempt at writing 
experimental reports in a very terse, proto-tabular form, gradually expands back into his 
more customary narrative form over the course of the experiments. McMullin’s idea 
that experiment is itself a sorting tool suggests that the principles of order Boyle was 
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interested in were epistemological devices for discovering truths, not for imposing or 
categorizing them. As Boyle writes in The Christian Virtuoso, Part II:113 
 
The book of nature is a fine and large piece of tapestry rolled up, 
which we are not able to see all at once, but must be content to wait 
for the discovery of its beauty, and symmetry, little by little, as it 
gradually comes to be more and more unfolded, or displayed. (XII, 
530) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Boyle’s writings and the methods of his natural philosophical programme are 
characterized by a tension between his strong adherence to an epistemology of 
nescience and his desire to seek out and discover natural philosophical truths, and his 
belief that his inquisitive age would ‘produce discoveries that will explicate divers of 
the more hidden mysteries of Nature’ (IX, 373). This tension is felt in the presentation 
of his work, particularly in the high level of circumstantial detail — which speaks of a 
desire not to filter out any information at this stage — juxtaposed with more practical 
exigencies such as summary deferrals to experience. It is also seen in the seeming chaos 
of his archive, which both strives for the sort of order that can reveal patterns and new 
knowledge, and yet resists premature systematization.  
An important part of Boyle’s methodology is the embracing of experiment as a 
means of moving beyond superficial readings of nature that rely on observation and 
intuition alone, to a method that allows the isolating and testing of facts. This also 
allows for the study of objects that are otherwise impossible to observe, such as the 
invisible air. The experimental method is highly spatial in that it relies on the careful 
demarcation and control of experimental spaces in order to produce reliable testing, 
particularly when environmental factors are relevant, or indeed, the object in question. 
This concern is very strongly felt in the high level of attention paid to the integrity of 
the air pump. There is also a second kind of spatiality attached to Boyle’s experimental 
method, and that is a mental spatiality. As Shapin and Schaffer suggest, Boyle uses 
literary technologies (including his descriptions and illustrations) to recreate the 
                                                
113 Ed. by Henry Miles, first published in Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. by Birch. 
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experimental scene in the reader’s mind. However, unlike Shapin, Schaffer, and Latour, 
I believe that this technique of creating virtual witnesses is not so much to do with 
mustering assent for Boyle’s hypotheses, as it is to do with creating mental laboratories, 
which facilitate the reader’s own reflections and speculations, stimulate the sort of 
imaginative thinking necessary for illative knowledge, and allow him or her to engage 
in natural philosophical experiment as a participant. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Isaac Newton: Absolute and Relative Space 
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Introduction 
 
Newton’s Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687, with corrected editions 
in 1713 and 1726) is a work intimately connected with space and spatiality. It does not 
have the same visuality of Hooke’s observational work on micro space, or even of 
Boyle’s sparsely illustrated, experimental work on the invisible air. It is spatial in a 
much more abstract sense, espousing a space that is mathematical and conceptual. And 
yet it concerns the real-world space that frames and makes sense of the interactions of 
bodies, which are fundamental to our understanding of the world.  
It is in the Principia that Newton states his laws of motion, his inverse square 
law of universal gravitation, and his derivation of Kepler’s laws of planetary motion. 
One of the key elements of Newton’s work is that it moves beyond kinematics — the 
study or description of the motion of bodies without reference to the cause of that 
motion — to dynamics, i.e. the study of the forces and torques that effect motion. This 
changes the study of motion from being about geometry to being about processes of 
change over time. As with Boyle, whose verbal rather than pictorial illustrations allow 
the reader to imagine the movement of atoms and the compression and unbending of air 
particles in a mental laboratory, Newton needed methods that allowed him and his 
readers to be able to conceive of and work (mathematically) with these processes of 
change. There are two main tools he employs for this: the calculus and inertial frames of 
reference.1 The inertial frame of reference — which is the subject of the second section 
of this chapter — allows for dynamics, for rates of change over time, to be understood, 
perceived, and to be measured. In some ways it is like the physically demarcated 
experimental spaces of Boyle’s method, in others like the mental laboratories Boyle 
constructs for his readers.  
In the first section of this chapter, I consider Newton’s ideas — in the Principia 
and other works — about the purpose and practice of natural philosophy, and some of 
his statements that illustrate his thoughts about general questions of epistemology, key 
features of which are the assumption of the consistency of nature and the acceptance of 
                                                
1 I do not consider the calculus here as it is beyond the scope of this thesis, but there are interesting 
resonances with Hooke’s idea of gathering data ‘at one view’ and corpuscularian conceptions of 
submicroscopic particles in its method, which works on the basis of ratios of aggregations of 
infinitesimally small parts of a whole. 
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contingent knowledge as having a vital role in natural philosophy. I also consider the 
way Newton’s figures the limits of human knowledge in relation to God. In the second 
section, I give a description of Newton’s concepts of absolute and relative space, and 
consider the epistemological and metaphysical issues arising from them. In the third 
section I investigate the relationship between God and space in Newton’s writings and 
show that it has epistemological implications as well as metaphysical ones.  
Through these considerations I show Newton’s thought to rely heavily on 
notions of space and spatiality, not just as a subject, but as a way of thinking. I also 
show that although Newton posits the idea of absolute space, defining him as an 
absolutist does not seem to be a correct or uncomplicated attribution. Newton uses 
absolute space as a way of understanding and thinking about our relative experience of 
space, and to arrive at mathematically more precise calculations of movement. But the 
absolute is understood by means of the relative, and his exploration is intimately tied up 
with epistemology and notions of perception and thought.  
 
 
Epistemology and the Frame of Nature 
 
Amongst several undated manuscript drafts of a paper entitled ‘A Scheme for 
Establishing the Royal Society’, Newton offers a definition of the purpose and practice 
of natural philosophy: 
 
Natural Philosophy consists in discovering the frame & operations of 
Nature, reducing them (as far as may be) to general Rules or Laws, 
establishing those rules by observations & experiments, & thence 
deducing the causes & effects of things.2 
 
Similarly, in Query 28 in the expanded Opticks (1718), Newton states: 
 
The main business of natural philosophy is to argue from phenomena 
without feigning hypotheses, and to deduce causes from effects, till 
                                                
2 Isaac Newton, ‘A Scheme for Establishing the Royal Society’, Cambridge University Library, Newton 
Papers, MS Add.4005, <http://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/view/MS-ADD-04005/21> [accessed 24 February 2014] 
(p. 2:6r).  
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we come to the very first cause, which certainly is not mechanical.3 
 
These quotations summarize a number of key interrelated aspects of Newton’s approach 
to natural philosophy: the complimentary roles of empirical evidence and deductive 
reasoning; Newton’s aversion to feigned hypotheses; the principle of generalization; 
and the relationship between the observable rules of nature and our understanding of 
cause and effect. The first quotation also highlights an intriguing notion of spatiality 
implicit in the way Newton imagines his philosophical task: the idea of ‘the frame [...] 
of Nature’ creates an image of an underlying structure — some organizing principle that 
is figured spatially — waiting to be uncovered by the diligent philosopher. However, as 
I will demonstrate of Newton’s concept of absolute space, this underlying frame has an 
ambiguous status, neither wholly literal nor wholly metaphorical. The idea of an 
underlying frame, and the key aspects of Newton’s approach listed above, all point to 
two central themes in Newton’s epistemology: the ideas of contingency and 
consistency. 
The status of hypothesis and the relationship between theory and fact is a central 
concern, which leads to the contingent approach. Roger Cotes, in his preface to the 
second edition of the Principia, compares three classes of natural philosopher. He first 
describes the scholastics, ‘wholly concerned with the names of things rather than with 
things themselves’, and distinguishes from them those who — believing matter to be 
homogeneous and that form arises from the attributes of particles — reject that 
approach.4 However, Cotes also criticizes these more modern philosophers (in particular 
Descartes and his theory of vortices), writing: 
 
But when they take the liberty of imagining that the unknown shapes 
and sizes of the particles are whatever they please, and of assuming 
their uncertain positions and motions, and even further of feigning 
                                                
3 Isaac Newton, Philosophical Writings, ed. by Andrew Janiak (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), p. 130. Further references to this collection are denoted PW and given parenthetically in the text. 
The Opticks was first published in English 1704 with sixteen queries, and republished in Latin with an 
additional seven queries in 1706. It had a second edition in English in 1718 with thirty-one queries, and a 
third, virtually unchanged, in 1721, on which Janiak’s text is based (see PW, p. xxxiii). 
4 Isaac Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. by I. Bernard 
Cohen and Anne Whitman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 385. Further references to 
this edition are denoted Principia and given parenthetically in the text.  
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certain occult fluids that permeate the pores of bodies very freely, 
[…] they are drifting off into dreams, ignoring the true constitutions 
of things, which is obviously to be sought in vain from false 
conjectures, when it can scarcely be found out by the most certain 
observations. (Principia, p. 385–86) 
 
Cotes condemns the taking of liberties, the making of uncertain assumptions, and the 
feigning of occult solutions as false conjecture and opposed to truth. He sums up: 
‘Those who take the foundation of their speculations from hypotheses, even if they then 
proceed most rigorously according to mechanical laws, are merely putting together a 
romance’ (Principia, p. 386). He contrasts this with the third class of natural 
philosophers, with whom he groups Newton: 
 
They assume nothing as a principle that has not yet been thoroughly 
proved from phenomena. They do not contrive hypotheses, nor do 
they admit them into natural science otherwise than as a question 
whose truth may be discussed. (Ibid.) 
 
Hypothesis may exist as a question, but is never foundational. Hypothesis is ‘false 
conjecture’, which is presented as dichotomous to the ‘certain observations’ of the 
empirical and experimental methods. Even more so, hypothesis is not just presented as 
uncertain, but as fictional, having the same status as dream or romance. Similarly, 
Cotes, in defending gravity from the accusation of being occult, contrasts ‘those causes 
whose existence is very clearly demonstrated by observations’ with ‘those whose 
existence is occult, imagined, and not yet proved’ (Principia, p. 392).  
That said, Newton’s science does not lack imagination and in his own practice, 
theory and experiment bleed into each other in a natural and symbiotic way, with ideas 
growing out of experiments and in turn suggesting further experiments which then 
support or falsify certain ideas. For example, Newton writes of a series of collision 
experiments in the Principia: 
 
the experiments just described work equally well with soft bodies and 
with hard ones, since surely they do not in any way depend on the 
condition of hardness. For if this rule is to be tested in bodies that are 
not perfectly hard, it will only be necessary to decrease the reflection 
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in a fixed proportion to the quantity of elastic force. (Principia, p. 
427) 
 
As we saw with Boyle, there is an organic relationship between the experiment and the 
reasoning of it. Newton goes on to test his theory with softer bodies (balls of wool), 
concluding: ‘in this manner the third law of motion — insofar as it relates to impacts 
and reflections — is proved by this theory, which plainly agrees with experiments’ 
(ibid.). Theory and experiment combine to form a double pronged, rational argument 
that is more imaginative and better able to progress than bare empirical observation, but 
also more certain than purely hypothetical speculation. 
 Newton stresses the foundational role of empirical and experimental data to 
natural philosophy. However he does not idolize it, but rather acknowledges its limits, 
which he then tempers with reason. Although clearly expressing a belief in the capacity 
for human knowledge and understanding, Newton’s epistemology, as Brian Copenhaver 
notes, also ‘stressed the weakness of human cognition’.5 In the General Scholium to the 
second edition of the Principia, Newton writes: 
 
We see only the shapes and colors of bodies, we hear only their 
sounds, we touch only their external surfaces, we smell only their 
odors, and we taste their flavours. But there is no direct sense and 
there are no indirect reflected actions by which we know innermost 
substances. (Principia, p. 942) 
 
The intense sensuality of the first sentence dramatically contrasts the sensory data 
available to the natural philosopher with other inner qualities that he does not, and 
seemingly cannot, know. This echoes Hooke’s frustration with the limited access to 
interiority and rather the multiplication of surfaces offered by the microscope, and the 
need expressed by Boyle to go beyond just superficial observations of things. 
Newton also questions the certainty of deduction from empirical evidence. In a 
letter to Henry Oldenburg of 11 June 1672 discussing the debate with Hooke over the 
certainty of Newton’s science of colours, Newton admits a contingency to experimental 
                                                
5 Brian P. Copenhaver, ‘Jewish Theologies of Space in the Scientific Revolution: Henry More, Joseph 
Raphson, Isaac Newton and their Predecessors’, Annals of Science, 37 (1980), 489–548 (p. 541). 
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and empirical principles that are the foundation of his mixed mathematics.6 He writes: 
 
but who knows not that Optiques & many other Mathematicall 
Sciences depend as well on Physicall Principles as on Mathematicall 
Demonstrations: And the absolute certainty of a Science cannot 
exceed the certainty of its Principles.7 
 
He goes on to describe the evidence for his propositions as being ‘from Experiments & 
so but Physicall: Whence the Propositions themselves can be esteemed no more than 
Physicall Principles of a Science’ (ibid.). The implication from the language used — 
‘but Physicall’, ‘can be esteemed no more than Physicall Principles’ — being that 
physical, empirical, experimental principles are less certain than purely mathematical 
ones. Newton goes on in this letter to defend his science of colours, but it is important 
that empirical data is acknowledged to be contingent even at the same time as it is used 
as evidence.  
Regardless of their contingency, Newton still prefers to base his philosophy on 
empirical and experimental principles as being more secure than the basis of the 
hypothetico-deductive method. As James Gleick points out, Newton never abandoned 
his reliance on sensation: his records of experiments and observations are replete with 
accounts of the taste, smell, and physical, sensory experience of phenomena.8  
There are several ways in which Newton deals with the uncertainty of sensory 
data and the conclusions drawn from it. One way is to clearly demarcate those aspects 
of the workings of the universe he is making a claim for and then to allow room for 
those that he is not — that is, the undiscovered and the unknown — to also exist within 
that system. Often this means asserting the general rules exhibited by observed 
phenomena, but leaving their causes unexplained. In the Principia, Newton explains the 
mysterious phenomenon of action at a distance by gravity, but does not attempt to assert 
a cause for gravity itself: 
 
                                                
6 Alan E. Shapiro, Fits, Passions, and Paroxysms: Physics, Method, and Chemistry and Newton’s 
Theories of Colored Bodies and Fits of Easy Reflection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
p. 37. 
7 The Correspondence of Isaac Newton, ed. by H. W. Turnball, 7 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1959–1977), I (1959), 187. 
8 James Gleick, Isaac Newton (London: Fourth Estate, 2003), p. 104. 
 151 
For many things lead me to have a suspicion that all phenomena may 
depend on certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by causes 
not yet known, either are impelled toward one another and cohere in 
regular figures, or are repelled from one another and recede. 
(Principia, pp. 382–83, my emphasis.) 
 
While Newton makes a claim for knowledge of how the universe operates at a physical 
level, he makes no such claim to know why this is so, or to know of its metaphysical 
workings.  
Similarly, in the General Scholium, as part of his rejection of the feigning of 
hypotheses, Newton writes: 
 
It is enough that gravity really exists and acts according to the laws 
that we have set forth and is sufficient to explain the motions of the 
heavenly bodies and of our sea. (Principia, p. 943) 
 
Observation and description of the laws of nature are sufficient for experimental 
philosophy, the implication being that valuable natural knowledge does not depend on a 
full knowledge of cause. Cotes similarly distinguishes the factual status of gravity from 
the factual status of the cause of gravity, and then expands this idea to include the 
unknown in the system itself. 
 
But will gravity be called an occult cause and be cast out of natural 
philosophy on the grounds that the cause of gravity itself is occult and 
not yet found? Let those who so believe take care lest they believe in 
an absurdity that, in the end, may overthrow the foundations of all 
philosophy. For causes generally proceed in a continuous chain from 
compound to more simple; when you reach the simplest cause, you 
will not be able to proceed any further. Therefore no mechanical 
explanation can be given for the simplest cause; for if it could, the 
cause would not yet be the simplest. (Principia, p. 392) 
 
This suggests that there is, at the level of first cause, something fundamentally unknown 
— or at least something non-mechanical and therefore unknowable in terms of human 
natural philosophical knowledge — in the system itself.  
As well as admitting to uncertainties, Newton — unlike the philosophers whom 
 152 
Cotes criticizes for imagining the shape and size of unknown particles to be whatever 
they please — acknowledges the contingency of any assumptions made. For example, 
in a letter to Boyle of 28 February 1679 discussing the aether, Newton draws a figure 
expressing the manner in which saline and metal particles interact, depicting the 
particles as round (see Fig. 3.1), but notes that in it, ‘I have made the particles round, 
though they may be cubical, or of any other shape’ (PW, p. 6). 
 
 
Fig. 3.1. ‘Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Boyle’, Cambridge University Library, Newton Papers, MS 
Add.9597/2/18, p. 63v (cropped). Photo: © Cambridge University Library. Further reproduction 
prohibited without permission. 
 
 
In the authorial preface to the Principia, Newton even suggests the contingency 
of his own methods, writing: ‘I hope that the principles set down here will shed some 
light on either this mode of philosophizing or some truer one’ (Principia, p. 383). There 
is room in Newton’s conception of natural philosophy for update and revision of both 
facts and approaches. He continues: 
 
I earnestly ask that everything be read with an open mind and that the 
defects in a subject so difficult may be not so much reprehended as 
investigated, and kindly supplemented, by new endeavours of my 
readers. (Ibid.) 
 
For all of his seclusion and anti-social practices, Newton — like Boyle and Hooke — 
had epistemological principles that conceived of knowledge as a collective endeavor 
and he was, in theory, open to his work being treated as contingent and to be developed 
by other practitioners.  
As well as contingency, the other significant aspect of Newton’s method and 
epistemology is the idea of consistency. Newton was searching for underlying 
principles, for the general rules by which nature operates that can be established from 
observable and experimental phenomena. This not only tells us about the task he was 
attempting, but also reveals an important assumption or guiding principle to his work: 
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that of the logical consistency of nature. As well as guiding his agenda, this assumption 
serves as an epistemological tool in Newton’s philosophical arsenal, legitimizing his 
claims to be uncovering truths despite the limits of human knowledge and cognition, 
and allowing him to develop a methodology or epistemological approach by which he 
can develop knowledge beyond what is provable by direct experience, but without 
relying on hypotheses. In the ‘Rules for the Study of Natural Philosophy’ laid out in the 
Principia, Newton writes: 
 
For the qualities of bodies can be known only through experiments; 
and therefore qualities that square with experiments universally are to 
be regarded as universal qualities; and qualities that cannot be 
diminished cannot be taken away from bodies. Certainly idle fancies 
ought not to be fabricated recklessly against the evidence of 
experiments, nor should we depart from the analogy of nature, since 
nature is always simple and ever consonant with itself. The extension 
of bodies is known to us only through our senses, and yet there are 
bodies beyond the range of these senses; but because extension is 
found in all sensible bodies, it is ascribed to all bodies universally. 
(Principia, p. 795) 
 
Again, Newton rejects hypothesis (‘idle fancies’) and asserts experimental evidence as 
the basis for philosophical knowledge, but he also adds a logical step of universal 
applicability based on the idea that, ‘nature is always simple and ever consonant with 
itself’.  
Cotes’s preface also describes this principle of inference from an assumption of 
consistency, giving examples of events happening at different earthly locations: 
 
The preceding conclusions are based upon an axiom which is accepted 
by every philosopher, namely, that effects of the same kind — that is, 
effects whose known properties are the same — have the same causes, 
and their properties which are not yet known are also the same. For if 
gravity is the cause of the fall of a stone in Europe, who can doubt that 
in America the cause of the fall is the same? (Principia, p. 391) 
 
There is a fascinating chicken and egg quality to his argument. Cotes continues: 
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All philosophy is based on this rule, inasmuch as, if it is taken away, 
there is then nothing we can affirm about things universally. The 
constitution of individual things can be found by observations and 
experiments; and proceeding from there, it is only by this rule that we 
make judgments about the nature of things universally. (Ibid.) 
 
Consistency is assumed, not only because it is a reasonable assumption, but also 
because it is a necessary one in order for man to be able to conduct natural philosophy.  
Newton summarizes his principle of generalization by induction in the General 
Scholium, after the famous assertion, ‘I do not feign hypotheses’. He writes: 
 
For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a 
hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, based 
on occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental 
philosophy. In experimental philosophy, propositions are deduced 
from the phenomena and are made general by induction. The 
impenetrability, mobility, and impetus of bodies, and the laws of 
motion and the law of gravity have been found by this method. 
(Principia, p. 943) 
 
Induction is distinguished from hypothesis and presented as a stable basis for 
formulating the laws of nature. Similarly, while this method does not allow Newton to 
make calculations on or draw conclusions about hidden metaphysical properties — such 
as the ‘innermost substances’ mentioned in the General Scholium — induction or 
inference from the known does allow him to do so for physical bodies beyond the range 
of sensory perception, including qualities of distant bodies such as the planets and 
comets, invisible interactions such as gravity and other forces, or subvisible phenomena 
such as atoms. In the unpublished draft ‘Conclusio’ to the Principia, written in 1686/87, 
Newton infers a micro world from the macro one and assumes a physical consistency 
between them, sharing his suspicion that there are ‘lesser forces, as yet unobserved, of 
insensible particles’ and stating that ‘whatever reasoning holds for greater motions, 
should hold for lesser ones as well’.9 
Newton outlines several rules for the determining of causes and gathering of 
                                                
9 Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, ed. and trans. by A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 333. 
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propositions. These rules are summarized: 
 
Rule 1: No more causes of natural things should be admitted than are 
both true and sufficient to explain their phenomena. […] 
Rule 2: Therefore, the causes assigned to natural effects of the same 
kind must be, so far as possible, the same. […] 
Rule 3: Those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and remitted 
and that belong to all bodies on which experiments can be made 
should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally. […] 
Rule 4: In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from 
phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very 
nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other 
phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to 
exceptions. (Principia, pp. 794–96) 
 
Rule 1 offers a safeguard to the certainty of what is admitted as a cause in its principle 
of a minimal limit. It follows from this in Rule 2 that there should be typological 
similarity between causes. Rule 3 states that qualities of bodies should be treated as 
universal, and Rule 4 expresses that principles known through experiments should be 
treated as universal (albeit contingently so). What distinguishes these practices from the 
feigning of hypotheses as foundational principles so criticized by Newton elsewhere, is 
that for Newton the step of universal applicability is not used to assert hypothesized 
truths as ontological realities, but rather — as the fourth rule in particular demonstrates 
— as contingent propositions to be treated as true in order to enable natural 
philosophical working and the further development of knowledge. It is a 
methodological and epistemological principle, not a metaphysical one.  
In the discussion under the third rule, Newton provides a good example of his 
practice: 
 
That all bodies are impenetrable we gather not by reason but by our 
senses. We find those bodies that we handle to be impenetrable, and 
hence we conclude that impenetrability is a property of all bodies 
universally. That all bodies are movable and persevere in motion or in 
rest by means of certain forces (which we call forces of inertia) we 
infer from finding these properties in the bodies that we have seen. 
The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and force of 
inertia of the whole arise from the extensions, hardness, 
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impenetrability, mobility, and force of inertia of each of the parts; and 
thus we conclude that every one of the least parts of all bodies is 
extended, hard, impenetrable, movable, and endowed with a force of 
inertia. And this is the foundation of all natural philosophy. 
(Principia, pp. 795–96) 
 
Knowledge about bodies that aren’t tested — including their ‘least parts’, which might 
not be possible to experiment on — is garnered by inference from what is learned of 
those that are. It is possible to interpret Newton’s statement, ‘this is the foundation of 
all natural philosophy’, in two ways: first, that universal applicability is the foundation 
of natural philosophy, and second, that these specific properties of bodies, which are 
assumed to be universal, are the foundation of natural philosophy. Certainly for 
Newton’s universe, the latter is required in order for it to work as a whole interrelated 
system, but both ideas fit as foundational to Newton’s physics and philosophy. Neither 
are they unrelated. Newton’s work — which marks the turn in physics from kinematics 
to dynamics — is all about movement, about tracing the paths of bodies, the 
interactions of forces, and rates of change. The consistency of natural phenomena and 
the consistent qualities of bodies listed above are both necessary for his physics. Thus, 
there is a sense in which the assumption of consistency is spatial as it is at heart about 
relations within space. More specifically, given the mathematical nature of Newton’s 
approach, a key concern is with measuring and thus quantifying such relations, and as 
such we find that in Newton’s work epistemology is intimately connected with the 
metaphysics of space and time.   
 
There is also a connection in Newton’s work between epistemology and God with 
Newton relating his epistemological anxiety about the limits of sensory experience — 
and thus natural philosophical knowledge — to the limits of man’s spiritual knowledge 
and capacity for knowledge of God. The passage from the General Scholium, lamenting 
that ‘there is no direct sense and there are no indirect reflected actions by which we 
know innermost substances’, continues: ‘much less do we have an idea of the substance 
of God’ (Principia, p. 942). The vivid detailing of what we do know of substances by 
each of the five senses (‘we see only the shapes and colors of bodies, we hear only their 
sounds’ etc.) seems an inverted echo of I Corinthians 2. 9, ‘Eye hath not seen, nor ear 
heard [...] the things which God hath prepared’. Newton’s description, like descriptions 
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of God in the apophatic tradition, casts what we do sense in a negative frame and draws 
attention to what we don’t see, hear, touch, smell, or taste — that is, innermost 
substances and the substance of God. And yet, at the same time as acknowledging the 
unknowability of God, Newton asserts that man is not without hope: ‘for all discourse 
about God is derived through a certain similitude from things human, which while not 
perfect is nevertheless a similitude of some kind’ (Principia, pp. 942–43). This 
contingent inference shares a similar methodological and philosophical position to 
Newton’s use of the assumption of the logical consistency of nature to infer from 
sensory data the characteristics of bodies beyond the range of the senses. 
Newton’s technique of leaving room for the unknown (and particularly for 
unknown causes) in his system of the universe, naturally allows room for God. In the 
Principia he writes of the cause of gravity as ‘not yet known’. In a letter to Bentley on 
the same subject, he elaborates further: 
 
Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to 
certain laws, but whether this agent be material or immaterial is a 
question I have left to the consideration of my readers.10 
 
Newton still declines to name a cause, but leaves room specifically for the possibility of 
an immaterial agent. When he writes about first causes, Newton makes the connection 
between religion and natural philosophy clear. He outlines ‘the main business of natural 
philosophy’ in his ‘Queries’ to the Opticks, writing about not feigning hypotheses, but 
also about ‘deduc[ing] causes from effects, till we come to the very first cause, which 
certainly is not mechanical’ (quoted above). The inclusion of a non-mechanical cause 
unites the purpose of natural philosophy to the search for knowledge of God through the 
chain of causality; the understanding of physical causality will ultimately result in the 
understanding of the first cause, that is, God. This is also connected to Newton’s 
principles of generalization and abstraction through the idea of simplification as one 
goes back through the chain of causes to the simplest cause (which cannot be 
mechanical) as described in Cotes’s preface. This fits Newton’s ideas about contingency 
and admitting unknown causes into natural philosophy, and as we see in the ‘Account 
of the Book Entitled Commercium Epistolicum’ (1715), Newton suggests that treating 
unknown causes — including laws which come from God — as miraculous or occult 
                                                
10 25 Feb 1693, in Correspondence, III (1961), 254. 
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rather than part of the system, is rather throwing the baby out with the bath water. 
 
The one [Newton] teaches that philosophers are to argue from 
phenomena and experiments to the causes thereof, and thence to the 
causes of those causes, and so on till we come to the first cause: the 
other [Leibniz] that all actions of the first cause are miracles, and all 
the laws impressed on nature by the will of God are perpetual 
miracles and occult qualities, and therefore not to be considered in 
philosophy. But must the constant and universal laws of nature, if 
derived from the power of God or the action of a cause not yet known 
to us, be called miracles and occult qualities, that is to say, wonders 
and absurdities? (PW, p. 125) 
 
First causes might be simple and non-mechanical, but there is an assumption that they 
are consistent and comprehensible rather than absurd. Newton believes in the all-
powerful will of God, but assumes a consistency to the application of this will. 
According to Newton, God is a part of his own system. 
Newton finds precedent for his unity of natural philosophy and theology in the 
practice of ancient priests: 
 
So then twas one designe of the first institution of the true religion to 
propose to mankind by the frame of the ancient Temples, the study of 
the frame of the world as the true Temple of the great God they 
worshipped. And thence it was that the Priests anciently were above 
other men well skilled in the knowledge of the true frame of Nature 
& accounted it a great part of their Theology. [...] So then the first 
religion was the most rational of all others till the nations corrupted it. 
ffor there is no way (without revelation) to come to the knowledge of 
a Deity but by the frame of Nature.11 
 
Natural philosophy and theology are related to one another by both method and 
purpose; as Newton writes in the General Scholium, ‘to treat of God from phenomena is 
                                                
11 Isaac Newton, Draft chapters of a treatise on the origin of religion and its corruption, Yahuda Ms. 41, 
<http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/THEM00077> [accessed 8 May 2013] (f. 
7r).  
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certainly a part of natural philosophy’ (Principia, p. 943).12 It is telling that Newton 
uses the same phrase, ‘the frame of Nature’ in both this theological text and in his 
natural philosophical writings. As he writes in the Yahuda manuscript, the true frame of 
Nature was considered by the ancient priests to be ‘a great part of their Theology’. In a 
letter to Richard Bentley, Newton offers another suggestion that for him the structures 
of Christian faith are entwined with human reason and empirical evidence, claiming: 
‘When I wrote my treatise about our Systeme I had an eye upon such Principles as 
might work wth [sic] considering men, for the beleife of a Deity’.13 We see this 
illustrated in Newton’s arguments from design for the existence of God and his hand in 
creation in his letters to Bentley and also in the General Scholium: ‘This most elegant 
system of the sun, planets, and comets could not have arisen without the design and 
dominion of an intelligent and powerful being’ (Principia, p. 940). 
Newton, in the ‘Queries’ to the Opticks, also writes about the enlarging of moral 
philosophy by the act of perfecting natural philosophy and thus increasing our 
knowledge of the first cause: 
 
For so far as we can know by natural philosophy what is the first 
cause, what power he has over us, and what benefits we receive from 
him, so far our duty towards him, as well as towards one another, will 
appear to us by the light of nature. And no doubt, if the worship of 
false gods had not blinded the heathen, their moral philosophy would 
have gone farther […], they would have taught us to worship our true 
author and benefactor, as their ancestors did under the government of 
Noah and his sons before they corrupted themselves. (PW, p. 140) 
 
Newton speaks of redeeming the corruption of man by means of natural philosophical 
learning. Intriguingly, the corruption Newton is thinking of is not original sin, but the 
confusio linguarum that occurred in the days of Noah and his sons. This does not carry 
the same sense of irreversible degradation of the human faculties, which is often 
associated with the Fall. As with the similitude between God and man posited in the 
Principia, there is a sense of the possibility for and the capacity of human knowledge. 
Furthermore, this is associated with the practice of natural philosophy.  
                                                
12 NB ‘natural philosophy’, quoted here from the third edition, read ‘experimental philosophy’ in the 
second. 
13 Correspondence, III, 233. 
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As we saw in Hooke and Boyle, Newton acknowledges a tension between the 
limits and possibilities of human knowledge. However, more than the others —and 
certainly more so than the nescient Boyle — there is a confidence to Newton’s 
epistemology, which assumes that the patterns found in the human experience of 
creation reflect a consistency in the chain of its causation, and are to be the basis of our 
understanding of both creation and cause. There is also a practicality to Newton’s 
method; the assumption of consistency and the admitting of contingent knowledge and 
treating it as fact, whilst still acknowledging its contingency, allows for the 
development of knowledge and the formulation and understanding of universal laws. 
  
 
Absolute and Relative Space 
 
In order to be understood, Newtonian dynamics requires frames of reference. Bodies in 
motion must be moving relative to something in order to be measurable or perceivable 
as such. Between the sections containing the definitions and the laws of the Principia 
sits Newton’s famous scholium on absolute space and time, where he makes a 
distinction between absolute and relative versions of time, space, place, and motion. 
With regard to space, Newton writes: 
 
Absolute space, of its own nature without reference to anything 
external, always remains homogeneous and immovable. Relative 
space is any movable measure or dimension of this absolute space; 
such a measure or dimension is determined by our senses from the 
situation of the space with respect to bodies and is popularly used for 
immovable space, as in the case of space under the earth or in the air 
or in the heavens, where the dimension is determined from the 
situation of the space with respect to the earth. (Principia, pp. 408–
09) 
 
Newton describes two types of space: relative space, which can be in motion and which 
we determine with our senses by means of reference to discernible, physical bodies; and 
a mathematical, absolute space, which we do not perceive sensually but which acts as a 
fixed backdrop or frame to relative space.  
 
 161 
Absolute and relative time are conceived in a similar way: 
 
Absolute, true and mathematical time, in and of itself and of its own 
nature, without reference to anything external, flows uniformly and 
by another name is called duration. Relative, apparent, and common 
time is any sensible and external measure (precise or imprecise) of 
duration by means of motion; such a measure — for example, an 
hour, a day, a month, a year — is commonly used instead of true 
time. (Principia, p. 408) 
 
Like relative space, relative time is sensible and measured externally. However, the 
presentation is much less static than that of space. Relative time is measured by motion, 
and absolute time — while still having that sense of being the backdrop of all times out 
of which relative time (a sensible and external measure of duration or absolute time) is 
experienced — also has its own sense of movement, albeit without reference to 
anything external as it ‘flows uniformly’. Absolute time is both backdrop and a state of 
uniform progression.  
Of the more minor terms, place is defined as ‘the part of space that a body 
occupies’ which is absolute or relative ‘depending on the space’, and absolute motion is 
‘the change of position of a body from one absolute place to another’, while relative 
motion is ‘change of position from one relative place to another’ (Principia, p. 409). 
As Julian Barbour describes, the whole corpus of Newton’s work on dynamics 
was based on the concept, taken from Descartes, of uniform rectilinear motion of 
undisturbed bodies. Barbour points out that, ‘The main question at issue is: uniform and 
rectilinear with respect to what?’ and shows that for Newton (as for Galileo and pre-
Inquisition Descartes) the answer is that it is with respect to absolute space, and that if 
such a space is granted, the formulation of the law of inertia is unproblematic.14 Another 
important aspect of Newtonian dynamics is, as Howard Stein has shown, its connection 
not just to space, but also to space-time.15 Even duration is measured ‘by means of 
motion’. This four-dimensionality is crucial for the descriptions of bodies in motion and 
rest, but relies on the structure of absolute space in order to be understood. As Michael 
                                                
14 Julian Barbour, Absolute or Relative Motion: A Study from a Machian Point of View of the Discovery 
and the Structure of Dynamical Theories, Volume 1, The Discovery of Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 610. 
15 Stein, p. 176. 
 162 
Friedman describes in the parlance of modern physics, Newtonian physics operates as a 
‘four-dimensional differentiable manifold.’16 If we consider any two points within this 
manifold, there is a notion of the temporal interval between them that is defined 
independently of the spatial coordinate system. Similarly, for any single point in the 
manifold, there is a notion of the set of all other points simultaneous with it, again, 
defined independently of the coordinate system. These simultaneity sets are called 
‘planes of absolute simultaneity’ and each three-dimensional plane of absolute 
simultaneity is a Euclidean three-space.17 These planes then need to be combined to 
understand the full manifold. Friedman writes: 
 
We have a separate Euclidean geometry on each instantaneous three-
space, but we have so far defined no spatial relations at all between 
points on different planes of simultaneity. To combine our different 
instantaneous three-spaces into one big ‘enduring’ three-space we 
need an additional geometrical structure. The additional structure we 
need is absolute space: a relation of occurring-at-the-same-place 
defined between arbitrary points in M [i.e. the manifold] (not just 
between pairs of points in the same plane of simultaneity). We can 
introduce such a relation by means of a rigging of space-time: a 
family of non-intersecting geodesics that ‘penetrates’ each plane of 
simultaneity.18 
 
With this structure in mind, we have a stable backdrop against which we can imagine 
and plot movement and rest in any or all of the four dimensions (see Fig. 3.2). 
 
                                                
16 Michael Friedman, Foundations of Space-Time Theories: Relativistic Physics and Philosophy of 
Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 71. 
17 Friedman, pp. 72–73. 
18 Friedman, p. 74. 
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Fig. 3.2. Diagram showing the manifold M, where S1, S2, and S3 are planes of absolute simultaneity, p1 
expresses a relation of occurring-at-the-same-place over time (e.g. the trajectory of a particle at rest), and 
p2 is the trajectory of a particle moving in uniform motion. 
 
 
As Robert DiSalle summarizes: 
 
Absolute space is that with respect to which the velocity of every 
body is its true velocity. It requires, therefore, that we should be able 
to say of any thing whether it occupies the same place from moment 
to moment. In other words, it implies that there is a set of trajectories 
in space-time that may be distinguished as the histories of particles 
that remain at rest.19 
 
Such a trajectory of a particle at rest through time would follow the path of Friedman’s 
rigging, of one of the geodesics penetrating the planes of simultaneity. The structure 
described by Friedman fits with both Newton’s description of absolute space and time, 
and his use of these concepts in his physics. 
In Newton’s descriptions of space and time, the ability to measure and perceive 
are key factors that distinguish the relative from the absolute. Relative space is ‘any 
movable measure or dimension of this absolute space’ and we are told that ‘such a 
measure or dimension is determined by our senses’. Similarly, relative time is, ‘any 
sensible and external measure [...] of duration’. In a way measurement and sensory 
perception are almost tautologous: if we can perceive a quantity by means of the senses 
then we can understand it in relation to other sensory experiences and thus measure it. 
                                                
19 DiSalle, pp. 25–26. 
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However, Newton’s pedantry emphasizes the methodological and epistemological 
importance of sensory perception: in order to make natural philosophy mathematical, 
phenomena must be quantifiable, that is, measurable; such measurement can only come 
to us from the relative world of human perception — we cannot deal directly with 
abstractions.  
In the descriptions of both absolute space and absolute time, Newton uses the 
phrase ‘of its own nature, without reference to anything external’. This lack of external 
reference emphasizes both the absoluteness of these structures in and of themselves, but 
also our lack of access to them. As such, space as an object of natural philosophical 
consideration is epistemologically fraught. Relative space can only be perceived ‘from 
the situation of the space with respect to bodies’ and so, like the invisible air, its 
observation and measurement relies on inference from the observation of other things. 
Absolute space is even more problematic, being seemingly unknowable by the senses. 
Newton writes: ‘these parts of space cannot be seen and cannot be distinguished from 
one another by our senses’ (Principia, p. 410). 
These tensions are compounded by the fact that Newton aligns the inaccessible 
absolute with true and mathematical quantities, and the accessible relative with apparent 
and common ones, the oppositional presentation of these descriptions encouraging the 
idea that the relative is inferior. Relative quantities are held to be tainted with 
preconceptions arising from their derivation from objects of sense perception: 
 
Although time, space, place, and motion are very familiar to 
everyone, it must be noted that these quantities are popularly 
conceived solely with reference to the objects of sense perception. 
And this is the source of certain preconceptions; to eliminate them it 
is useful to distinguish these quantities into absolute and relative, true 
and apparent, mathematical and common. (Principia, p. 408) 
 
The implication is that the abstract absolute notions of space, time, place, and motion 
offer truer quantities than their relative counterparts, and indeed do so because they are 
not dependent on sense perception. We can see how this may be so in Newton’s 
comparison of absolute and relative space:  
 
Absolute and relative space are the same in species and in magnitude, 
but they do not always remain the same numerically. For example, if 
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the earth moves, the space of our air, which in a relative sense and 
with respect to the earth always remains the same, will now be one 
part of the absolute space into which the air passes, not another part 
of it, and thus will be changing continually in an absolute sense. 
(Principia, p. 409) 
 
Even if the earth is moving, then in a relative sense the space of the air with respect to 
the earth remains the same: it appears still. However, in an absolute sense, with respect 
to a backdrop of fixed space, it moves. Our intuitive perceptions of stillness and motion 
are thus only relative or apparent. They are not truths, nor are they mathematically 
sufficient.  
And yet, in the passage quoted above starting, ‘Although time, space, place, and 
motion are very familiar’, we see that Newton believes it is possible to eliminate the 
preconceptions of sense perception. He proposes to do this by the very act of distinction 
between absolute and relative itself. The act of recognizing the contingency of relative 
space allows such compromises to be used in order to further knowledge. It also 
prevents calculations on relative data from being a naïve final resting place for enquiry; 
the fact that we can imagine absolute space — even if we can’t perceive it — allows us 
to make adjustments to relative data in a layer of abstract, mathematical thought 
subsequently imposed on what is perceived relatively. Commentators usually focus on 
the distinction between relative and absolute space and time, but Newton’s technique 
actually relies on the distinction and recombination of the two. Newton distinguishes 
between our absolute and relative conceptions of space along lines evocative of the 
distinctions between the activities of fit and unfit readers in Milton, the distinction 
between ‘Mathematical’ and ‘common’ (vulgares) qualities possibly implying a 
distinction between mathematical and common interpreters (although perhaps with less 
pejorative connotation than we might read in ‘common’, as vulgus is used in the 
previous sentence in the sense of ‘familiar’).20 The addition of reading skills (skills of 
interpretation) rooted in self-knowledge (an awareness of relativity) to what is perceived 
sensually, is required in order to avoid being an unfit interpreter reading only the 
                                                
20 Latin text from Isaac Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (London: Joseph 
Streater, 1687), p. 5. 
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‘apparent’ or ‘common’ qualities, and to perceive more truly.21 This takes the form of 
recontextualizing relative space in terms of an understanding of absolute space to make 
it mathematical and rational. Newton writes that relative understandings are ‘not 
inappropriate in ordinary human affairs, although in philosophy abstraction from the 
senses is required’ (Principia, p. 411). Taking into consideration the wider context of 
Newton’s use of empiricism, experiment, measurement, and observation, the 
importance of abstraction being ‘from the senses’ (a sensibus) is apparent; this 
abstraction is not a rejection of the sensory, but a development of it — Newton uses the 
experience of relative understandings of space to step beyond to something abstract.22 
Similarly, Newton’s definition of the popular conception being ‘solely [non aliter] with 
reference to the objects of sense perception’ (my emphasis) implies that the error is not 
the reference to sensory objects in and of itself, but the lack of some additional 
reference to eliminate preconception and thus make the data more robust.23 Like 
Boyle’s experimental spaces, the concept of absolute space exerts a form of control and 
mensurability over the motions or interactions in question, which allows Newton to 
work at a less superficial level. Newton captures this sense of mixed or applied 
mathematics in his description of the Principia as a work of ‘rational mechanics’, 
describing mechanics as being distinct from geometry by means of its lack of exactness 
(Principia, pp. 381–82). 
One of the major criticisms of Newton’s theory of absolute and relative space 
stems from the epistemological difficulty of absolute space. Contemporary philosophers 
— including Leibniz, Huygens, and Berkeley — presumed that Newton’s absolute 
space was posited as a metaphysical theory and so objected to its unobservable and thus 
hypothetical nature. In the wake of Mach, Einstein, and twentieth-century relativity, 
many historians treated Newton’s absolutism with contempt.24 However, Stein 
neutralizes some of the apparent problems of absolute space by recontextualizing the 
                                                
21 See Sharon Achinstein, ‘Milton and the Fit Reader’, in British Literature 1640–1789: A Critical 
Reader, ed. by Robert DeMaria, Jr (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 40–68 (pp. 48–50, 66).  
22 Principia (1687), p. 7. 
23 Principia (1687), p. 5. 
24 For example, E. A. Burtt describes Newton’s idea as an ‘error’, and writes that, ‘the very nature of 
absolute space negates the possibility of its having any assignable significance’. See E. A. Burtt, The 
Metaphysical Foundation of Modern Physical Science, rev. edn (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 
1932), pp. 256, 255. 
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idea, not as a physical proposition but as an epistemological construct. Absolute space 
is not a proposed theory of the arrangement or nature of matter, but a piece of mental 
apparatus necessary for constructing and thinking about Newton’s dynamical laws, 
which need a fixed backdrop against which moving bodies can be understood. Stein 
concludes that ‘the principles of dynamics [...] distinctly require a view of motion and 
therefore of place and space that cannot be explicated in terms simply of the 
geometrical relations among bodies’.25 Similarly, DiSalle argues that Newton was not 
trying to answer the presumed question of whether space, time, and motion were 
absolute or relative. Newton’s aim rather, was to ‘define’ absolute space, time, and 
motion, ‘to exhibit empirical criteria for applying the concepts, and to reveal the roles 
that they play in solving the problems of mechanics.’26 Stein and DiSalle are in 
harmony with Newton’s suggestion that absolute space is useful in eliminating 
preconceptions; this is not about space but about thinking about space.  
Newton’s understanding of natural philosophy as contingent and his view of 
empiricism as foundational and yet limited are compatible with the thesis of absolute 
space as an epistemological construct. Similarly, the notion that the principles set down 
in the Principia are but one ‘mode of philosophizing’ — and a contingent one at that — 
suggests that Newton offers but one method of reading nature, not a definitive portrait 
of its reality. 
This practical approach to definition and the language in which Newton 
conducts natural philosophy can also be seen at a more local level throughout his works. 
For example, just before the scholium on space and time, his definition of ‘The motive 
quantity of centripetal force’ includes phrases such as ‘so to speak’ (ut ita dicam), ‘for 
the sake of brevity’ (brevitatis gratia), and ‘for the sake of differentiation’ (distinctionis 
gratia), emphasizing the need to accommodate physics to a suitable form of language in 
order to understand and discuss it (Principia, p. 407).27 Shortly after, Newton continues: 
 
Moreover, I use interchangeably and indiscriminately words 
signifying attraction, impulse, or any sort of propensity toward a 
center, considering these forces not from a physical but only from a 
mathematical point of view. Therefore, let the reader beware of 
                                                
25 Stein, p. 197. 
26 DiSalle, p. 17, my emphasis. 
27 See also Principia (1687), pp. 3–4. 
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thinking that by words of this kind I am anywhere defining a species 
or mode of action or a physical cause or reason, or that I am 
attributing forces in a true and physical sense to centers (which are 
mathematical points) if I happen to say that centers attract or that 
centers have forces. (Principia, p. 408) 
 
For Newton, the act of description is intimately connected with the act of mathematical 
abstraction, which he makes a point of separating from a definition of physical truth. 
This association supports the idea that these abstract structures are epistemological 
rather than metaphysical or ontological. 
As numerous critics have observed, Newton’s distinction between absolute and 
relative space was a reaction to the failures of Cartesian relationalism, which lacked 
consistency and coherence.28 This also adds support to the idea that absolute space is 
epistemological rather than ontological. This anti-Cartesian thread is apparent in his 
published works, including the Principia, but is most explicitly found in the manuscript 
treatise De Gravitatione.29 Newton complains: 
 
When a certain motion is finished it is impossible, according to 
Descartes, to assign a place in which the body was at the beginning of 
the motion; it cannot be said from where the body moved. And the 
reason is that according to Descartes, the place cannot be defined or 
assigned except with respect to the position of the surrounding 
bodies, and after the completion of some motion the position of the 
surrounding bodies no longer stays the same as it was before. (PW, p. 
19) 
 
The problem is not with the nature of motion through space, it is with the fact that 
motion cannot be calculated or understood mathematically using Descartes’s relative 
version of space and place. This is particularly problematic for the concept of velocity, 
which is vectorial (i.e. it requires both magnitude and direction). According to Newton, 
this inability to describe motion speaks of the need for absolute space: 
                                                
28 DiSalle, 2006, pp. 16–19, 36–37; Barbour, pp. 604–05; Curtis Wilson, ‘The Newtonian Achievement in 
Astronomy’, in Planetary Astronomy from the Renaissance to the Rise of Astrophysics: Part A: Tycho 
Brahe to Newton, ed. by René Taton and Curtis Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
pp. 233–74 (p. 235). 
29 Probably written before 1685, see PW, ‘introduction’, p. xviii. 
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Cartesian motion is not motion, for it has no velocity, no 
determination, and there is no space or distance traversed by it. So it 
is necessary that the definition of places, and hence of local motion, 
be referred to some motionless being such as extension alone or space 
in so far as it is seen to be truly distinct from bodies. (PW, pp. 20–21) 
 
Space that is distinct from bodies, i.e. without reference to anything external, is absolute 
space. In contrast to Descartes’s relational space, Newton’s structure of absolute and 
four-dimensional space-time does allow for the adequate description of motion and does 
not contradict the laws of motion.  
The need for a spacio-temporal structure that can adequately accommodate the 
motion and rest of bodies can be felt in the restrictive nature of the static, two-
dimensional diagrams with which Newton seeks to represent paths of motion and rates 
of change. Newton distinguishes in his notes between geometric and what he calls 
‘mechanicall lines’, these latter mapping the motion of a point, or two such motions 
compounded (i.e. a vector).30 The reader must understand the mechanical line in the 
static diagram as tracing a path over time. Rates of change require a further mental 
process; as Gleick describes, they are ‘an abstraction of an abstraction’.31 This applies 
visually as well: the curves representing rate of change don’t even map the trace of a 
path over time, but rather the acceleration of the movement. Gleick notes that while 
Newton’s diagrams look static they actually ‘depicted processes of dynamic change’, 
again quoting the accompanying descriptions:  
 
His lemmas spoke of quantities that constantly tend to equality or 
diminish indefinitely; of areas that simultaneously approach and 
ultimately vanish; of momentary increments and ultimate ratios and 
curvilinear limits. He drew lines and triangles that looked finite but 
were meant to be on the point of vanishing.32 
 
                                                
30 The Mathematical Papers of Isaac Newton, ed. by D. T. Whiteside, 8 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967–1980), I (1967), 377. 
31 Gleick, p. 46. 
32 Ibid. 
 170 
This creates a dependence in the diagrams on the accompanying text. Gleick observes 
that while ‘the diagrams appeared to represent space’ on reading the accompanying 
descriptions, ‘time kept creeping in’.33  
The diagram offers a map and the text instructs the reader in how to read it so 
that he or she can trace the movements or imagine the passage of time accordingly and 
bring the motion to life in the mind. For example in the text accompanying the diagram 
(see Fig. 3.3) in Proposition 34, Problem 14 of Book III, ‘To find the hourly variation of 
the inclination of the lunar orbit to the plane of the ecliptic’, the reader is asked to let 
mTl represent ‘the momentaneous motion’ of the nodes N and n. The angle PGp (where 
P is the place of the moon in its orbit, and p the projection of that place on the plane of 
the ecliptic) ‘will be the inclination of the moon’s orbit to the plane of the ecliptic when 
the moon is in P’, and the angle Pgp ‘will be the inclination of the same orbit after a 
moment of time has been completed’. Therefore the angle GPg ‘will be the 
momentaneous variation of the inclination’ (Principia, p. 864). 
 
Fig. 3.3. Isaac Newton, Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (London, 1687), p. 457 (cropped). 
Photo: © Cambridge University Library. Image published with permission of ProQuest. Further 
reproduction is prohibited without permission. 
 
                                                
33 Gleick, p. 134. 
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In De Gravitatione, Newton connects the idea of delineation of figures with a 
somewhat more metaphysical discussion, but in a way that frames the practice as 
epistemological. In discussing the ability to distinguish space into parts by mathematical 
surfaces, lines, and points, he asserts: 
 
And hence there are everywhere all kinds of figures, everywhere 
spheres, cubes, triangles, straight lines, everywhere circular, 
elliptical, parabolical, and all other kinds of figures, and those of all 
shapes and sizes, even though they are not disclosed to sight. For the 
delineation of any material figure is not a new production of that 
figure with respect to space, but only a corporeal representation of it, 
so that what was formerly insensible in space now appears before the 
senses. (PW, pp. 22–23) 
 
Delineation is an act of making visible, of understanding a structure in a certain way, 
not of bringing into being. In an explanatory analogy of adding colour to water to make 
shapes appear in it, Newton writes: ‘However, if the color were introduced, it would not 
constitute material shapes, but only cause them to be visible’ (PW, p. 23). 
Newton, in the scholium on space and time, addresses the difficulty in 
calculating true motions that the imperceptibility of absolute space occasions: 
 
It is certainly very difficult to find out the true motions of individual 
bodies and actually to differentiate them from apparent motions, 
because the parts of that immovable space in which the bodies truly 
move make no impression on the senses. Nevertheless, the case is not 
utterly hopeless. For it is possible to draw evidence partly from 
apparent motions, which are the differences between the true 
motions, and partly from the forces that are the causes and effects of 
the true motions. (Principia, p. 414) 
 
First of all it is worthwhile to note that the importance of being able to perceive or not 
perceive absolute space is not because of a desire to know about absolute space in and 
of itself, but rather because it is important for working out the true motions of bodies 
against its backdrop. Newton is also under no illusions about the need to recourse to the 
relative in order to gather evidence and thus perform his calculations. However, his 
awareness of the status of this data as merely apparent, allows him to see the need to 
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mentally adjust and calculate for that. Newton then goes on to describe his famous 
thought experiment — the example of two balls attached by a chord rotating around a 
common centre of gravity — showing that it is possible to determine data about true 
motion (‘the quality and direction of the circular motion’) from the evidence of apparent 
motions (the tension in the chord and the change in tension under difference forces), 
even ‘where nothing external and sensible existed with which the balls could be 
compared’ (ibid.). Indeed ‘how to determine true motions from their causes, effects, and 
apparent differences, and, conversely, of how to determine from motions whether true 
or apparent, their causes and effects’, is the stated purpose of the work (Principia, p. 
415). 
In understanding the connection between absolute and relative space, the notion 
of place is significant. In Newton’s criticism of Descartes in De Gravitatione, the 
inability to assign place makes a nonsense of the effort to define and understand or 
calculate motion mathematically. As Edward Casey describes, a characteristic of early 
modern thinkers is a disdain for the genius loci and indifference to the specialness of 
place intrinsic to Aristotelian thought. However, even with its reduced scope, place still 
has an important power in its ability to be the limit for something else.34 Unlike the 
metaphysical scope of Aristotelian place, this redefined power or role is 
epistemological.  
In Newton we see just this. Place is important for locating and thus measuring 
and defining space, or more specifically, bodies in space and their movement through 
space, but there is no special quality or identity reserved for each part of space, other 
than its geometric location. Newton writes in De Gravitatione: 
 
The parts of duration and space are understood to be the same as they 
really are only because of their mutual order and position; nor do they 
have any principle of individuation apart from that order and position, 
which consequently cannot be altered. (PW, p. 25) 
 
Place is abstract and is defined by its order and position, it does not itself determine 
order as it did in the Aristotelian system. As Casey describes, Newton subsumes place 
under space and as a part of space, so it has no being or identity other than that of space 
                                                
34 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1998), pp. 133–34. 
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itself. It is in this sense, pure construct. At the same time, Newton also collapses place 
into body. Together, these two moves deny autonomy to place.35 We see them cohere in 
Newton’s definition: ‘Place is the part of space that a body occupies’ (Principia, p. 
409). 
The idea that place and order are intrinsically linked and that this is a part of 
understanding unmovable (that is, absolute) space is also found in the Principia: 
 
Just as the order of the parts of time is unchangeable, so, too, is the 
order of the parts of space. Let the parts of space move from their 
places, and they will move (so to speak) from themselves. For times 
and spaces are, as it were, the places of themselves and of all things. 
All things are placed in time with reference to order of succession and 
in space with reference to order of position. It is the essence of spaces 
to be places, and for primary places to move is absurd. They are 
therefore absolute places, and it is only changes of position from 
these places that are absolute motions. (Principia, p. 410) 
 
The identity of parts of duration and space is purely one of order, of spatial or temporal 
location, and this is the notion of place. In the cases of Hooke and Boyle, ordering was 
most often a spatial tool for organizing data and conceptualizing mental processes such 
as thought and memory. In Newton, order is also used as part of the underlying 
framework that allows us to conceptualize space and time (and parts of space and time) 
themselves. Casey notes the repetition of placial terms in this passage, describing them 
as ‘Symptomatic of the irrepressible role of place in specifying any systematic thinking 
about space, above all absolute space’.36 Again, the significance is at the 
epistemological rather than ontological level and these ideas of identity and 
specification are tools for being able to think about and discuss space and motion. 
There is however a flaw in using absolute space as a conceptual backdrop for 
relative spaces, places, and motions. As Newton points out, motion and rest are 
distinguished in relative terms:  
 
motion and rest, in the popular sense of the terms, are distinguished 
from each other only by point of view, and bodies commonly 
                                                
35 Casey, p. 144. 
36 Casey, p. 146. 
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regarded as being at rest are not always truly at rest. (Principia, p. 
405) 
 
Newton’s discussion of place continues: 
 
But since these parts of space cannot be seen and cannot be 
distinguished from one another by our senses, we use sensible 
measures in their stead. For we define all places on the basis of the 
positions and distances of things from some body that we regard as 
immovable, and then we reckon all motions with respect to these 
places, insofar as we conceive of bodies as being changed in position 
with respect to them. Thus, instead of absolute places and motions we 
use relative ones, which is not inappropriate in ordinary human 
affairs, although in philosophy abstraction from the senses is 
required. For it is possible that there is no body truly at rest to which 
places and motions may be referred. (Principia, pp. 410–11) 
 
The lack of referentiality absolute space affords, makes it impossible to measure against 
it in any real way. This means it is impossible to tell whether bodies are at rest or are in 
uniform rectilinear motion. This is implied in Corollary 5: 
 
When bodies are enclosed in a given space, their motions in relation 
to one another are the same whether the space is at rest or whether it 
is moving uniformly straight forward without circular motion. 
(Principia, p. 423) 
 
There is no way of knowing whether that given space is at rest or in motion.  
Similarly, in Corollary 4, Newton concludes that ‘the common center of gravity 
of all bodies acting upon one another (excluding external actions and impediments) 
either is at rest or moves uniformly straight forward’ (Principia, p. 421). The either/or 
construction (vel… vel) highlighting the fact that which state is the correct one is 
unknown.37 Under Leibniz’s theory of the identity of indiscernables, as there is no way 
of telling the two states apart, then they should be considered the same thing. However, 
this does not feel satisfactory against Newton’s absolute framework. There is a real 
distinction, just not one we are able to perceive. Newton writes: 
                                                
37 Principia (1687), p. 17. 
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Moreover, absolute and relative rest and motion are distinguished 
from each other by their properties, causes, and effect. It is a property 
of rest that bodies truly at rest are at rest in relation to one another. 
And therefore, since it is possible that some body in the regions of the 
fixed stars or far beyond is absolutely at rest, and yet it cannot be 
known from the position of bodies in relation to one another in our 
regions whether or not any of these maintains a given position with 
relation to that distant body, true rest cannot be defined on the basis 
of the position of bodies in relation to one another. (Principia, p. 411) 
 
Newton admits the inability to determine true rest based on relative positions, and even 
suggests a fudge in considering the fixed stars as absolutely at rest, but ultimately 
admits true rest as an unknown. 
The epistemological rather than ontological nature of these structures of space is 
felt in Newton’s recourse to imagination and understanding in describing them. In De 
Gravitatione, he writes that: 
 
Space is extended infinitely in all directions. For we cannot imagine 
any limit anywhere without at the same time imagining that there is 
space beyond it. (PW, p. 23)  
 
The human inability to imagine a limit is given as a reason for the infinity of space. In 
going on to describe a line ‘greater than finite’, Newton continues: 
 
Nor can anyone say that this is infinite only in imagination, and not in 
fact; for if a triangle is actually drawn, its sides are always, in face, 
directed towards some common point, where both would meet if 
produced, and therefore there is always such an actual point where the 
produced sides would meet, although it may be imagined to fall 
outside the limits of the physical universe. And so the line traced by 
all these points will be real, though it extends beyond all distance. 
(Ibid.) 
 
This passage posits space, experienced in the imagination, as non-material (i.e. outside 
the limits of the physical universe), and possibly even non-geometric (beyond all 
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distance), but still real, still fact. This is a very abstract notion of reality, partly 
mathematical, partly philosophical, and reliant on the imagination.  
This abstract notion of reality is also redolent of Newton’s view of the literal 
status of scripture. In a letter to Burnet of January 1681, Newton describes Moses’s 
description of the creation: 
 
As to Moses I do not think his description of the creation either 
Philosophical or feigned, but that he described realities in a language 
artificially adapted to the sense of the vulgar. Thus where he speaks 
of two great lights I suppose he means their apparent, not real 
greatness.38 
 
Neither is this accommodation a simple translation; he also writes, ‘and yet the things 
signified by such figurative expressions are not Ideall or moral but true.’39 The act of 
artificial adaptation and the figurativeness of the expressions somehow does not reduce 
the truth value of what is communicated. Andrew Janiak, in a paper that hypothesizes 
that Newton’s conception of absolute space was initially developed in the early 1680s to 
deal with theological issues concerning the maintenance of Biblical creation alongside 
the physical laws of nature, interprets this letter as proof of Newton’s rejection of the 
idea of accommodation (in a metaphorical sense) and relates it to his subsequent 
thinking on the distinction between absolute and relative space along the lines of what is 
‘real’ and what is ‘apparent’.40 Janiak argues that for Newton, scripture always refers to 
apparent ideas and motions, which, like the relative, are ones adapted to the sense of the 
vulgar. So it is not real, and yet it is not metaphorical. It is a literal description of how 
things appear, not how they are. In this way Newton manages to accommodate, for 
example, both the Biblical truth that the sun travels around the earth, with the scientific 
truth that the earth revolves around the sun. 
There is a sense in which absolute and relative truths are dependent on each 
other, like two sides of a coin. Newtonian dynamics requires a certain configuration of 
space and time — a four-dimensional differentiable manifold — in order to be 
                                                
38 Correspondence, II (1960), 331. 
39 Correspondence, II, 333. 
40 Andrew Janiak, ‘Newton’s Conception of Absolute Space: A New Hypothesis’, a talk given at 
University College London (24 October 2010). 
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understood, and that structure is dependent on a concept of absolute space. However 
absolute space is replete with epistemological issues as we can only experience relative 
space whereas, to human minds, absolute space can only ever be experienced 
conceptually. This posed a problem for those who believed Newton was positing 
absolute space as an ontological or metaphysical reality, but does not pose any such 
problem if we understand it as an epistemological construct, employed to enable us to 
do Newtonian physics. It also poses an epistemological problem as there is an implicit 
value judgement in the ‘apparent’ nature of the relative, tainted with preconceptions. 
Newton negotiates our inability to deal directly with abstractions by working with the 
contingent relative, but reframing it in the context of the absolute, combining the 
empirical with the conceptual in order to abstract from the senses and eliminate 
preconceptions. This way of thinking and working is also implicit in the tension 
between perception and abstraction felt in Newton’s two-dimensional diagrams of four-
dimensional accelerating paths and in the simultaneous literal and abstract reality of his 
thought experiments about mathematical objects that are real but do not exist within the 
physical universe, or possibly even within geometry. 
 
 
God and Space 
 
As I briefly touched on in the first section of this chapter, Newton connects theology 
and natural philosophy through causality and the design argument, and treats the study 
of nature as akin to worship and the study of God. As Janiak shows us, there is also a 
parallel — and possibly a developmental link — between Newton’s thinking on the 
nature of the real and the apparent in relation to scripture, and his thinking on the 
relative and absolute natures of space. In the General Scholium, Newton relates the 
epistemological problems of natural philosophy to the epistemological problem of 
knowing God: ‘there is no direct sense […] by which we know innermost substances; 
much less do we have an idea of the substance of God’ (Principia, p. 942). He posits the 
partial solutions of learning of God through his creation: ‘We know him only by his 
properties and attributes and by the wisest and best construction of things and their final 
causes’, and analogy with the human: ‘all discourse about God is derived through a 
certain similitude from things human, which while not perfect is nevertheless a 
similitude of some kind’ (Principia, pp. 942–43). This is a similar tension to that 
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between the real and apparent, the relative and absolute, the sensory and the abstract 
that has been under discussion throughout this thesis. The question of how we can know 
God through our relative experience, and of how God is related to the concept of 
absolute space in Newton’s portrayal will be our concern for the rest of the chapter.  
 
The General Scholium starts with a criticism of Descartes’s theory of vortices, showing 
by calculation that the actual motions of the planets and comets are disproportional to 
those expected if vortices are assumed. Newton then discusses air resistance, similarly 
asserting that the celestial spaces above the atmosphere of the earth — like Boyle’s 
vacuum — lack resistance and so the orbits of planets must be continuous (Newton’s 
nod to Boyle emphasizing the role of artificial experiment in understanding natural laws 
through the theory of universal applicability to states beyond the scope of human 
verification). Newton next ponders causation, deducing from the mechanical system 
that there must be a non-mechanical cause for these regular motions; planets, while 
persevering in their orbits by the laws of gravity, could not have acquired those 
positions in the first place by means of those laws. The free movement and eccentric 
orbits of comets also suggest a non-mechanical cause. The elegance of the system and 
the serendipitous placement of bodies within it inspire Newton to assert ‘the design and 
dominion of an intelligent and powerful being’ (Principia, p. 940). The discussion turns 
to the nature of God and his relation to the universe: his supreme dominion and his 
relation to duration and space. 
Newton relates God to space and duration as follows: 
 
He is eternal and infinite […], that is, he endures from eternity to 
eternity, and he is present from infinity to infinity […]. He is not 
eternity and infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration and 
space, but he endures and is present. He endures always and is present 
everywhere, and by existing always and everywhere he constitutes 
duration and space. (Principia, p. 941)41 
 
The distinction between being and constituting duration and space is both subtle and 
confusing and it is easy to sympathize with those such as Berkeley and Leibniz who 
                                                
41 NB the second edition reads ‘he constitutes duration and space, eternity, and infinity’. 
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assumed Newton to be identifying God with space.42 The idea that God is not duration 
and space but constitutes duration and space seems contradictory, but I think analogy 
with his patterned expression about eternity and infinity can help us unravel the 
meaning here. The Latin reads: ‘Non est æternitas & infinitas, sed æternus & infinitus; 
non est duratio & spatium, sed durat & adest.’43 When Newton writes that he is not 
‘eternity and infinity’ (æternitas & infinitas), but is ‘eternal and infinite’ (æternus & 
infinitus), the move from noun to adjectival forms repositions the concepts as attributes 
of God rather than as ontological states. The repeated sentence structure suggests that 
‘he endures and is present’ (sed durat & adest) is to ‘duration and space’ (duratio & 
spatium), as ‘eternal and infinite’ is to ‘eternity and infinity’. That is to say, that 
enduring and being present are attributes of God but that he is not identified with 
duration and space in any ontological way. Like absolute space, it is a more abstract 
conception. The subsequent sentence expands on the concepts of enduring and being 
present in the context of God’s eternal and infinite nature, and as such is really a subset 
of ‘but he endures and is present’, and so the phrase ‘he constitutes duration and space’ 
(durationem & spatium constituit) is placed in a position of contrast to the idea of God 
being duration and space (non est duratio & spatium). As such, I reject an interpretation 
of ‘constitutes’ as ‘be[ing] the elements or material of which the thing spoken of 
consists’, favouring as applicable here the definitions: ‘To set, place’, ‘To set up, ordain, 
establish, appoint, determine’, and ‘To frame, form, make (by combination of 
elements)’.44  
De Gravitatione, which also positions itself against Cartesian relationalism and 
ideas of place, supports this reading of the relationship between God and space in 
Newton’s thought. Newton writes: 
 
But I see what Descartes feared, namely that if he should consider 
space infinite, it would perhaps become God because of the 
perfection of infinity. But by no means, for infinity is not perfection 
except when it is attributed to perfect things. (PW, p. 25) 
                                                
42 On Berkeley and Leibniz on Newton and space see Geoffrey Gorham, ‘Newton on God’s Relation to 
Space and Time: The Cartesian Framework’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 93 (2011), 281–320 
(p. 281). 
43 Isaac Newton, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (London: William and John Innys, 
1726), p. 528. 
44 OED, 8; 1a; 3; 5. 
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Newton explicitly addresses the question of the identity between God and infinity, 
asserting that space and God are not identical, and neither are they identical by means of 
their shared attribute of infinity. 
However, having made a distinction between being and constituting duration and 
space, Newton in the next paragraph of the General Scholium writes:  
 
He is omnipresent not only virtually but also substantially; for action 
requires substance. In him all things are contained and move, but he 
does not act on them nor they on him. (Principia, p. 941)45 
 
As with the ideas of space discussed above which are simultaneously real and abstract, 
there is a seeming contradiction in God’s omnipresence being described as both virtual 
and substantial. However, the nature of this substantiality is confused: Newton writes 
that God does not act on bodies nor they on him, which undermines the need for the 
condition of substantiality in the idea that ‘action requires substance’. The idea of God 
as a container in which bodies move also suggests that perhaps this is a special 
understanding of substantiality. Newton had earlier stated that celestial spaces must be 
empty (like Boyle’s vacuum) because of the lack of drag and the disproportionate 
movements of the planets and comets; it makes no sense to rid these spaces of Cartesian 
vortices only to fill them again with another physical substance. In the next sentence, 
Newton confirms that ‘the bodies feel no resistance from God’s omnipresence’, but he 
does not explain his description of God as being omnipresent substantially (Principia, 
pp. 941–42). It is possible that the idea of God as a container, but one which has no 
interaction with the bodies moving within it, is related to the idea of absolute space as 
an epistemological backdrop to the movement of bodies, and that the substantiality 
referred to here is the necessary and essential reality of the presence of God, but does 
not include the same sort of material substantiality as bodies. 
Newton also asserts that extension is not an accident inhering in subjects, that is, 
that space exists independently of body: 
 
Moreover, since we can clearly conceive extension existing without 
any subject, as when we may imagine spaces outside the world or 
                                                
45 NB Newton’s note attached to move cites classical and Biblical authors as authority for this belief. 
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places empty of any body whatsoever, and we believe [extension] to 
exist wherever we imagine there are no bodies, and we cannot believe 
that it would perish with the body if God should annihilate a body, it 
follows that [extension] does not exist as an accident inhering in 
some subject. (PW, p. 22)46 
 
Newton also provides against the argument that relating God to space occasions the 
assertion that he is like a body: 
 
Moreover, lest anyone should for this reason imagine God to be like a 
body, extended and made of divisible parts, it should be known that 
spaces themselves are not actually divisible, and furthermore, that 
any being has a manner proper to itself of being present in spaces. 
(PW, p. 26) 
 
Again, space and body are distinguished from one another by means of their properties. 
That space is not divisible adds credence to it being epistemological rather than 
metaphysical. 
There is similar uncertainty over the status of the identification between God and 
space in Newton’s famous description of space as an ‘emanative effect’ of God in De 
Gravitatione: 
 
Space is an affection of a being just as a being. No being exists or can 
exist which is not related to space in some way. God is everywhere, 
created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space that it 
occupies; and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not 
exist. And hence it follows that space is an emanative effect of the 
first existing being, for if any being whatsoever is posited, space is 
posited. And the same may be asserted of duration: for certainly both 
are affections or attributes of a being according to which the quantity 
of any thing’s existence is individuated to the degree that the size of 
its presence and persistence is specified. (PW, p. 25) 
 
Newton’s list of beings that relate to space in some way includes three different kinds of 
being — God, created minds, and bodies. The distinction of the three, and particularly 
the inclusion of minds, suggests that for Newton there is no requirement for a being’s 
                                                
46 Square brackets follow Janiak’s text. 
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material substantiality to necessitate space. A similar reading can apply to the idea of 
space as an ‘emanative effect’ (effectus emanativus) of God.47 The concept of 
emanation can apply to both material and immaterial things, and even things with a 
more ambiguous status, for example Henry More, who did equate absolute space with 
spiritual (yet immaterial) extension, uses ‘emanative’ to describe the procession of the 
Holy Ghost.48 It can be interpreted in a similar way to the idea of God constituting space 
and duration discussed above, that is to say, that space emanates from God as a 
necessary and consequential framework of his existence: God exists and therefore the 
space in which he exists must also exist. This also answers for the connection between 
the eternity and immutability of God and space: ‘space is eternal in duration and 
immutable in nature because it is the emanative effect of an eternal and immutable 
being’ (PW, p. 26).  
I think it is also possible to read this framework as mental and epistemological. 
When Newton describes space as an ‘emanative effect’ of God on the grounds that ‘if 
any being whatsoever is posited [posito], space is posited [ponitur]’, he creates a 
necessary link between space and existence, but in doing so also creates a parallel 
between the act of God occasioning space and the act of the creaturely imagining of 
space. Pono, ponere can be literally translated as ‘to place’, but also includes more 
figurative meaning which describe mental acts of placing. It is in this period that the 
English word ‘posit’ develops an extended meaning in logic and philosophy of ‘to put 
forward’ or ‘to postulate’ – a mental placing in addition to the original meaning of a 
physical act of placing.49 This resonates with Newton’s argument that space exists 
because we cannot think that it does not: 
 
although we can possibly imagine that there is nothing in space, yet 
we cannot think that space does not exit […]. This is manifest from 
the spaces beyond the world, which we must suppose to exist (since 
we imagine the world to be finite), although they are neither revealed 
to us by God, nor known through perception […]. But it is usually 
believed that these spaces are nothing; yet indeed they are spaces. 
                                                
47 For Latin text see Isaac Newton, ‘De Gravitatione et æquipondio fluidorum’, Cambridge University 
Library, MS Add. 4003, <http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/THEM00093> 
[accessed 5 April 2014] (p. 18).  
48 Henry More, Paralipomena Prophetica (London: 1685), p. 471, quoted in OED, ‘emanative’, 1. 
49 OED, 2a. The first usage in this context listed by OED is from 1697. 
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Although space may be empty of body, nevertheless it is not itself a 
void; and something is there, because spaces are there, although 
nothing more than that. (PW, pp. 26–27) 
 
The same tools are used in imagining space as are used in conceiving of phenomena 
beyond our perception, and there is a reality to space, even if it is empty of body and yet 
not itself a void.  
Another controversial aspect of Newton’s portrayal of the relationship between 
space and God is the idea of space as God’s ‘sensory’ in the ‘Queries’ to the Opticks: 
 
Is not the sensory of animals that place to which the sensitive 
substance is present, and into which the sensible species of things are 
carried through the nerves and brain, that there they may be perceived 
by their immediate presence to that substance? And these things 
being rightly dispatched, does it not appear from phenomena that 
there is a being incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who in 
infinite space, as it were in his sensory, sees the things themselves 
intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends them 
wholly by their immediate presence to himself[.] (PW, p. 130) 
 
This passage suggests that the immediate co-presence of God and all things allows his 
intimate knowledge of them. It is a spatial conception of God’s omniscience, relating it 
to his omnipresence, and using the analogy of the sensorium from the animal world to 
describe the location — infinite space — for this meeting of perceiver and perceived. In 
the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, Leibniz (perhaps disingenuously, or perhaps as a 
result of the infamous missing tanquam) takes Newton literally, claiming that ‘Sir Isaac 
Newton says that space is an organ which God uses to perceive things’, a view still 
upheld by some modern critics.50 Even without the tanquam, I think it is possible to 
read Newton’s query less literally, and indeed do so because of the spatiality of the idea. 
If the sensorium is infinite space itself, it is of the same magnitude as God and is co-
present with him. As such, the notion of the sensorium must either be a metaphor, or an 
aspect of God as a whole being and not an organ, which is but a part of a being. That 
                                                
50 Leibniz/Clarke 1717, First Letter (2000), p. 4, quoted in Gorham, p. 281. The phrase ‘as it were’ did 
not appear in some copies of the Opticks; see Alexander Koyré and I. Bernard Cohen, ‘The Case of the 
Missing Tanquam,’ Isis, 52 (1961), 555–66. See also Barbour, p. 629. 
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there is no need for a separate organ is implicit in the notion of the sensory of God, 
which comes from the idea that he is intimately present with all things, and that 
therefore his whole (spatial) being is like a sensory.  
Newton explicitly states that the world is not to be considered the body of God, 
despite the analogy of the sensorium: 
 
we are not to consider the world as the body of God, or the several 
parts thereof, as the parts of God. He is a uniform being, void of any 
members or parts, and they are his creatures subordinate to him, and 
subservient to his will; and he is no more the soul of them, than the 
soul of man is the soul of the species of things carried through the 
organs of sense into the place of its sensation, where it perceived 
them by means of its immediate presence, without the intervention of 
any third thing. The organs of sense are not for enabling the soul to 
perceive the species of things in its sensorium, but only for conveying 
them thither; and God has no need of such organs, he being 
everywhere present to the things themselves. (PW, pp. 138–39) 
 
Newton compares the metaphor of the sensorium of God to the place of sensation in 
man to establish the relation between God and creation as one of subject and object of 
perception, not any more metaphysical or ontological link. He also makes an analogy 
between the sensorium of God and the will of man with regard to their control over the 
physical universe and the human body respectively (PW, p. 138) thus reinforcing the 
sense of relation between human experience and the conception of God. 
There is a similar idea of the expansiveness but indivisibility of mind in De 
Gravitatione: 
 
And just as we understand any moment of duration to be diffused 
throughout all spaces, according to its kind, without any concept of 
its parts, so it is no more contradictory that mind also, according to its 
kind, can be diffused through space without any concept of its parts. 
(PW, p. 26) 
 
Newton compares mind to the structure of a plane of simultaneity (duration diffused 
throughout all spaces), asserting its ability to be present throughout space without being 
divided. This passage comes shortly after the quotation given above about God and 
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space not being divisible (ibid.) and thus there is a sense that Newton is thinking about 
the mind of God (although there is nothing to say that this does not also apply to the 
minds of men). Another possible result emphasized by the idea of the sensorium of this 
identification or co-existence between God and absolute space (if the space under 
discussion is infinite and indivisible then it is absolute), is that God himself is a witness 
to absolute space and to the relation of relative space and motion to it.  
It is intriguing that discussions of the relation between God and space are 
intertwined with musings on the perception and thought of God and man. Immediately 
between the passages from the General Scholium quoted above on eternity, infinity, 
space, and duration, and on God being omnipresent both virtually and substantially, 
Newton describes: 
 
Every sentient soul, at different times and in different organs of 
senses and motions, is the same indivisible person. There are parts 
that are successive in duration and coexistent in space, but neither of 
these exist in the person of man or in his thinking principle, and much 
less in the thinking substance of God. Every man, insofar as he is a 
thing that has senses, is one and the same man throughout his lifetime 
in each and every organ of his senses. God is one and the same God 
always and everywhere. (Principia, p. 941)  
 
Newton seems to be positing a unity to man’s collective experiences of sense or thought 
that transcends the linear and divisible experience of time and space. He then draws an 
analogy between this and the idea that God’s omniscience is unified, even though it 
occurs across all times and spaces. This perhaps echoes the layer of abstract 
mathematical thought in which man is able to conceive (if not perceive) of absolute 
space. 
In describing the unity of God, Newton writes: 
 
It follows that all of him is like himself: he is all eye, all ear, all brain, 
all arm, all force of sensing, of understanding, and of acting, but in a 
way not at all human, in a way not at all corporeal, in a way utterly 
unknown to us. (Principia, p. 942) 
 
Newton separates the image of God into parts (all eye, all ear), making it 
comprehensible and comparable to man, at the same time as asserting that each of these 
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parts is the whole. He also asserts that the way these things are is not at all human and 
utterly unknown to us. On the one hand this gives the comparison with the united and 
collective sensory experience of man the force of elevating man to something beyond 
his mundane capacity, but on the other highlights the impossibility of it, echoing his 
distinction between what is true or absolute versus what is apparent or relative and 
framed in such a way to be understood by the vulgar man.  
The analogy between human and divine experience here appears to have been 
formed in reverse, partly because the passage starting ‘Every sentient soul’ is an 
addition of the third edition, and also because the unification of the separate senses does 
not seem like a natural description of human experience but rather a back formation 
from his thinking of God’s omniscience in spatial terms and of using accommodated, 
anthropomorphic imagery to describe God’s sensing and understanding. The gap 
between human and divine experience is also emphasized in the passage from the 
‘Queries’ to the Opticks on infinite space as the sensorium of God. The passage 
continues: 
 
[God] who in infinite space, as it were in his sensory, sees the things 
themselves intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and 
comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to himself: of 
which things the images only carried through the organs of sense into 
our little sensoriums, are then seen and beheld by that which in us 
perceives and thinks. And though every true step made in this 
philosophy brings us not immediately to the knowledge of the first 
cause, yet it brings us nearer to it, and on that account is to be highly 
valued. (PW, p. 130) 
 
After the analogy between the sensory of creatures and the (‘as it were’) sensory of 
God, there is a contrast between the immediate presence and thus intimate perception of 
God in his infinite and co-present sensory, and the more limited perception of man 
whose experience of objects is mediated through our organs and located separately in 
our finite and little sensoriums. However, as with the stepped approach of Hooke and 
even the aspirational nescience of Boyle, the second sentence of this quotation validates 
the human experience as worthy, for it is by these means that we can come closer to 
knowledge of the first cause. While the ‘true steps’ of Newton’s text only explicitly 
refer to human observations of the natural world, and thus the potential for knowledge 
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of God through his creation, it is suggestive that this idea of narrowing the gulf and 
approaching knowledge of the first cause comes after a comparison between human and 
divine experiences and perceptions. A quick or imprecise reading could easily 
misinterpret this as support for the idea that human and divine perception are 
comparable and perhaps even on the same continuum. As Richard Cotes observes, ‘his 
[Newton’s] tremendous genius, enodat[es] each of the most difficult problems and 
reach[es] out beyond the accepted limits of the human’ (Principia, p. 398). Although 
Newton resists the literal possibility of comparison between human and divine 
perception, the juxtaposition of these ideas suggests an aspirational trajectory. 
In Newton’s presentation there is a mixture of both potential comparison and 
literal disunity in man and God’s experience of space, a sense of shared yet different 
experience. Newton draws an analogy with ‘a blind man with no idea of colors’ to 
express our ignorance of ‘the ways in which the most wide God senses and understands 
all things’ (Principia, p. 942). In describing God as ‘most wide’, Newton emphasizes 
the idea that his spatial extent is related to his perceptions, a detail echoed in the 
ambiguity of how to read ‘all things’ — while our experience would be of a sequence of 
parts, the wideness of God is such that he can comprehend an entire plane of 
simultaneity at once, or even the whole manifold. But it also emphasizes the spatiality 
of our understanding of God, and this is another way in which Newton’s God is like his 
conception of space; there is a need for a fixed absolute backdrop, something consistent 
and all pervasive even if not wholly comprehensible, against which the relative, 
experiential world can be understood. For Newton this consistency and all 
pervasiveness is figured spatially (temporally too, but with greater emphasis on the 
spatial), as if this aspect, like the notion of absolute space as an epistemological 
construct, is necessary to be able to think of God.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Newton places a lot of confidence in man’s ability to discern the frame of nature and to 
figure out the mechanical workings of the universe. He posits an approach that prizes 
the certainty of its facts and refuses to feign hypotheses, preferring instead to mark off 
areas of knowledge — such as primary causes — as admittedly unknown. In order to 
make these standards of certainty workable and practicable with the capacities of man 
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and the current state of knowledge, he admits contingent knowledge and asserts that, 
methodologically, it is to be treated as if it is certain, until proven otherwise. In order to 
accommodate the limited perceptual faculties of man, Newton also assumes a 
consistency to the laws of nature, inferring from what can be observed or deduced by 
experiment, principles that are to be applied to bodies universally (albeit contingently). 
This sense of unity and universality has a distinctly spatial feel to it, emphasizing the 
sense of location in man’s relation to creation and the things of the world. This is also 
felt in Newton’s portrayal of absolute and relative space. In order to make sense of 
dynamics, a concept of absolute space must be projected as a backdrop and corrective 
recontextualization to the relative space and motion that we can perceive. I have argued 
that this absolute space is an epistemological construct rather than an ontological reality, 
even if there is an abstract or mathematical sense in which is it more ‘true’ than its 
relative counterpart. This abstract or mathematical mental space, underpinned by 
absolute space, is key for understanding Newton’s work, for example in understanding 
the two-dimensional diagrammatic representations of four-dimensional paths. Absolute 
and relative space are intimately connected as we cannot deal directly with abstracts and 
must always deal with them in terms of each other. This relation is echoed in Newton’s 
exploration in spatial terms of the nature of God, who must be similarly understood in 
terms of an abstract corrective to a relative understanding.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
John Milton and Literary Space 
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Introduction 
 
Angelica Duran, in her significant book The Age of Milton and the Scientific Revolution, 
argues that Milton’s literature is ‘as much a part of the project that Francis Bacon called 
the advancement of learning as were the optical lenses, air pumps and intravenous 
syringes created by early modern scientists’. Although it is not itself ‘science’, Milton’s 
work does more than merely reflect or praise the work of scientists, and with its concern 
about the development of knowledge, it participates in a cultural project wider than the 
specific disciplinary divisions arising at the time.1 As I hope I have demonstrated in the 
previous three chapters, applying techniques of literary analysis to the works of Hooke, 
Boyle, and Newton confirms the idea that ‘science’ does not just happen in laboratories, 
under lenses, or in experiments and then gets reported in publications. Natural 
philosophy is much wider ranging in its remit and also takes place — for both 
practitioners and readers — on the page and in the mind, both in terms of exploring the 
philosophical questions about knowledge that underpin it, and also at the level of praxis 
in the performing of thought experiments and in the processing and understanding of 
data in order to construct knowledge. In this chapter, I follow Duran in reading Milton 
as participating in a wider cultural project of ‘science’ that does so much more than just 
summarize or comment on the findings, theories, or practice of contemporary natural 
philosophers, and that actually engages with the same fundamental questions about 
knowledge, and even uses some cognate methods — on the page and in the mind — to 
test and explore the human experience of the world around us. Again, space is central. 
As well as providing a thematic point of contact between Milton’s theological epic and 
the work of contemporary natural philosophers, the use and representation of spatiality 
are intimately connected with questions of epistemology.  
Paradise Lost is a poem directly concerned with space and spatiality. It includes 
the creation of and travel between worlds, battles for territory, encroachments and 
banishments, and characters engaged in astronomical contemplation. However, while 
Milton’s presentation of space has enough detail to demonstrate his interest and literacy 
in contemporary astronomy and cosmology, he does not seem to be concerned with 
outlining a particular cosmology or system of physics. Like Raphael’s refusal to answer 
Adam’s astronomical probing in Book VIII, Milton does not reveal enough to allow the 
                                                
1 Duran, p. 3. 
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reader to determine any particular system. Alastair Fowler notes that Milton’s cosmos 
relates coherently to the cosmos as understood by Milton’s contemporaries, but can be 
variously interpreted as Copernican, Ptolemaic, or Tychonic.2 What I believe stands out 
more in Milton’s work, is his exploration of the creaturely experience — or indeed 
experiences, for they are subjective, various, and multiple — of space, and its relation to 
the quest for knowledge. 
In this chapter I trace the theme by exploring how Milton engages, not with 
systems or theories, but with the more fundamental questions of natural philosophy that 
we have seen at the core of work by Hooke, Boyle, and Newton. In the first section, I 
outline the anxieties and convictions of Milton’s epistemology and the methods he 
encourages and demonstrates for coming to knowledge. In the second section, I 
consider his exploration of the ideas of the legibility of nature and the relationship 
between the visible and invisible worlds; and in the final section, I examine the 
presentation of space in Paradise Lost, considering the similarities between the 
observed, experimental, and conceptual spaces of Hooke, Boyle, and Newton, and the 
spaces created by Milton’s literary imagination — spaces which are themselves created 
to test and explore, and which have an intimate relationship with thought and the 
development of knowledge.  
 
 
Epistemology 
 
The epistemological beliefs and the methodologies for attaining and developing 
knowledge written into Milton’s oeuvre betray similar themes and tensions to those of 
the natural philosophers considered in this thesis. Milton shows faith in the human 
capacity for knowledge and a belief in founding knowledge on human experience and 
sensory data, but there is some tension between these beliefs and an awareness of the 
limits of human knowledge because of its basis in corporeality. There is also an anxiety 
about what man should know. These anxieties are especially prominent with regard to 
the desire for higher knowledge, such as the secrets of nature, and ultimately, God. 
However, like the natural philosophers, Milton does not abandon his quest for truth, and 
                                                
2 Paradise Lost, ed. by Fowler, p. 34. References to the poem are to this edition and are given by book 
and line number, parenthetically in the text. 
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in many cases employs similar strategies for allowing knowledge to progress in spite of 
its limits. These strategies include the ennobling of subjective and sensory human 
experience, the framing of human knowledge in the context of a process of learning, the 
acceptance of the contingency of human knowledge, the embracing of human reason, 
and the assumption of the consistency of nature. 
 
In Paradise Lost there are numerous anxieties about the status and capacity of human 
knowledge. Milton makes Raphael the mouthpiece for some of these anxieties as the 
archangel frets over educating Adam:  
 
how shall I relate 
To human sense the invisible exploits 
Of warring spirits[?] (V. 564–66) 
 
Raphael questions his ability to communicate angelic events specifically to Adam’s 
‘human sense’. Throughout the poem we are reminded of the incomprehensibility of 
God who, ‘invisible | Amidst the glorious brightness’ (III. 375–76), is portrayed only in 
accommodated forms, and also of the limited mental and perceptual faculties of even 
unfallen man who must rely on Raphael for revelation of things, ‘Unknown, which 
human knowledge could not reach’ (VII. 75). Raphael worries about the legitimacy of 
sharing information with Adam, of unfolding ‘The secrets of another world, perhaps | 
Not lawful to reveal’ (V. 569–70), suggesting that there might be limits to what man 
should know, and perhaps offering support against the curiosity of practices such as 
natural philosophy. He tells Adam that his commission is ‘to answer thy desire | Of 
knowledge within bounds’ (VII. 119–20, my emphasis). There are also frequent 
reminders of the disparity between the understanding of fallen and unfallen man. As 
Stanley Fish illustrates with his notion of the ‘guilty reader’, the reader’s experience is 
dialectical and he or she is repeatedly asked to make a distinction between him or 
herself and Adam and Eve, always reading through the lens of his or her corruption, 
even where the described Edenic scene is pure, such as in the sensuous description of 
Eve in Book IV.3 In Book IX we witness the changes in Adam and Eve as they fall: 
their ‘inmost powers | Made err’ (IX. 1049–50), and ‘their minds | How darkened’ (IX. 
                                                
3 Stanley Fish, Surprised by Sin, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 142. 
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1053–54). Ultimately they are hidden from the face of God and angel, whose sight now 
dazzles them (XI. 1080–84; X. 723–24). 
However, despite these anxieties, which would seem to align Milton with 
traditional narratives of the impassable gulf between man and God, and the irreparable 
breach between the pre- and post-lapsarian states, Milton offers a generally positive 
view for the knowledge capabilities of man, both before and after the fall. There are 
numerous occasions where Milton celebrates and elevates the bodiliness of sensory 
experience. As Christopher Tilmouth shows, the passions guide Adam and Eve to God 
and their intuitive worship of him through wonder, love, and sensuous revelry.4 Neither 
does Raphael disdain corporal food, admitting that angels also possess ‘every lower 
faculty | Of sense’ (V. 410–11) and falling to his meal with Adam and Eve, ‘with keen 
despatch | Of real hunger’ (V. 436–37). Even Satan is arrested by the sensual 
description of Adam and Eve, not for any reason of depravity, but because ‘so lively 
shines | In them divine resemblance’ (IV. 363–64). Satan sees reference to God in their 
outward appearance, and this sensory experience provokes an emotional reaction of 
grief and wonder in the fallen angel and shows him at his best and closest to 
redemption. Lee A. Jacobus describes an epistemology that ‘credits sensory experience 
in Heaven, Hell and on Earth’, showing that while for Milton, sensory perception is not 
sufficient in itself, it is not a detestable or unreliable guide for knowledge and is 
necessary if knowledge is to be had at all.5  
In Paradise Regained, Milton similarly emphasizes the substantial humanity of 
the Son. He is the ‘True image of the Father’, but is also described as ‘enshrined | In 
fleshly tabernacle, and human form’.6 The word fleshly focuses on the gross 
corporeality of the incarnation, but the words enshrined and tabernacle elevate that 
fleshy casing with their worshipful, religious connotations, enshrined in particular 
suggesting the ‘appropriateness’ of the container for what it houses.7 The description of 
God’s purpose in the incarnation emphasizes the importance of Jesus’s bodily humanity 
                                                
4 Christopher Tilmouth, Passion’s Triumph over Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 
190–92. 
5 Lee A. Jacobus, Sudden Apprehension: Aspects of Knowledge in ‘Paradise Lost’ (The Hague: Mouton, 
1976), pp. 8–10. 
6 ‘Paradise Regained’, in Complete Shorter Poems, ed. by Carey, IV. 596, 598–99. Further references, 
denoted PR, are to this edition and given by book and line number parenthetically in the text. 
7 OED, ‘enshrine’ 1a. 
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to his task: ‘His weakness shall o’ercome Satanic strength | And all the world, and mass 
of sinful flesh’ (PR, I. 161–62). There is a potentially dual reading here and as well as 
the primary meaning that Satan and the world and mass of sinful flesh will be overcome 
by the Son’s weakness (i.e. his assumption of human form), one can also read ‘the 
world’ and/or ‘the mass of sinful flesh’ as being in apposition to ‘his weakness’ and so 
actually a part of what will overcome Satanic strength.8 
In Paradise Lost, Milton portrays knowledge as growing out of human 
experience and physical observation. There are gestures towards the tradition that held 
Adam to have innate knowledge — such as Adam’s instinctive looking to heaven (VIII. 
257) and awareness of a maker (VIII. 278) — however his knowledge of his self and the 
other objects of creation seem to derive from observation, interpreted with reason. For 
Adam, Eden is a place of learning and his behaviour features exploration and 
experiment. In his description of his nativity he recounts: ‘Myself I then perused, and 
limb by limb | Surveyed, and sometimes went, and sometimes ran’ (VIII. 267–68), this 
example encompassing examination, trial, and bodily experience. The biblical episode 
from Genisis 2. 19 where Adam names the animals — traditionally used as evidence of 
Adam’s innate knowledge — is alluded to in the poem:  
 
I named them, as they passed, and understood 
Their nature, with such knowledge God endued 
My sudden apprehension. (VIII. 352–54) 
 
The idea of sudden apprehension seems to support the idea of innate knowledge, but 
there is a hint of tension between this suddenness and the act of the animals passing 
before Adam, which gives a sense of the historicity of experience, a relationship 
between spatial and temporal experience, emphasized by the homonym passed/past.9 In 
Tetrachordon, Milton writes that Adam, ‘had the wisdom giv’n him to know all 
creatures, and to name them according to their properties’ (CPW, II, 602). Here, the gift 
is not knowledge itself, but the wisdom to know, a subtle difference that places more 
emphasis on Adam’s own agency in his coming to knowledge. Combined with the 
                                                
8 This reading is supported by Milton’s citation of Romans 8. 3, ‘“God having sent his own Son formed 
like flesh, liable to sin”’, in the discussion of the dual nature of Christ in De Doctrina (CPW, VI, 419). 
9 On this and other resonances of the passed/past homonym see William Poole, Milton and the Idea of the 
Fall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 165–66. 
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Aristotelian idea of naming ‘according to their properties’, this gift is portrayed as a set 
of categorical principles to be applied upon phenomenological encounter rather than an 
innate knowledge of the thing itself. While Genesis 2. 19 is not related in full in 
Paradise Lost, the naming we are shown — where Adam demonstrates fit pairings of 
animals based on verbal patterning — has the feel of an experiment to test the 
categorical boundaries of these names, rather than a sudden God-given apprehension of 
their natures.  
 
they rejoice 
Each with their kind, lion with lioness; 
So fitly them in pairs thou hast combined; 
Much less can bird with beast, or fish with fowl 
So well converse, nor with the ox the ape; 
Worse then can man with beast, and least of all. (VIII. 392–97) 
 
Adam starts with lion and lioness, their fitness expressed in the near congruence of 
variant forms of lion. Then come the less apt, but alliterative, bird and beast, fish and 
fowl. The regression continues with ox and ape, which have no patterning, and finally 
man and beast who not only have no shared features to unite them, but are pulled in 
opposite directions along the line by internal rhymes with other words, can and least, 
thus emphasizing the verbal incongruity that exemplifies the categorical unfitness of 
their natures to be paired. This is perhaps a lexical and poetic rendering of a natural 
historical exploration of categories. 
By presenting these methods of learning in Eden, Milton suggests that even the 
most ideal state of human knowledge is not something fixed, but a process, and indeed a 
process that includes learning from empirical evidence derived from the senses. 
Working to the same conclusion, Karen Edwards argues against readings that interpret 
fallen Eve’s praise of experience as her ‘Best guide’ (IX. 808) as Milton’s 
condemnation of experience. Edwards shrewdly points out that the actual objection to 
Satan’s method isn’t its reliance on experience, but its fraudulence; Satan falsifies the 
experimental data he claims, not having eaten the fruit himself. If Eve had held to her 
own reading of nature’s ordered ways she would have been able to see the talking snake 
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for the monstrosity it was.10 One of the things that makes Satan’s lie so seductive is his 
claim, with the influence of the fruit, to have ‘Considered all things visible in heaven, | 
Or earth, or middle’ (IX. 604–05). It is seductive precisely because this is the method 
that, according to Milton, man must use in order to come to knowledge.  
These interpretations of the validity of empirical knowledge, square with 
Milton’s own syllabus of learning as set out in Of Education, which departs from 
classical education not only in the subjects covered — to which Milton added 
geography, physics, applied mathematics, and natural philosophy amongst others — but 
also in the methods deemed suitable: 
 
To set forward all these proceedings in nature & mathematicks, what 
hinders, but that they may procure, as oft as shall be needfull, the helpfull 
experiences of Hunters, fowlers, Fishermen, Shepherds, Gardeners, 
Apothecaries; and in the other sciences, Architects[,] Engineers, 
Mariners, Anatomists[.] (CPW, II, 393–94) 
 
As well as reading texts, the students are encouraged to consult the experiences of 
practitioners. As Duran describes, Milton’s syllabus emphasizes humans, not theories.11 
As well as ennobling the necessarily corporeal aspect of human data collection, 
Milton also provides metaphysical and moral solutions to Raphael’s anxieties, through 
the angel’s own reason and revelation. The hierarchy of beings may cause anxiety about 
the limited capacity for knowledge of lesser beings, but it also allows for the possibility 
of man’s ascension up the hierarchy and for methods of his understanding by means of 
various accommodations. As well as his rhetorical query in Book V about the capacity 
of ‘human sense’ to understand the exploits of angels (quoted above), Raphael also 
wonders: 
 
to recount almighty works 
What words or tongue of seraph can suffice, 
Or heart of man suffice to comprehend? (VII. 112–14) 
 
                                                
10 Karen L. Edwards, Milton and the Natural World: Science and Poetry in ‘Paradise Lost’ (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 15–18. 
11 Duran, p. 156. 
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These two quotations taken together emphasize a three-tiered hierarchy, which shifts 
with perspective, rather than just a divide between man and higher beings. Like Boyle’s 
comparisons between the natural philosopher and the child, or the anatomist and the 
illiterate man, used as analogies for the disparity between human and diving knowledge, 
there is a subjective relativity to the status of knowledge. The quotation from Book V 
establishes the difference between man and angel, but this from Book VII is more 
ambiguous about that distinction. The gulf here is between God and angel, and between 
God and man; in this case, angel and man are on a much more equal footing, as the 
connective or and repeated suffice help to suggest, although we still assume the second-
level distinction between angel and man because of what we remember from Raphael’s 
speech in Book V about the disparity between the recounting of angels and the 
comprehension of man. This reading emphasizes Raphael’s role as an intermediary 
between man and God, between different states of comprehension, and furthermore 
emphasizes the lack of fixity of a creature’s place in the hierarchy of beings. As with 
Boyle, Hooke, and Newton, there is a sense of limit, but not necessarily a strict 
definition of where, or how permanent that limit is. 
This potentially fluid hierarchy also echoes Raphael’s message about the 
potential for creatures to ascend a material hierarchy. He suggests this when discussing 
the angelic digestion of earthly food (‘corporeal to incorporeal turn’ (V. 413)), the 
connections between the parts of the universal ecosystem (‘the grosser feeds the purer’ 
(V. 416)), and finally in his revelation of a traversable, neoplatonic conception of divine 
matter: 
 
one first matter all, 
Indued with various forms, various degrees 
Of substance, and in things that live, of life; 
But more refined, more spirituous, and pure, 
As nearer to him placed or nearer tending 
Each in their several active spheres assigned, 
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds 
Proportioned to each kind. (V. 473–79) 
 
The connection between refinement of comprehension and refinement of matter further 
validates the foundation of knowledge on sensory information, and echoes the ideas 
seen in Boyle, Hooke, and Newton of human knowledge as contingent and incremental. 
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Milton, like Hooke and Newton, uses Bacon’s image of knowledge as stepped, 
concluding from Raphael’s lessons that, ‘In contemplation of created things | By steps 
we may ascend to God.’ (V. 511–12).  
The particular method that Raphael lights on for communicating across levels is 
simile: 
 
what surmounts the reach 
Of human sense, I shall delineate so, 
By likening spiritual to corporal forms, 
As may express them best[.] (V. 571–74) 
 
This is evocative of the use of analogy with what is known (by metaphor and simile) in 
order to understand the unknown, for example in Hooke’s descriptions of microscopical 
findings or Boyle’s speculations about the invisible air. Milton expresses a similar idea 
in Areopagitica when he writes of the search for truth: ‘To be still searching what we 
know not, by what we know’ (CPW, II, 551). 
Adam takes away a methodology of the contemplation of nature from Raphael, 
and yet numerous critics have read Raphael’s injunction to Adam, ‘heaven is for thee 
too high | Too know what passes there; be lowly wise’ (VIII. 172–73) in relation to the 
archangel’s anxiety over what is lawful to reveal (quoted above), and concluded that it 
is intended as a rebuke to Adam’s curiosity about the workings of the heavenly bodies 
and an instruction against the investigations of astronomy and natural philosophy. 
However, despite the loadedness of the theme of curiosity in its foreshadowing of the 
dangers of the tree of knowledge, the position is not so clear cut. Not only does the 
injunction to ‘be lowly wise’ contradict Adam’s earlier lesson that the contemplation of 
creation can allow man to ascend to God, the narrator also seems to have disregarded 
the presumed lesson of humility himself: while Adam obediently checks the roving of 
his mind from things remote from use, Milton does not. Adam says, ‘Therefore from 
this high pitch let us descend | A lower flight’ (VIII. 198–99), but we remember that 
Milton’s poem, ‘with no middle flight intends to soar’ (I. 14). I believe caution is 
needed with the simplistic reading of Raphael’s instruction to ‘be lowly wise’ as an 
injunction against curiosity. Raphael, having heard Adam’s query about the efficiency 
of heavenly motions, does not criticize our first father: 
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To ask or search I blame thee not, for heaven 
Is as the book of God before thee set,  
Wherein to read his wondrous works[.] (VIII. 66–68) 
 
Raphael also re-emphasizes the value of contemplating and reading creation. Barbara K. 
Lewalski’s reading of this scene is helpful here. She notes that Adam’s query grows out 
of Raphael’s creation story and the tension between its geocentric portrayal and the hint 
at the possibility of other inhabited worlds, rather than suddenly stumbling upon 
forbidden or presumptuous knowledge. Lewalski writes that instead, ‘as usual’, Adam: 
 
proceeds by trial and error in his intellectual growth: he starts with certain 
faulty assumptions and formulations, and it is Raphael’s province to teach 
him the proper spirit in which to approach natural science.12 
 
Furthermore, Lewalski notes that Adam does not conclude that the earth moves, he just 
asks questions about its purpose, and that Raphael’s tone is not censorious, the 
archangel even inviting Adam to consider more advanced theories and suggesting that 
the geocentric model might be a result of limited human perspective (VIII. 114–18).13 
The major point of Lewalski’s reading is that Raphael is not there to resolve questions 
of natural science for man and as such he leaves the confirmation or otherwise of 
scientific facts to Adam to work out himself.  
Milton sends Raphael on a voyage through space, which, as Malabika Sarkar 
suggests, allows for the combination of cosmic speculation and experience in the 
poem.14 In the context of Adam, I think it also allows for the contrast of these two 
modes as Raphael chooses not to reveal to Adam the cosmological truths of the poem, 
but the reader has witnessed Raphael’s journey, thus foregrounding the different relative 
perspectives of the two characters. Raphael’s concern is with the attitude Adam brings 
to enquiry; he does not limit Adam’s enquiry, but rather urges contentment with what is 
revealed and redirects Adam’s attention to his primary concerns and joys, which are 
                                                
12 Barbara Kieffer Lewalski, ‘Innocence and Experience in Milton’s Eden’, in New Essays on ‘Paradise 
Lost’, ed. by Thomas Kranidas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 86–117 (p. 108). 
13 Lewalski, pp. 108–09. 
14 Malabika Sarkar, ‘“The Visible Diurnal Sphere”: Astronomical Images of Space and Time in Paradise 
Lost’, Milton Quarterly, 18 (1984), 1–5 (p. 2). 
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humanistic.15 The emphasis in Lewalski’s reading is on learning and methods of 
thought, not on prohibition of subject matter. As such it is possible to see Raphael as 
encouraging human learning through natural philosophical means as well as revelation. 
It is also possible to see Raphael’s urging for Adam’s contentment, not as a stricture, 
but as a recommendation of an epistemological method that accepts the contingency and 
relativity of human knowledge — as we have seen in Hooke, Boyle, and Newton. 
Similarly, the redirection onto the humanistic is compatible with empirical methods of 
learning, and with the idea of the natural philosopher of the seventeenth century as an 
underbuilder participating in a wider, collaborative project to be developed by later 
generations.  
One of the key aspects of Milton’s epistemology is the rejection of the 
dichotomy between the pre- and post-lapsarian human conditions, which both allows us 
hope for the capacity of fallen man and allows us to see the lessons of unfallen man 
(including his ways of learning and creating knowledge) as directly applicable to the 
fallen reader. The catastrophizing tendencies common to orthodox seventeenth-century 
commentaries offer a woefully limited view of human moral and epistemological 
capability after the fall: pre-lapsarian Adam was credited with superior knowledge and 
clearly reasoned thought, expressed in a perfect word-thing language; whilst his fallen 
counterpart languished with partial knowledge and confused thought, mediated by the 
senses and clouded by the passions. This understanding of the fall encouraged, even 
mandated, the rejection of emotions and sensory experiences as its signs and tainted 
artefacts. However, as Poole shows, Milton’s heterodox narrative does not hold the two 
states to be fixed or discrete: ‘the mind is degraded, but not utterly so’.16 By avoiding 
strict dichotomy, Milton presents a holistic notion of human capability, an extension of 
felix culpa, which encompasses the very ‘flaws’ that make man fallen.  
When Milton writes in Of Education that ‘The end then of learning is to repair 
the ruins of our first parents by regaining to know God aright’ (CPW, II, 366–67), he 
simultaneously acknowledges the fall and its attendant loss of knowledge, but also 
suggests that the epistemological consequences of the fall are repairable, and knowledge 
of God possible. Indeed the way to achieve this is through our most fallen faculties. 
Milton continues: 
                                                
15 Lewalski, pp. 110–12. 
16 Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall, p. 145. 
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and out of that knowledge to love him, to imitate him, to be like him, as 
we may the neerest by possessing our soul of true vertue, which being 
united to the heavenly grace of faith makes up the highest perfection. But 
because our understanding cannot in this body found it selfe but on 
sensible things, nor arrive so cleerly to the knowledge of God and things 
invisible, as by orderly conning over the visible and inferior creature, the 
same method is necessarily to be follow’d in all discreet teaching. (CPW, 
II, 367–69) 
 
The knowledge of God, which is the end of learning, is to be founded on sensible and 
visible things, i.e. the contemplation of created things. Here, Milton relies on an 
assumption of the consistency of nature between the visible and invisible realms to both 
make possible the pursuit of higher knowledge, and to give an epistemic value to the 
study of visible things in the process of coming to know God. Although this is presented 
as the method of repairing the damage of the fall, in Paradise Lost, we see this method 
of learning used before the fall. Raphael, despite his anxieties about the disjunction in 
referentiality between man and angel, exemplifies Milton’s educational principles and 
makes visible the invisible with resort to simile in his teaching of Adam. 
Further to this, in Of Education, the knowledge of God does not make up the 
highest perfection in and of itself, but must lead to love and the imitation of God (as 
near as possible) through the possession of virtue. I have shown that the idea that 
knowledge of the creation is a pious act of devotion leading to love of God, rather than 
an impious and impudent curiosity leading away from God, is exemplified in the 
writings of Boyle, Hooke, and Newton. The idea is similarly expressed by Milton’s 
Adam, whose plea to Raphael for knowledge of the creation is couched: 
 
if unforbid thou mayst unfold 
What we, not to explore the secrets ask 
Of his eternal empire, but the more 
To magnify his works, the more we know. (VII. 94–97) 
 
The act of loving and imitating God suggested in Of Education again ennobles the 
bodily and the human by means of virtue. In Areopagitica (composed the same year as 
Of Education), Milton identifies virtue with the passions: ‘Wherefore did he creat 
passions within us, pleasures round about us, but that these rightly temper’d are the very 
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ingredients of vertu?’ (CPW, II, 527). In Areopagitica, the emphasis is also on fallen 
man proving his virtue by the very markers of his fallenness; the ‘dust and heat’ (CPW, 
II, 516) in which the race is to be run evoke the bodily punishment of Adam at Genesis 
3. 19. 
Finally, in the passage from Of Education, the soul must be united to the 
‘heavenly grace of faith’, a type of knowledge predicated on the absence of rational or 
empirical proof.17 The relationship of faith to grace in this construction creates a 
dependence between the two; faith takes on an air of God-given belief, and divine grace 
is implied to be dependent on the faith of the believer. While Milton strongly believes in 
empirical methods as the basis for human knowledge, he also leaves room for the divine 
gifts that are necessary to ultimate knowledge. In Paradise Lost, knowledge learned 
from interacting with the world sits alongside and combines with revelations from God 
and his messengers. The acknowledgement of the lack in human knowledge that needs 
to be made up by grace, actually makes human knowledge more secure. Like the 
nescience that we see in natural philosophy — particularly in the work of Boyle — this 
lack both protects the validity of human knowledge by not claiming too much for it to 
bear, and also leads Milton (and Adam) to further knowledge of the human condition. 
Adam’s seemingly innate knowledge of his maker is inferred from not knowing his own 
beginning (VIII. 251), or who he is (VIII. 270), and his feeling that he is happier than he 
knows (VIII. 282). Further, Adam draws praise of his knowledge from God precisely 
for admitting its limits:  
 
To attain 
The height and depth of thy eternal ways 
All human thoughts come short[.] (VIII. 412–14) 
 
To which God replies: 
 
Thus far to try thee, Adam, I was pleased, 
And find thee knowing not of beasts alone, 
Which thou hast rightly named, but of thyself, 
Expressing well the spirit within thee free, 
                                                
17 On the tension between reason and faith in puritan thought see John Morgan, Godly Learning: Puritan 
Attitudes towards Reason, Learning, and Education, 1560–1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), p. 41.  
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My image[.] (VIII. 437–41) 
 
Adam, using his very lack of knowledge to substantiate the point, demonstrates that he 
has knowledge of himself in relation to God, and it is the ability to work this out that 
expresses the image of God in man.  
That nescience is a part of unfallen Adam’s experience points to the key 
epistemological tool that brings together various different aspects of knowledge 
acquisition: reason. Adam’s unfallen knowledge is not perfect in its completeness, but 
in his capacity to reason and determine relationships, to learn, based on observations of 
the world around him, what he knows and what he doesn’t know. Reason would not be 
necessary if knowledge was complete, and similarly free will would be meaningless. In 
the quotation above, Milton’s God emphasizes that it is the freedom of the spirit within 
man that is his image. As Milton says of Adam in Areopagitica: ‘when God gave him 
reason, he gave him freedom to choose, for reason is but choosing; he had bin else a 
meer artificiall Adam, such an Adam as he is in the motions’ (CPW, II, 527). Similarly, 
in Paradise Lost, Milton’s God states that ‘reason also is choice’ (III. 108), questioning 
the value of obedience paid to necessity rather than to him.  
Milton is confident of man’s capacity to choose correctly and to make 
appropriate value judgements. In Areopagitica, he cites Dionysius Alexandrinus’s 
vision of God who tells him, ‘Read any books whatever come to thy hands, for thou art 
sufficient both to judge aright, and to examine each matter’ (CPW, II, 511). Further, in 
Paradise Lost, Milton’s God deems man, ‘Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall’ 
(III. 99). As Thomas Fulton describes, Areopagitica shows why a prescribed set of 
beliefs cannot produce knowledge. He writes, ‘Milton shows that the natural conditions 
of reason require freedom in order for people to know what they profess,’ and also 
emphasizes that the search for truth is necessarily fragmented, since ‘epistemological 
fragmentation causes constant trial and assists in the process of discovery’.18  
Our nescience provides the opportunity for reason, that is, for choice, which 
combines the knowledge gleaned from observation of the natural world with man’s 
faculty for reason, his most divine attribute. Again, this combines ‘scientific’, 
philosophical, or rational knowledge with faithful knowledge because of the guidance 
of the inner spirit. The proliferation of biblical referencing persuades the reader of the 
                                                
18 Thomas Fulton, ‘“Areopagitica” and the Roots of Liberal Epistemology’, English Literary 
Renaissance, 34 (2004), 42–82 (pp. 59, 67). 
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authority of the poem, however, it is anachronistic in its narrative context and so there is 
ambiguity as to what these references mean for the characters. Is Milton’s scriptural 
reference only there for the reader, or is divine revelation another source of knowledge 
available to the poem’s characters, occurring in tandem with their experiential learning? 
In De Doctrina, Milton asserts his belief in the authority of scripture but states that 
scripture is twofold: there is the external written scripture, and also an internal scripture 
‘engraved upon the hearts of believers’ by the holy spirit (CPW, VI, 587). The 
anachronistic inclusion of biblical language, especially in the mouths of characters, 
suggests this second form. The scripture of the heart offers an integrated sense of 
revealed knowledge, linking revelation, reason, and the body (and thus sensory 
knowledge). The heart is emphasized as corporeal by Milton’s citation of II Corinthians 
3. 3 on the ‘“fleshly tablets of the heart”’ (CPW, VI, 586), but could also be understood 
as the seat of the mind, soul, or emotions (OED, 5a, 6a, 9a).  
By quoting scripture not yet written, Milton also creates a continuity between 
pre- and post-lapsarian language. Milton reminds us of Isaiah 59. 21, asserting that the 
spirit in us, and the word of God in our mouths, is not obliterated by the fall (CPW, VI, 
587). Ironically this shifts authority away from scripture and more to the inward spirit 
of God found in man, i.e. his capacity to reason and judge, and so to a confidence in his 
ability to know. Fulton cites a passage from De Doctrina:  
 
God’s providence committed the contents of the New Testament to such 
wayward and uncertain guardians […] so that this very fact might 
convince us that the Spirit which is given to us is a more certain guide 
than scripture, and that we ought to follow it. (CPW, VI, 589) 
 
Fulton argues that to Milton’s mind, ‘God created an uncertain [Biblical] narrative in 
order to produce an internal authority, thus enhancing the process by which knowledge 
is obtained.’19 
Our ultimate exemplar in how a human should act in relation to his knowledge 
and faith is of course the Son. In Paradise Regained, the Son’s strength, and ironically 
his wisdom, comes from faith, both in the guidance of his inner spirit and his trust that 
his limited, human knowledge will suffice. When he goes into the wilderness, it is not a 
carefully calculated decision, but an impulse: ‘by some strong motion I am led’ (PR, I. 
                                                
19 Fulton, p. 61. 
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290). The term motion suggests the passions,20 but the context also suggests this 
impulse or motion to be potentially God given; there is a sense that God is directing 
Jesus by means of his passions.21 This impulse is not a full revelation and relies on faith, 
which can only be demonstrated in the absence of knowledge. The Son states:  
 
to what intent  
I learn not yet, perhaps I need not know; 
For what concerns my knowledge God reveals. (PR, I. 291–93) 
 
The Son acknowledges his state of not knowing and renounces his need for knowledge, 
trusting to the aptness of God’s revelation. Milton echoes this sentiment in ‘When I 
Consider How my Light is Spent’, with the line, ‘They also serve who only stand and 
wait’.22 These pious yet human examples encapsulate the idea from Of Education of 
active passivity in the faith of grace; the passivity of waiting for revelation and grace, 
underwritten by active choice and active faith. 
In Book IV of Paradise Regained, Satan tries to tempt the Son with knowledge: 
 
Be famous then 
By wisdom; as thy empire must extend, 
So let extend thy mind o’er all the world, 
In knowledge, all things in it comprehend. (PR, IV. 221–24) 
 
He offers Pagan philosophy concluding, ‘These rules will render thee a king complete | 
Within thyself’ (PR, IV. 283–84), the line break giving ‘Within thyself’ more the feel of 
a caveat than a promise and emphasizing the closedness of Satanic reason to revelation 
or external data. 
 Satan’s use of the word knowledge undermines him as its primary definition is 
of ‘acknowledgement or recognition’ (OED, 1) and Satan’s failure throughout Paradise 
Regained is his refusal to allow himself to acknowledge or recognize the identity of the 
Son. This is even more apparent in the word wisdom, which, as well as its primary 
                                                
20 Richard DuRocher, ‘Samson’s “Rousing Motions”: What They Are, How They Work, and Why They 
Matter’, Literature Compass, 3 (2006), 453–69 (pp. 455–56). 
21 DuRocher, pp. 463–64 similarly argues for the passions as the point of interaction between God and 
Samson. 
22 Complete Shorter Poems, p. 333, l. 14. 
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meaning, is one of the manifestations of the divine nature in Christ and used as one of 
his titles, the ‘Wisdom of the Father’ or simply ‘the wisdom’ (OED, 1c).23 The ironic 
truth hidden in Satan’s words is that anything beyond the statement ‘Be famous then by 
wisdom’ is extraneous. Wisdom and knowledge are not exactly synonymous and 
Satan’s move from one to the other reveals a lack of subtlety in his own knowledge and 
emphasizes his lack of appreciation for the additional qualities of wisdom that 
encompass the ability to judge rightly (OED, 1a) over and above simple recognition. 
 While it might be tempting to read Satan’s offer in line with Milton’s views 
against the restriction of non-orthodox material in Areopagitica, it is Jesus who truly 
exemplifies Milton’s position, having the sufficiency to judge of its value as knowledge. 
The Son, who responds ‘sagely’ (PR, IV. 285) to Satan, shows more wisdom and 
knowledge than Satan, not because he reveals possession of knowledge, but because he 
recognizes its limits and lack of necessity. 
 
Think not but that I know these things, or think 
I know them not; not therefore am I short 
Of knowing what I ought: he who receives  
Light from above, from the fountain of light, 
No other doctrine needs, though granted true. (PR, IV. 286) 
 
The Son dismisses the pagan learning offered, pausing only to praise the nescient 
Socrates, who resisted the feigning of hypotheses and the falseness of premature 
systematization: ‘The first and wisest of them all professed | To know this only, that he 
nothing knew’ (PR, IV. 293–94). 
 
 
The Legibility of Nature, and Visible and Invisible Worlds 
 
The discussion of Milton’s epistemology thus far betrays several connections to the 
ideas of visuality and spatiality which have been the core focus of this thesis and which 
will make up the rest of this chapter. The reliance on sensory information has an 
obvious connection to visuality, but there is also a more complex dynamic — which we 
                                                
23 In Paradise Lost, God describes the Son as ‘my wisdom’ (III. 170). 
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have seen in our natural philosophers as well — in the relation of the visible to 
knowledge of what is beyond the visible.  
As discussed above, the method of learning Milton outlines in Of Education, and 
indeed the method that will allow access to knowledge of invisible things, is the 
‘orderly conning over the visible and inferior creature’. That this boundary between the 
visible and invisible is in Milton’s mind in Paradise Lost is clear from his invocation to 
Urania (the muse of astronomy) to help him ‘see and tell | Of things invisible to mortal 
sight’ (III. 54–55).  
When Raphael discusses with Adam what the focus of his study should be, he 
says that heaven is ‘as the book of God before thee set, | Wherein to read his wondrous 
works, and learn’ (VIII. 67–68). This comparison between creation and the book of God 
is evocative of the idea of the book of nature, perhaps doubly so due to the anachronism 
of the comparison — for Adam, the book of God, i.e. scripture, has not yet been written 
and so the creation and his inner spirit are the only books of God he can read. The idea 
of reading nature is (as demonstrated in the previous chapters) related to semiotic 
questions of natural philosophical enquiry, in particular the dynamic between what is 
seen and what is therefore known, and the level of interpretation required by mankind to 
deduce or infer knowledge from what he or she sees. 
Fish suggests that ‘By using language to point up the distortion that results 
wherever fallen man attempts to make sense of the world around him, Milton passes 
judgement on the scientific and linguistic optimism of his own century’.24 However, I 
think Fish mistakenly presumes a positivist version of science that does not fit either the 
epistemologies of the natural philosophers studied in this theses, or Milton’s own 
approach in his characters’ exploration of the world through language. In Milton’s 
linguistic exploration of the relationship between what is seen and known, it is — 
perhaps surprisingly — the inherently imperfect, referential nature of fallen human 
language, the gap, rather than congruence, between sign and referent, that facilitates his 
(and indeed Adam’s) exploration and testing both of semiotic structure itself, and of the 
relationships between created objects.  
When Adam first sees Eve he says:  
 
I now see  
Bone of my bone, flesh of my flesh, myself 
                                                
24 Fish, p. 107. 
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Before me; woman is her name, of man  
Extracted. (VIII. 495) 
 
Adam renders Genesis 2. 23 almost exactly, but adds the phrase ‘myself before me’, 
highlighting the metaphorical aspects of the description against the more literal truth of 
Eve’s nativity from Adam’s rib. The addition emphasizes the importance of 
referentiality, identity, and self-knowledge in arriving at truth and shows Adam 
exploring these themes as he fathoms out his relation to Eve. However, we also see 
flaws in Adam’s reasoning as he tries to turn Eve into a sign of himself in his confusion 
of unity and identity. ‘Myself before me’ flags the tension between understanding bone 
and bone as either one or two signs, and the potential danger in reading too literally and 
abandoning the elasticity of referential language.  
Even Milton’s God uses metaphorical language to suggest semiotic 
relationships, telling Eve that her image, seen reflected in the lake, is her self, ‘What 
there thou seest, fair creature is thyself’ (IV. 468), and describing Adam to her, ‘he | 
whose image thou art’ (IV. 471–72). By verbally equating her with her reflected image, 
and calling her the image of Adam, God teaches Eve to distinguish but also to see the 
relationships between herself and others.25 In Eve’s recounting of her nativity, Adam 
again makes the mistake of literality, calling Eve: ‘His flesh, his bone’ (IV. 483) 
(referring to himself in the third person). This contrasts with God telling Adam that Eve 
is his ‘likeness’ (VIII. 450), and also God’s description of the image relationship to Eve 
(quoted above) at IV. 471, just a few lines before. Adam later solidifies his 
(mis)identification of Eve in his decision to fall: ‘Our state cannot be severed, we are 
one, | One flesh; to lose thee were to lose myself’ (IX. 958–59). Further evidence of 
Milton’s condemnation of Adam’s literalism is clear from Tetrachordon where Milton 
disputes the interpretation of Genesis 2. 23 as mandate for ‘the indissoluble bond of 
marriage’, preferring a reading where it represents the ‘unity of mind and heart’ 
between spouses, not mere flesh (CPW, II, 602). 
Nature in Milton’s presentation acts as a sign for the causes of its creation, but 
— as in Boyle and Hooke — not in an immanent, revelatory way that equates sign with 
referent. This is why Raphael needs to teach Adam about seeing and interpreting nature 
in different ways, that is, with admiration rather than vain curiosity. By so doing, Adam 
                                                
25 This is of course problematic in other ways, as feminist critics such as Annabel Patterson have rightly 
pointed out.  
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can read nature correctly as a sign for the maker, instead of merely seeing his works and 
failing to make that interpretive connection to what lies beyond. In contrast, Satan 
exhibits a lack of imagination in his facetiously literal, pseudo-scientific reasoning: 
 
Doctrine which we would know whence learned: who saw 
When this creation was? Rememberest thou 
Thy making, while the maker gave thee being? 
We know no time when we were not as now; 
Know none before us, self-begot, self-raised 
By our own quickening power[.] (V. 856–61) 
 
Satan’s exclusive focus on worldly evidence in his ‘critical scrutiny’ of the creation tale, 
leads to his claim for autochthony and deprives him of any real understanding of God. 
The fruit of the tree of knowledge provides a good example of nature as a sign 
that is not inherently legible. When Eve contemplates the fruit, she fixes her gaze on it 
(IX. 735) and it is seductive to her eyes and other senses, but nothing about its 
appearance to the sight or other senses gives any indication that it is forbidden, good, 
evil, or even particularly special. It is merely ‘fair to the eye, inviting to the taste’ (IX. 
777). What is highlighted elsewhere as special about it, however, is its function as a 
sign. When describing the prohibition against the fruit of the tree of knowledge, Adam 
calls it: 
 
The only sign of our obedience left 
Among so many signs of power and rule 
Conferred upon us[.] (IV. 428–30) 
 
The fruit is a sign of obedience, not necessarily an inherently magical object. 
Another recurring epistemological theme in Milton’s exploration of the 
relationship between visual signs and their referents, is that of deception and visual 
trickery. While Milton highlights the deceptive potential of sensory data, the physical 
act of seeing is related to cognitive functions such as recognition and evaluation, and 
often bound up with self-knowledge. The way through the confusion of sensory data is 
not in its outright rejection, but in an integrated and subjective way of being that 
acknowledges and uses the sensory and corporeal, at the same time as scrutinizing it, 
i.e. the application of reason and judgement. In Paradise Regained, Satan appears to the 
 210 
Son in various guises, but unlike the vulnerable Lady of A Masque Presented at Ludlow 
Castle who trusts Comus’s rural disguise, or Eve who ignores her misgivings about the 
serpent, Jesus sees through the deception immediately. He says to Satan, ‘I discern thee 
other than thou seem’st’ (PR, I. 348), creating a sense of dual vision between what is 
discerned and what seems.26 He questions why Satan would suggest he distrust God, 
‘Knowing who I am, as I know who thou art?’ (PR, I. 356), linking self-knowledge to 
the ability to unravel deceptive identities. The narrator immediately describes Satan as 
‘th’ Arch-fiend now | Undisguised’ (PR, I. 357–58) suggesting the performative nature 
of the Son’s statement of recognition. This contrasts strongly with Satan’s inability or 
refusal to recognize Jesus as the Son of God. 
In Paradise Lost there is a failure (by Eve and by Uriel) to see past Satan’s 
disguises which contributes to the circumstances of the fall. Satan’s snake-like disguise 
and actions are designed ‘to lure her eye’ (IX. 518), the visuality of this emphasized at 
line 528 with a further mention of Eve’s eye. Eve is described as ‘unwary’ (IX. 614), 
and the ‘credulous mother’ (IX. 644). However, this failure of recognition does not 
seem to be morally loaded, for the narrator says after Uriel has been tricked by Satan, 
‘Neither man nor angel can discern | Hypocrisy’ (III. 682–83). While this contributes to 
the circumstances of the fall, the moral aspect is firmly the breaking of the prohibition. 
 In Paradise Regained, another form of visual trickery is found when Satan 
presents Jesus with visions to tempt him from God. The vision of Rome (offered as 
worldly power) is impossible; it is ‘presented to his eyes | Above the height of 
mountains interposed’ (PR, IV. 38–39) and allows him to see, simultaneously, inside 
and outside of houses. Its strangeness is highlighted: 
 
By what strange parallax or optic skill 
Of vision multiplied through air, or glass 
Of telescope, were curious to inquire. (PR, IV. 40–42) 
 
We cannot know from the text how Satan showed Jesus this vision (by optical 
instruments augmenting natural sight, or by supernatural means), but in employing the 
language of scientific instruments, Milton taps into anxieties about the veracity of such 
images mediated by optical instruments, and highlights the interpretive role of the 
subjective observer. As Maura Brady argues in her analysis of the telescope in Paradise 
                                                
26 Discern can refer to distinction both with the mind and with the eyes (OED, 2, 5a). 
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Lost, ‘the instrument is no apparatus of godlike vision across distance, but one that 
embodies the difficult work of seeing and knowing, the material, pedagogical, and 
rhetorical craftsmanship without which knowledge is impossible.’27 
 Satan’s line, ‘so well I have disposed | My airy microscope’ (PR, IV. 56–57), 
suggests his hand in the mode of viewing, and his use of microscope for telescope 
results in a confusion of scale (the microscope making small things appear larger rather 
than distant things nearer), and thus possibly suggests an attempted obfuscation of 
value. This Satanic vision, a layer of falsehood provided by some intermediary 
deception, is similar to the obscuring film over Adam’s eyes in Book XI of Paradise 
Lost (bred by the first fruit which Satan falsely claimed to give clearer sight), which 
Michael has to remove to enable Adam to see truly.28 The vision Satan provides the Son 
reminds us that visual data has its own rhetoric.  
 Rather than dispelling these visions, the Son instead engages with the difficult 
work of seeing and knowing. Despite warnings of its deceptiveness, the visual stimulus 
is not dismissed as false; rather, the Son’s faith and reason are strong enough that these 
illusions are not persuasive to his judgement. In response to the vision of Rome, Jesus is 
described as ‘unmoved’ (PR, IV. 109); despite the effect on his senses, he does not 
respond passionately, a contrast to his Godly impulse to journey into the wilderness in 
the first place. The Son replies to Satan: 
 
Nor doth this grandeur and majestic show  
[...] allure mine eye,  
Much less my mind. (PR, IV. 110–13) 
 
This reveals a relationship between thinking and seeing based on evaluation. It recalls 
the Lady of A Masque who, whilst drugged, uses her experience of confused vision to 
ward her mind against temptation, using a metaphor of visual disguise to unwrap 
Comus’s false reason:  
 
this juggler  
                                                
27 Maura Brady, ‘Galileo in Action: The ‘Telescope’ in Paradise Lost’, Milton Studies, 44 (2005), 129–52 
(p. 50). 
28 Milton links these visions by comparing Adam’s hilltop to the one from which Satan shows Jesus 
earth’s kingdoms (PL, XI. 381–84). 
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Would think to charm my judgement, as mine eyes 
Obtruding false rules pranked in reason’s garb.29 
 
The Son and the Lady are able to use their faithful judgement to draw on an inner 
vision, distinct but related to their corrupt, sensory experiences. Like Adam using his 
lack of knowledge as a basis for forming knowledge, or Milton and Raphael 
approaching the invisible by means of the visible, the Son and the Lady use their 
experience of distorted vision to reason out a true one. As Brady describes of the 
telescopic occlusions in Paradise Lost, ‘they are offered as a challenge to the reader to 
accept a limited perspective and confusion as necessary conditions of the search for 
knowledge, and to make of them something useful.’30 
 We find this relationship between distorted and true vision within the realm of 
subjective, fallen experience in Milton’s emotional exploration of his own blindness and 
visionary sight. In ‘Methought I Saw my Late Espoused Saint’, the poet closes: ‘But O 
as to embrace me she inclined | I waked, she fled, and day brought back my night’, the 
simple binary of day and night working in tension with the complex truth of the poet’s 
subjective experience of my night, where sign and referent have become personalized, 
relative, and thus altered from their normal designation.31 He remembers the original 
mapping of day and night, light and dark from his sighted years, but his daily 
experience is of darkness, and it is night that offers the vision of dreams. Similarly, the 
vatic poetry of Paradise Lost goes beyond the typical paradox of revealed vision in 
blindness (a common trope that Milton nods to with his reference to Tiresias at III. 35) 
and entwines spiritual and corporal sight. In the opening to Book III Milton moves 
through an anguished description of his blindness to an invocation of the celestial light 
to plant inner eyes, purged from mist (ideas pre-echoing the circumstances of Adam’s 
vision), that he ‘may see and tell | Of things invisible to mortal sight’ (III. 54–55). And 
yet, despite the opportunities his blindness affords for spiritual sight, the sensory sight 
lost is not presented as base for its corporality, nor incomplete for its fallenness, but is 
genuinely mourned and worried about — not least for its role in achieving wisdom — 
in words pre-echoing Eve’s paean to nature, ‘sweet is the breath of morn’ (IV. 641). 
 
                                                
29 Complete Shorter Poems, ‘A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle’, ll. 756–58. 
30 Brady, ‘Galileo in Action’, p. 50. 
31 Complete Shorter Poems, p. 348, ll. 13–14. 
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Thus with the year 
Seasons return, but not to me returns 
Day, or the sweet approach of even or morn, 
Or sight of vernal bloom, or summer’s rose, 
Or flocks, or herds, or human face divine; 
But cloud instead, and ever-during dark 
Surrounds me, from the cheerful ways of men 
Cut off, and for the book of knowledge fair 
Presented with a universal blank 
Of nature’s works to me expunged and razed, 
And wisdom at one entrance quite shut out. (III. 40–50) 
 
Milton’s blindness cuts him off from the views of God’s creation our first parents had in 
Eden, from the creatures that allowed Adam to demonstrate his fit knowledge, and from 
the visible image of God in the face of man, still present even to fallen man.32 The 
phrase ‘book of knowledge’ at line 46 connects his blindness with, and separates him 
from, man’s contemplative purpose, discussed by Adam and Raphael. Milton creates a 
beautiful image in his visually evocative listing of dawn, sunset, vernal bloom, 
summer’s rose, flocks, herds, and human faces, and yet it is an image that necessarily 
does not exist, a ghost image that creates itself in our minds at the same time as insisting 
on its absence. The repeated returns, used positively of the seasons and then negatively 
of Milton’s visual experience, emphasizes this tension, with the idea of cyclical 
repetition evoking renewal and fecundity working against the infertile aporia of trying 
to recover something now lost to all but memory. The haunting quality heightens 
emotion, emphasizing the sense of loss and so allowing the reader to discern the value 
of this lost corporeal vision, even while acknowledging the worth of the poet’s vatic 
gifts. However, this technique, holding sight and the absence of sight in tandem, is also 
suggestive of something greater than either in isolation.  
 This is at odds with the more typical Christian paradox of ‘true vision’, the 
mysterious, spiritual, revealed vision, in comparison to which physical sight becomes 
the blindness of corporeal attention, and physical blindness an opportunity for 
revelation.33 The account of Adam’s vision in Book XI has elements of this idea, but 
                                                
32 See also XI. 353–54. 
33 Forrest G. Robinson, The Shape of Things Known: Sidney’s Apology in its Philosophical Tradition 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 31. 
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tempered by Milton’s ennobling of fallen man. Michael removes the obscuring film 
from Adam’s eyes, purges Adam’s ‘visual nerve’ (XI. 415) with euphrasy and rue, and 
instils drops from the well of life. The effect is powerful:  
 
So deep the power of these ingredients pierced, 
Even to the inmost seat of mental sight,  
That Adam now enforced to closed his eyes,  
Sank down and all his spirits became entranced. (XI. 417–20) 
 
The removal of the film, distinction of mental sight, and Adam’s closed eyes suggest 
the rejection of corrupt, corporeal sight, and yet spirituality and mental sight are not 
divorced from the sensual organs. As Fowler notes, the treatment with euphrasy, rue, 
and water of life is symbolic of purging sin with gladness, repentance and grace.34 On 
one level this supports the idea of needing to reverse the fallen corruption of the body 
and yet the application is directly to the eyes, their bodiliness emphasized by the 
anatomical term ‘visual nerve’.35 What is the value of rue (repentance) to the eyes if the 
senses do not have rational, intellectual capabilities? This suggests a monist position 
where bodily functions operate in an integrated way with intellectual and spiritual ones. 
Once Adam has been treated, rather than giving him a vision in his blind and swooning 
state, Michael raises him up and bids him open his eyes; Adam sees the future of 
mankind with spiritual and sensory vision operating concurrently. 
 We also find a dual sense of vision when we look at the accommodated 
presentation of God himself. Arnold Huijgen’s analysis of divine accommodation 
illustrates the tension between a Platonic, transcendent idea of accommodation where 
the truth of God exists somewhere behind the so-called truth of revelation, and an 
immanent view in which there is held to be some truth or knowledge of God as he 
actually is in his accommodated revelation to man.36 Neil Graves’s analysis of De 
Doctrina reveals Milton’s heterodox, immanent view, arguing for a synechdochic 
(rather than metaphoric) theory of scriptural accommodation, which aligns with the 
                                                
34 Paradise Lost, ed. by Fowler, p. 621, note to lines 413–15. 
35 While it is possible Milton used nerve in the sense of ‘strength’ as he does elsewhere, he would likely 
have known the anatomical usage of visual nerve, e.g. from Francis Bacon’s Sylva Sylvarum (1626) 
(OED, ‘visual’, 3a). 
36 Arnold Huijgen, Divine Accommodation in John Calvin’s Theology: Analysis and Assessment 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), pp. 13–28, 36–42. 
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second idea of accommodation as outlined by Huijgen.37 This is also close to Newton’s 
idea of scriptural truth being real, but relative. Graves bases his argument on two 
idiosyncratic principles in Milton: that the accommodated image (the literal, textual 
image in scripture) should be the locus of understanding, and that this image is a 
veridical presentation of the subject, even though it does not contain the whole truth of 
the subject.38 In his proof for the second principle, Graves cites from Chapter 2, ‘God 
has revealed only so much of himself as our minds can conceive and the weakness of 
our nature can bear,’ and lists the scriptural quotations with which Milton supports this: 
from Exodus (the back parts of God); Isaiah (a vision of God enthroned); John (no man 
has seen or heard God); and I Corinthians (seeing God in a mirror) (CPW, VI, 133). 
Graves’s reading — that God has revealed himself and not merely a symbol for himself, 
albeit incompletely — is supported by his categorizing the quotations to form three 
parts of a pseudosyllogistical form of reasoning: ‘Major Premise — No man can see 
God (Command); Minor Premise — Man has seen God (Experience); Conclusion — 
Man both does and does not see God, i.e., Man sees God either partially or merely parts 
of God.’39 This fits with the idea of man’s sufficiency to evaluate found in 
Areopagitica, and man’s capability to come to some knowledge of God in Of 
Education. It also emphasizes the value of holistic subjective experience and the dual 
vision I have demonstrated in Milton’s poetry. 
 While Graves’s article discusses De Doctrina, his principles help achieve a 
more subtle reading of the accommodation of God in Paradise Lost. When Raphael 
comes to his solution of simile — ‘likening spiritual to corporal forms, | As may express 
them best’ (V. 573–74) — he continues with a suggestive unanswered question: 
 
Though what if earth 
Be but the shadow of heav’n, and things therein 
Each to other like, more than on earth is thought? (V. 574–76) 
 
Raphael questions the extent of the relationship between heavenly reality and his 
accommodated narrative, suggesting that there might be a closer relationship than his 
                                                
37 Neil D. Graves, ‘Milton and the Theory of Accommodation’, Studies in Philology, 98 (2001), 251–72 
(p. 252). 
38 Graves, pp. 257–60. 
39 Graves, p. 261. 
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initial framework of simile offers, and which Graves’s synechdoche would satisfy. The 
phrase ‘more than on earth is thought’ is also provocative; who are these thinkers? Does 
Raphael refer to Adam and Eve, or does Milton’s voice come in here too, referring to 
the fallen reader and the wider philosophical tradition? 
 The portrayal of God in Paradise Lost antagonizes the tensions between seen 
and unseen with its apophatic techniques, but this ultimately allows a dual experience of 
seeing and not seeing God. Milton’s description of God at book III, lines 373–82, after 
the contemplation of man’s impending fall and the elevation of the Son, invokes the 
negative way with adjectives ‘immutable, immortal, infinite’, describing God by what 
he is not. Throughout the passage the description of the ‘invisible’ God is concerned 
with spectacle. There is light and brightness and there are seemingly tangible objects: 
throne, cloud, shrine, God’s skirts. However, these do not resolve themselves into an 
image, but contradict their visibility: the brightness dazzles, the throne is inaccessible, 
the cloud obscures, the shrine is but a simile. The only image we can truly visualize is 
that of the seraphim veiling their eyes from the view of God. It is by this understanding 
of visuality that we are able to ‘see’, but only in as far as we can see a negative image, 
in relation to which we hold an accommodated idea of the vision of God. This might 
seem a fairly traditional presentation, but remember that unfallen Adam used a similar 
method to reason about God, even in the presence of God. The high levels of spectacle 
emphasize the visual in this non-vision, recalling the phenomenon of Milton’s 
description of his lost sight at III. 40, which held sight and the absence of sight in 
tandem. This earlier passage prepares the reader for the vision of God by teaching the 
technique of reading and imagining. That we might interpret Milton’s passage in the 
same way as scriptural accommodation is authorized by its scriptural sources (the same 
as those cited in the discussion of accommodation in De Doctrina, referred to above) 
and the fact that this scene comes directly after Milton’s invocation to the holy light and 
is framed as proof that Milton’s request for prophecy has been granted. The reader is 
given the impression that Milton is indeed seeing and telling of things invisible to 
mortal sight. 
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The Literary Presentation of Space 
 
In this section, I look at the way space and spatiality are described as a subject, how 
they are employed in the consideration of the theme of epistemology, and how they are 
used as a way of exploring human subjectivity and the relationships between 
humankind and his environment.  
The first of Milton’s settings encountered in Paradise Lost is hell. One might 
almost refer to it as an anti-description though for all its ambiguity. In the argument to 
Book I, hell is set up, not as a place in its own right, but in opposition to heaven, the 
emphasis being that the angels were ‘driven out of heaven’ and into ‘the great deep’. It 
is located, ‘not in the centre’, but ‘in a place of utter darkness, fitliest called chaos’. This 
requires some complicated mental gymnastics to accommodate as this negative location 
is dependant on the reader supposing heaven and earth as ‘yet not made’. This is 
achieved by a typically Miltonic technique of simultaneously suggesting and 
undermining a concrete relation, telling us that hell is not locatable by its usual relation 
to heaven and earth, and furthermore placing it in context of a space — chaos — which 
is known more as an intangible ‘what’ rather than any sort of concrete ‘where’. The 
only geographical feature described of hell is ‘the burning lake’, but at the close of the 
argument we are also told that, ‘Pandaemonium the palace of Satan rises, suddenly built 
out of the deep’, suggesting a confusingly unstable and mutable landscape. 
When we reach the initial descriptions of hell in the poem proper, we are met 
with similar ambiguities. Hell, like much of Milton’s epic scenery, is characterized by a 
vastness that is indeterminate. The location to which the fallen angels are hurled is first 
described as ‘bottomless perdition’ (I. 47), the word bottomless creating both a sense of 
epic proportion and a lack of concrete imagery or specific dimension, and perdition also 
carrying an abstract quality being both a state of being and the place of hell. Similarly, 
when Satan casts his eye and ‘At once as far as angels’ ken he views’ (I. 59), Milton 
creates a sense of vast scope without giving any information. He does this entirely in 
terms of the extent and limit of Satan’s own perception, rather than by any features of 
the landscape. Beyond the repeated insistence of the presence of fire, there is virtually 
no detail with which to conjure up the scene that is instead created with a more 
emotional rather than visual palette. We feel rather than see ‘The dismal situation waste 
and wild, | A dungeon horrible’ (I. 60–61), the ‘sights of woe, | Regions of sorrow, 
doleful shades’ (I. 64–65). Even the persistent imagery of fire is undercut by the 
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revelation that its flames cast, ‘No light, but rather darkness visible’ (I. 63). The few 
details which crop up — ‘floods and whirlwinds of tempestuous fire’ (I. 77) — are not 
anchored enough to create a specific scene rather than a mood. Throughout the scene we 
get occasional references to parts of the setting, the ‘dreary plain’ (I. 180), the ‘upper, 
nether, and surrounding fires’ (I. 346), ‘hell’s concave’ (I. 542), but overwhelmingly the 
description is conveyed by comparative reference to either heaven or (anachronistically) 
earth, or by means of the fallen angel’s emotional or perceptual experience of it. We do 
start to get some sense of the scale of the setting when the fallen angels gain in 
confidence and correspondingly take firmer shape; the number of banners raised is ‘ten 
thousand’ (I. 545), a more specific measure than we have had thus far, but Milton still 
includes an array of shields ‘of depth immeasurable’ (I. 549) in the same sentence. Later 
the number of spirits is ‘millions’ (I. 609), again conveying vastness and hinting at the 
idea of measure with a numerate word, but both unspecific and so large as to be 
uncountable.  
The one feature of hell that does receive specific description is the hill on which 
Pandæmonium is to be raised: 
 
There stood a hill not far whose grisly top 
Belched fire and rolling smoke; the rest entire 
Shone with a glossy scurf, undoubted sign 
That in his womb was hid metallic ore, 
The work of sulphur. (I. 670–74) 
 
The description is used as a way of redirecting the narrative. The reader is given an 
approximate location, and several details of appearance, composition, and behaviour. 
We are also given information about how to read this landscape for what it reveals of its 
interior, how it works as a sign for something else. This is confirmed when the fallen 
angels, under the leadership of Mammon, ‘Opened into the hill a spacious wound | And 
digged out ribs of gold’ (I. 689–90). The landscape becomes a symbolic parody of 
Godly creation, an idea built upon by the praise for the work and for the architect of 
Pandæmonium at lines 731–32. The artificial structure that is Pandæmonium is, like the 
hill, given specific detail: 
 
The ascending pile 
Stood fixed her stately height, and straight the doors 
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Opening their brazen folds discover wide 
Within, her ample spaces, o’er the smooth 
And level pavement: from the archèd roof 
Pendent by subtle magic many a row  
Of starry lamps and blazing cressets fed 
With naphtha and asphaltus yielded light 
As from a sky. (I. 722–30) 
 
The detail here uses analogy with natural imagery (‘starry lamps’, ‘as from a sky’), but 
in so doing emphasizes its artifice. This is also felt in the description of the ‘smooth and 
level pavement’ or the ‘archèd roof’. As with the experiments of the natural 
philosophers there is a level of descriptive detail that is achievable in an instrumental or 
artificial setting. There is again a sense of vast space, ‘stately height’, ‘discover wide 
within, her ample spaces’ but also in this case one of bound: the structure stands ‘fixed’, 
and the adverb ‘straight’ also lends itself to this feel, connoting limit. Once inside 
Pandaemonium (I. 775–97), the sense of an artificial environment under scrutiny, as 
well as the sense of an unstable environment dependent on the perspective of the 
viewer, is further troubled by the strange distortions of scale that the fallen angels enact 
and which Milton’s narrative applies.  
Hell, this first location or setting of Milton’s poem, creates a sense of 
geographical uncertainty and mutability, and is conveyed to the reader in a subjective 
rather than factual way. This is contrasted with the certainty that is available in a more 
artificial, constructed setting. As we shall see, this foreshadows the intimate connection 
between space and relative experience in Milton’s epic, as well as connecting it to the 
ideas we have seen in the natural philosophers of this study of needing to demarcate 
experimental spaces (either physically or mentally) in order to construct knowledge.  
In the introduction to this chapter, I reviewed Fowler’s reading of Paradise Lost 
that acknowledges the indeterminacy of Milton’s cosmos. As well as the possibility of 
Copernican, Tychonic, or Ptolemaic interpretation, there are also wider incongruities. 
While Satan and Raphael travel through an apparently continuous and homogeneous 
space on their voyages to Eden,40 there are also references to older cosmological 
traditions, such as the ‘crystàlline sphere’ (III. 482) and the angels as stars (V. 708–09). 
                                                
40 Satan, ‘Down right into the world’s first region throws | His flight precipitant, and winds with ease | 
Through the pure marble air his oblique way | Amongst innumerable stars’ (III. 562–65). Raphael, 
‘through the vast ethereal sky | Sails between worlds and worlds’ (V. 267–68). 
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Sarkar describes the astronomical images of space in Paradise Lost as ‘keep[ing] alive 
the possibility of infinity in an otherwise finite universe’ and the images of time as 
‘project[ing] the simultaneous presence of the temporal in the midst of eternity’. Her 
reading of the poem is of a world that is both ‘at once measurable and immeasurable’.41 
Following Sarkar’s cue about the simultaneity of finity and infinity in the poem, I 
propose that, rather than seeing Milton’s systemic indeterminacy as a weakness, it is 
more usefully considered as akin to Newton’s view of the true and apparent versions of 
creation, being both real in some way, but witnessed from different viewpoints. 
The holding open of multiple cosmic possibilities in Milton’s poem cultivates an 
awareness of the limits of the relative experience of space, as explored by means of the 
(differently) limited perspectives of the characters and narrator. In one of his cosmic 
vistas, Milton describes the angel Uriel moving in relation to the sun and the earth: 
 
Uriel to his charge 
Returned on that bright beam, whose point now raised 
Bore him slope downward to the sun now fallen 
Beneath the Azores; whether the prime orb, 
Incredible how swift, had thither rolled  
Diurnal, or this less volúble earth 
By shorter flight to the east, had left him there[.] (IV. 589–95) 
 
The repeated now, ‘now raised [...] now fallen’, emphasizes the temporary nature of 
location in this description. The speculative second part of the quotation then effectively 
pans out on the scene, allowing the narrator to contemplate the movement of the two 
bodies, and to demonstrate that the directionality described in the first part is relative: 
the raised end of the sun beam, Uriel’s downward slope, and the fallen sun. This is 
evocative of Newton in De Gravitatione:  
 
Gravity is the force in a body impelling it to descend. Here, however, by 
descent is not only meant a motion towards the center of the earth, but 
also towards any point or region, or even from any point. (PW, p. 36)  
 
                                                
41 Sarkar, p. 5. 
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Like Newton’s flexible descent, the downward trajectory Uriel follows to the sun is not 
absolute, but relative to a specific viewpoint and to that specific configuration of 
moving bodies in that particular moment of time.  
Milton’s narrator presents two possible explanations for the fall of the sun 
beneath the Azores: the movement of the sun, or the movement of the earth. Perhaps the 
incredulity of the swiftness of the prime orb suggests doubt for the first of these 
hypotheses, but the sluggishness of the less voluble earth does not allow this to be 
uncontested (as we from our heliocentric perspective might be tempted to read it). 
Despite the trajectories of downward and fallen, both explanations remain possibilities, 
even from the vantage point of a narrator who can view these cosmic exchanges from 
space. It is also possible that for Uriel, moving towards it, the sun does not appear to be 
fallen. We share these vantage points and can create multiple images in our minds, 
demonstrating that even with the imagined, remote perspective of the narrator, we can 
only understand the motions of the heavens as relative. If we try to imagine these orbits 
without including a fixed backdrop of absolute space or any other points of reference 
we see how difficult it is to visually distinguish between the two hypotheses. Milton 
later returns to the question of which body moves when Adam asks Raphael about the 
‘numbered stars, that seem to roll | Spaces incomprehensible […] Round this opacious 
earth’ (VIII. 19–23) and ‘the sedentary earth, | That better might with far less compass 
move’ (VIII. 32–33). By asking the question, Adam foregrounds the relative perspective 
of man watching the skies from the earth (which may or may not itself be moving). 
Raphael suggests possibilities — include heliocentrism — but demurs to answer, 
leaving the case uncertain and thus emphasizing the limitedness of the relative human 
viewpoint without revelation. Furthermore, the archangel suggests the possibility of 
other relative viewpoints, albeit by telling Adam not to think of them: ‘Dream not of 
other worlds, what creatures there | Live, in what state, condition, or degree’ (VIII. 175–
76).  
As well as a more modern notion of space that is homogeneous and continuous, 
the poem is very aware of a more traditional, Aristotelian idea of place, and uses this 
theme to work through a number of moral issues — particularly that of our place in 
creation and our relation to God — in a way which has some affinity with Aristotelian 
ideas about the impulse of objects towards their final, rightful place. Place in Milton is 
not just location; creatures are deliberately placed in particular locations by God, the 
subject of the whole work being, ‘the loss thereupon of Paradise wherein he was 
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placed’ (Book I. argument, my emphasis). Punishment and justice are effected by 
expulsion and imprisonment — acts of removal, re-placing, and restriction of movement 
— and tied to specific locations and their distance from God. Similarly, order (including 
creation itself) is established by acts of containment and the maintenance of boundaries, 
while the disruptive forces of the poem transgress these bounds. Satan on his first entry 
into Paradise, ‘At one slight bound high overleaped all bound | Of hill or highest wall’ 
(IV. 181–82), the repeated word bound emphasizing the transgression by weakening its 
very sense. We find moral trajectories in the descriptive language of the poem and are 
invited to contrast, for example, the upright forms of paradisal Adam and Eve, ‘Godlike 
erect’ (IV. 288), to the downward bent of Satan, ‘Oh foul descent!’ (IX. 163). This is 
also explicitly linked to place of habitation. The narrator links ‘purity and place and 
innocence’ (IV. 745) in discussing Adam and Eve’s connubial love, while a hundred 
lines later, Zephon reveals the contrast in Satan’s bearing since his fall and expulsion: 
 
Think not, revolted spirit, thy shape the same [...] 
As when thou stoodst in heaven upright and pure; 
[...] thou resemblest now 
Thy sin and place of doom obscure and foul. (IV. 835–40) 
 
Syntactically, ‘upright and pure’ can apply to both Satan’s former self and to heaven, 
while Satan now resembles both his sin and his current place of doom, suggesting 
equivalence between the state of sin and the place of hell. 
Despite the congruity of these metaphorical readings of place that suggest a 
correlation between location and rightness, directionality and morality, place in 
Paradise Lost is incompatible with the idea that bodies come to rest once they are in 
their correct and final place. There is a recurring theme of rest in the poem with 
numerous examples of the restfulness of paradise, ‘as nature wills, night bids us rest’ 
(IV. 633), contrasting with the agitation of hell, ‘where peace | And rest can never 
dwell’ (I. 65–66). However, unlike the Aristotelian system where rest is a function of 
physical place and predetermined according to elemental composition, rest in Paradise 
Lost, even when externalized by the poem’s characters, is really a function of mental 
state and does not have a fixed location. Even in paradise, Eve (after her Satanic dream) 
experiences ‘unquiet rest’ (V. 11), and Satan and his crew are ‘dislodged, and void of 
rest’ (VI. 415) before they are cast out of heaven. When Adam and Eve are expelled 
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from paradise, they are not moving towards or further from their fixed place of rest, but 
have the option, ‘where to choose | Their place of rest,’ (XII. 646–47). It seems that in 
Milton one’s sense of place is a psychological rather than physical impulse. Although 
presented as vain posturing, there is a ring of truth to Satan’s words, ‘The mind is its 
own place, and in itself | Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven.’ (I. 254–55) Sadly 
for Satan this truth spells his self-condemnation, ‘which way I fly is hell; myself am 
hell’ (IV. 75), as he refuses to allow himself a ‘place | Left for repentance’ (IV. 79–80).  
In Paradise Lost, Milton adds to the account in Genesis the destruction of Eden 
(XII. 636), its foretold move ‘Out of his place’ (XI. 831) by the flood, and the reason 
given for these acts. Michael tells Adam that the flood comes: 
 
To teach thee that God áttributes to place 
No sanctity, if none be thither brought 
By men who there frequent, or therein dwell. (XI. 836–38) 
 
In the Bible the reason given for the flood is the ending of fleshly corruption and 
violence (Genesis 6. 11–13). Milton introduces an idea of the sanctity of place, but one 
that is conditional on man’s beliefs and actions, not on special properties of place. 
Michael Lieb argues that the fall and expulsion from paradise necessitates a 
readjustment of what holy place means: that external place becomes deprived of 
sanctity and that holy place becomes interiorized as the ‘paradise within’.42 I agree with 
the view of place that Lieb ends up with, but not that it is a result of the fall or 
expulsion, but rather that an internalized sense of place is a consequence of being free to 
fall. It is the discontent of angel and man, expressed in terms of place, which leads them 
to fall, not their falls that lead to their discontent and thus displacement. As mentioned, 
both Satan and Eve experience restlessness before their falls. Satan ‘dislodge[s]’ (V. 
669) his camp before the fall of the angels (as we know from the possibility of Abdiel’s 
return at the end of Book V), and Eve, feeling the restraint of dwelling ‘In narrow 
circuit’ (IX. 323), leaves Adam’s presence, occasioning her temptation. 
Brady argues that the space of Paradise Lost is not ‘the absolute, naturalized 
space of the physical world’. She reads it in the context of Aristotelian place and 
concludes: 
                                                
42 Michael Lieb, ‘“Holy Place”: A Reading of Paradise Lost’, Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900, 
17 (1977), 129–47 (p. 145).  
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we situate Paradise Lost on the keen edge of modernity, at a moment 
before space has yet become absolute, an aspect of either the physical 
world or perception itself. Poised on this threshold, the poem registers 
emergent features of modern space, but also their disruption by the 
persistence of place. We are thereby reminded that space was not always 
part of experience, but something that had to be imagined before it could 
be inhabited.43 
 
Brady’s reading of the space and place of Paradise Lost is for the most part very 
perceptive, but she presumes an ontological reality for absolute space and also does not 
register where Milton’s ideas of place diverge from Aristotle. By considering absolute 
space as an epistemological construct — indeed as something that has to be imagined 
— and something that can only be understood in terms of relative experience, it 
becomes possible to accommodate what Brady calls the persistence of place by means 
of relativity and the centrality of the thinking and perceiving subject. The psychological 
interpretation of place that I offer, unlike an Aristotelian interpretation, does not 
contradict the more modern (albeit non-specific) physical presentation of space we have 
seen in Paradise Lost. It is also more compatible with Newtonian ideas; Newton’s 
physical definition of place is simply the space that a body occupies.44 By internalizing 
any special properties of place as part of the psychological experience and construction 
of spatial relations by the thinking and feeling individual, Milton avoids physical 
contradiction at a systemic level whilst observing an emotional relativity that in some 
ways corresponds to the creaturely, relative experience of space and the psychological 
experience of thinking about space. So doing, he liberates morality from physics in a 
similar way to Newton’s liberation of physics from morality in his rational universe 
with its homogeneous space, force-driven motion, and purely numerical concept of 
place. As such, Milton uses Aristotelian concepts of rightness of place in a metaphorical 
way, but can also give rational meaning to free choice. 
 
As we have seen in Newton’s writings, in Milton there is some degree of identification 
or affinity between God and space. Both writers imply the possibility of material 
                                                
43 Maura Brady, ‘Space and the Persistence of Place in Paradise Lost’, Milton Quarterly, 41 (2007), 167–
82 (p. 178). 
44 Principia, p. 409. 
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identity but then pull back from this to varying degrees, Newton ending up with a 
purely conceptual and metaphorical identity, Milton with a more complex, mixed 
identity. In both writers, the relationship between God and space is explored in a way 
that is intimately connected with the action of human thought at the boundaries of the 
unknown. 
In Milton’s work there is a material connection between God and space through 
the idea of creation ex Deo. The author of De Doctrina Christiana disproves, on logical 
and philological grounds, the orthodox concept of creation by God ex nihilo and 
surmises that as the world was created out of something, but that there could not be a 
pre-existing substance independent of God; the raw matter of creation must have come 
from God himself, divided from him by the retraction of his will.45 This act is 
demonstrated in Paradise Lost by God’s words to the Son at the creation, as recounted 
by Raphael: 
 
ride forth, and bid the deep  
Within appointed bounds be heaven and earth, 
Boundless the deep, because I am who fill 
Infinitude, nor vacuous the space.  
Though I uncircumscribed myself retire,  
And put not forth my goodness, which is free 
To act or not, necessity and chance 
Approach not me, and what I will is fate. (VII. 166–73) 
 
The resulting substance of God’s uncircumscription and retraction is widely held to be 
the ‘dark materials’ (II. 917) found in the ‘vast abyss’ (I. 21) or ‘womb of nature’ (II. 
911) that is the realm of chaos or the boundless ‘deep’. Because these materials are so 
strongly identified with the location that is chaos, and again with the locations they 
become — the deep itself is bid to be heaven and earth — there is a sense of 
identification between this material and with space. However, in withholding his 
goodness from matter and making it ‘Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall’ (III. 
99), God creates an affinity, but significant lack of identification, between himself and 
matter, turning that former identification into memorial or conceptual rather than 
                                                
45 George Newton Conklin, Biblical Criticism and Heresy in Milton (New York: King’s Crown Press, 
1949), pp. 67–74; see also CPW, VI, 301–08. 
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material identification. As with the relationship between Adam and Eve, the important 
relationship is semiotic, and not concerned with material identity. 
There is also a potential identification between God and space as a framework. 
God says, ‘I am who fill | Infinitude, nor vacuous the space’; the idea that God fills 
infinitude and ensures that space is not empty suggesting that space and infinitude are 
separate from God. However, the principle occasioning Milton’s theory of creation ex 
Deo — that there can be nothing that pre-exists God — suggests that any notion of 
space or infinity that is separate from God is not real in the same sense. By making I am 
intransitive and drawing attention to it by not resolving the difficult syntax, Milton also 
potentially removes the idea of thingness from God, perhaps echoing Newton’s 
distinction between God who is infinite and infinity itself, or Henry More’s concept of 
spiritual extension.  
Elsewhere in Paradise Lost something akin to absolute space or a wider frame 
of reference than the relative experience of creatures is hinted at by the inclusion of vast 
angelic perspectives and even ultimately God’s limitless perspective (albeit in 
accommodated form). When Adam talks of the ‘Unknown, which human knowledge 
could not reach’ (my emphasis), he uses a common spatial metaphor to compare his 
epistemological capacity to that of ‘higher’ beings. However — like Newton’s line, 
imagined as being beyond distance, or Boyle’s notion of things that are beyond 
proportion — the narrator locates God, ‘High throned above all height’ (III. 58, my 
emphasis). The contradiction of height above height takes God outside of the human 
spatial framework and emphasizes the accommodated nature of the semantic field of 
height that persists throughout the passage. From this seat, God beholds a uniquely 
inclusive panorama, ‘His own works and their works at once to view’ (III. 59), and 
looks, ‘from his prospect high, | Wherein past, present, future, he beholds’ (III. 77–78). 
God’s vision encompasses concurrently successive temporalities, and hints at an 
altogether wider visual frame by his ability to see the whole of creation, the whole four-
dimensional manifold in one view. This exploration of the expansive scope of God 
helps the reader to experience the thinking of space beyond relative space by mentally 
tracing the inhuman line of sight.  
Sarkar describes Milton’s ‘special kind of word play which helps to create a 
tremendous sense of space’ in Paradise Lost. She comments on the sense of expansion 
in the synechdochic image of the world hanging by a golden chain, ‘in bigness as a star | 
Of smallest magnitude close by the moon’ (II, 1052–53): ‘although visually reductive 
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for the moment, the image keeps alive simultaneously the possibility of immense 
enlargement.’46 This possibility occurs, Sarkar suggests, by means of the clash between 
‘bigness’, ‘smallest’, and ‘magnitude’, ‘the self-infolding of world into star, and the 
simultaneous expansion of star into world’ (ibid.). Like the confusion of scales found in 
Hooke’s work, which encouraged a sense of encounter or of the reader entering into the 
micro world, these intense optical effects create an intimate experience of space in the 
reader’s mind. They emphasize the relativity of perception (in this case of scale), and 
keep the image in the mind’s eye moving, the reader not just seeing, but actively tracing 
a path. In being both reductive and yet also keeping alive the possibility of enlargement, 
the effect is one of continual expansion. This telescoping is dynamic in the Newtonian 
sense, and the reader is both witness to and participant in the phenomenon.  
Another view of an unknown and potentially unknowable (indeed ‘secret’) 
space, which uses a similarly expansive technique, occurs when — with Satan, Sin, and 
Death — we first look upon chaos: 
Before their eyes in sudden view appear 
The secrets of the hoary deep, a dark 
Illimitable ocean without bound, 
Without dimension, where length, breadth, and height, 
And time and place are lost[.] (II. 890–94) 
The idea of perspective is emphasized in the first line as the reader starts at the eye of 
the viewers and traces the lines of sight out to their view. A semblance of that view is 
created in the reader’s mind by the use of familiar images (ocean and bound), and 
words of measurement (dimension, length, breadth, height, time, place), but is 
destabilized by the negating words (illimitable, without), culminating in the ripping 
away of any surety of the containable framing of the scene with the delayed word lost, 
which enacts the stripping away of measurement. Catherine Gimelli Martin reads a 
theology of relative space in Milton in the context of Pascal and his appreciation of the 
significance of the ‘decentered spaces’ of man and God once the new science opens up 
to infinity and the void. She describes the concept of zero which is transformed in this 
period from a ‘merely negative to a positive absence’, and argues that for Milton and 
Pascal, ‘God can be approached only by inventing a new and ironic allegory of absent 
                                                
46 Sarkar, p. 2. 
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presence based on the analogy of the new absences discovered in his spatial universe.’47 
I believe that Martin’s reading can be fruitfully combined with an appreciation of 
Milton’s application of the methods of apophatic theology to his description of chaos, to 
create that sense of positive absence, which is similar to his description of God or of the 
duality of sight and the absence of sight. We feel this ‘decentering’ of space in the 
literary and cognitive effects of Milton’s description of chaos. He makes the reader 
think spatially on a grand scale and then push beyond a static, bound image so the 
experience is one of continual expansion, which decenters the exterior space being 
explored by making it understandable in terms of movement or trajectory rather than 
fixed location. This expansive tracing also draws attention to and decenters the interior 
mental space of the thinking subject tracing those trajectories. With the stripping away 
of measurement the security of relativity in its sense of relatability is destabilized, 
leaving only relativity in the sense of a subjective experience of space. However, rather 
than undermining knowledge, as with the descriptions of God, this expansiveness 
captures a sense of reaching beyond the limits of the human in its very uncertainty. 
This expansiveness contrasts with the knowable — indeed experimental — 
spaces of Eden and earth, which are decidedly measureable, and, like Boyle’s 
experimental spaces, are made concrete by detailed description. When Raphael 
describes the heavens as a book of God set before Adam, it is specifically with the 
intention of helping him to measure time: ‘Wherein to read his wondrous works, and 
learn | His seasons, hours, or days, or months, or years’ (VIII. 78–79).   
As well as Adam, Milton includes in his epic specifically scientific observers by 
means of his allusions to Galileo. Milton’s knowledge of Galileo’s Dialogue 
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems has been demonstrated, although the meaning 
of these allusions (and whether they are for or against the new science) is contested.48 
McAdam notes that Satan’s invention of the cannon and gunpowder recalls the 
discussion of the cannonball from the Dialogue, pairing a Galilean paraphrase from the 
Dialogue, ‘All truths are easy to understand, once they are discovered; the point is, to 
discover them’, with the admiration of the rebel angels for the Satanic act: 
 
                                                
47 Catherine Gimelli Martin, ‘“Boundless the Deep”: Milton, Pascal, and the Theology of Relative Space’, 
ELH, 63 (1996), 45–78 (p. 56, 72). 
48 See Ian McAdam, ‘Milton, Satan, Galileo, and Gunpowder’, Notes and Queries, 253 (2008), 289–91, 
for a brief survey and critical history.   
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The invention all admired, and each, how he 
To be the inventor missed, so easy it seemed 
Once found, which yet unfound most would have thought 
Impossible[.] (VI. 498–501)49 
 
McAdam, lured by the association of Galileo and Satan, hypothesizes that Milton could 
be casting doubt on the validity of scientific endeavour, offering support for the pro-
Satanic faction, or was an ‘ideologically or psychologically conflicted author.’50 
However, what McAdam misses is the difference between the two passages: Galileo is 
talking about discovery, Milton’s rebel angels, invention. The difference is between the 
roles of observer and progenitor, something Satan wilfully confuses throughout the 
poem. Satan’s experience of relativity is taken to the extremes of interiority with his 
solipsistic denial of God’s agency, such as in his autochthonous parody of empirical 
thinking, cited above. He also displaces God’s agency in creative acts when he says 
‘Space may produce new worlds’ (I. 650). The irony of this is that Satan’s relative 
denial of God simultaneously affirms the truth of God’s creative power by reference to 
the wider frame, of which Satan has no understanding. Space is not just the space that 
Satan experiences, but is also the ‘dark materials’ (II. 916) of creation ex Deo; God’s 
method of creation by the appointment of boundaries and divisions (VII. 165–67); and 
even God himself, the ‘I am who fill | Infinitude’ (VII. 168–69). By failing to 
acknowledge the absolute (whether epistemological or ontological) that the relative 
implies, Satan fails as a fit reader and is unable to truly value anything, including his 
own words. 
It is the exploratory role of the discoverer (the role we saw in Newton’s 
description of himself as a boy collecting pebbles on the shore which aligns with 
Milton’s idea of a fit reader and seeker of truth) that we find foregrounded in the other 
allusions to Galileo.51 This observational, searching role fulfils the epistemological 
potential for man and Milton’s educational mission expressed in Of Education. The 
allusions to Galileo emphasize the limited vantage point of the human observer with 
reminders in each allusion of our restricted capacity, for example the description of the 
horns of Venus, ‘though from human sight | So far remote, with diminution seen’ (VII. 
                                                
49 McAdam, p. 290. 
50 McAdam, p. 291. 
51 I. 287–91, III. 588–90, V. 261–63, VII. 366–69, VII. 577–581. 
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368–69). However they also demonstrate the glimpse of something greater that even 
this limited vantage point can offer, when we are taught to see rightly. The way to 
God’s house is described by Raphael to Adam: 
 
A broad and ample road, whose dust is gold 
And pavement stars, as stars to thee appear, 
Seen in the galaxy, that Milky Way 
Which nightly as a circling zone thou seest 
Powdered with stars. (VII. 577–81, my emphasis.) 
 
The allusion acts as a poetic telescope, allowing the narrator to mediate between his 
cosmic vision and his human reader, drawing analogies to known or imaginable acts of 
human vision and showing us where and how to look. This is discovery, not invention, 
and the visible road of stars we are taught to see, leads to the invisible. 
And so we return to the question of how to bridge the gap between the invisible 
and visible, the relative and absolute, the human and divine. So far we have seen 
examples of inference from the visible and faith in possibility. Both rely on an act of 
imagination to conceptualize something beyond the self and beyond one’s own 
experience. As with Newton’s conception, it is the relationship between absolute and 
relative that enables us to understand each of them. As such is not just the content of the 
conceptualization that is important, but the imaginative act itself, which enables the 
relationship between absolute and relative and connects man to God in its expansive 
creativity. In De Gravitatione, Newton likens the creative will of God to the will of man 
to move his own body. He asserts that, ‘the analogy between the divine faculties and our 
own may be shown to be greater than has formerly been perceived’ (PW, p. 30). In 
Paradise Lost Raphael reveals that human discursive reason is related to angelic 
intuitive reason, ‘Differing but in degree, of kind the same’ (V. 490), and in Of 
Education suggests imitating God as a method of regaining knowledge of him (CPW, II, 
367). Laïla Ghermani suggests that Milton’s Arminianism allows that, ‘visible realities 
are indeed able to reflect divine realities in truth because the difference between them is 
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not ontological but corresponds only to a difference in scale between “great things” and 
“small”’.52 
Space seems to play a particularly important role in this dynamic. When Newton 
describes space as an ‘emanative effect’ of God in De Gravitatione, he creates a 
necessary link between space and existence, but in doing so also creates a parallel 
between the act of God creating space and the creative acts of the creaturely imagining 
of space. Likewise, Milton urges his readers to re-enact a spatial creation in the mind. 
His repeated emphasis on the act of witnessing gives a sense that the poem’s worlds and 
locales come into being with that act, that looking is performative (‘Before their eyes in 
sudden view appear’ (II. 890)). Like Boyle, Milton makes his readers witnesses to the 
events of the poem and similarly schools them in ways of looking and thinking so that 
they can become participants in its mental activities and experiments. A frequent trope 
is the defining of space by filling it with sound or light, our tracing of boundaries 
following lines of sight or guided by echo, and our experience of relative space 
mimicking God’s creative act of thinking and ordering space into being.53 Milton 
emphasizes the limitedness of relativity and warns the reader of the solipsism of Satan, 
but also shows us the wonders of creative acts of outward looking imagination, which 
allow us glimpses of things invisible to mortal sight. Our experience of thinking about 
space brings us closer to the creative act of God. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite popular mistrust — particularly in religious contexts — of the body and the 
passions, Milton incorporates them into his Edenic epistemology. He shows what is 
usually considered a perfect state of knowledge to be a state not fixed, but — like the 
natural philosophical project of his contemporaries in the Royal Society — a process of 
learning, ennobling the state of not-knowing and the various tools and methods used 
(sensory, discursive, rational, and linguistic) to achieve knowledge through experience 
                                                
52 Laïla Ghermani, ‘“That I may see and tell | Of things invisible to mortal sight”: Representing the 
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53 See for example the lines: ‘At once as far as angels’ ken he views’ (I. 59); and ‘all the hollow deep | Of 
hell resounded’ (I. 314–15). 
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and trial. Milton also ennobles the state of fallen man, presuming for him the dignity of 
sufficiency to judge rightly of knowledge, and the ability to regain the knowledge of 
unfallen man, even in his fallen state. The tools by which man can approach this 
knowledge integrate the rational and bodily; they are passionate (rightly tempered in 
virtue and love), sensory and intellectual (in contemplation of the visible world), and 
faithful of the grace that will complete his elevation. Man’s example in achieving this 
end of learning is the Son, whose humanity, bodily experience, and faith are shown to 
be his strength. Milton also provides a second example in the self-conscious 
presentation of his own subjective experience and flawed agency as a writer, using 
emotion and blindness to create value and teach insight. Milton does not deny the 
deceptive potential of sensory perception, but his exploration allows that its inherent 
unreliability can in itself lead to true inner vision. He holds this insight (whether vatic 
or rational) in duality with sensory experience, allowing the two to inform one another, 
whether it be spiritual and sensory vision, sight and the absence of sight, or the 
synechdochic duality of immanent accommodation, which holds the scriptural vision of 
God to be both actual and representative of something more. Milton aligns reason with 
the image of God, which we should aspire to imitate in order to reach that end of 
learning (CPW, II, 492). This implies that reason is accommodated to our fallen state, 
and therefore that there is real truth in its accommodated form. Milton also describes 
reason as choice, which encapsulates the necessity of nescience. Like Newton’s 
portrayal of the relationship between the absolute and the relative, Milton understands 
the interconnectedness of these two modes; it is only by means of the visible that we 
can know of the invisible, but then in turn the invisible recontextualizes and allows us 
to understand more fully the visible. 
These epistemological themes are also echoed in the spatiality of Paradise Lost. 
The poem’s bounded space — the garden of Eden — acts as an observational space as 
the reader studies Adam and Eve and their natural habitat; an experimental space as we 
watch their obedience test; and a point of relative reference in conceptual space as we 
follow the wider cosmic portrayals in the narrative and the cosmic speculations of the 
characters. The space of the poem is first and foremost mediated through human 
relativity and conceived in relation to the limits of human knowledge. However, its 
exploration at the limits of these boundaries which the poem’s vast cosmic scope — 
with its imagining of heaven, chaos, hell, and the space in between — affords, 
encourages the reader to use his or her experience of thinking about space in new and 
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expansive ways to approach the invisible by means of the visible, and the unknown by 
means of the known. The limited, solipsistic thought of Satan, who uses false, pseudo-
scientific logic to deny God and who keeps himself emplaced in hell as a psychological 
function of his denial, serves as a negative example to the reader. We are instead 
encouraged, by the portrayal of the inquisitive Adam and his lessons from Raphael, to 
look to creation as a sign of the creator, and to do so with humility and wonder.  
 
 
Epilogue 
 
In his seventh prolusion, ‘In Defence of Learning’ (written in the late 1620s and first 
published in 1674), in which he advocates the knowledge of natural science and 
expresses favour towards Baconian and experimental methods, Milton declaims: 
  
So at length, my hearers, when universal learning has once completed its 
cycle, the spirit of man, no longer confined within this dark prison-house, 
will reach out far and wide, till it fills the whole world and the space far 
beyond with the expansion of its divine greatness. (CPW, I, 296) 
 
This statement connects an internal sense of selfhood — the confined spirit of man — 
with a reaching out into the external space of the world (and beyond) through universal 
learning, which expands that which is divinely great in the spirit of man. Like Newton’s 
image of himself as a boy playing on the shore, the great ocean of truth undiscovered 
before him, there is a vast expansiveness — even transcendence — to this image of 
learning that contrasts with the cloistered shallowness of self that is characteristic of the 
book learner from Paradise Regained, whose collection of ‘pebbles’ prompted 
Newton’s analogy. This confident image from the young Milton captures the vast 
spatial capacity of the imagination to trace an infinite exterior within the mind, and 
connects this capacity to divinity in a manner reminiscent of Newton’s metaphor of 
space as God’s sensory. 
In my thesis I have traced the epistemologies of Hooke, Boyle, Newton, and 
Milton, all of whom explore the tensions between a belief in methodologies rooted in 
observation, experience, and experiment, and the insecurities attendant on a reliance on 
subjective perception. The four thinkers each accommodate the concept of doubt into 
their structures of knowledge by various means, particularly by the assumption of the 
consistency of the laws of nature and the admission of hypothetical or uncertain 
knowledge on a contingent basis, each incorporating these ideas into their work with 
varying degrees of confidence in the capacity of mankind to know and reach beyond his 
limits. I have shown how these writers engaged with uncertainties and emergent 
spatialities in microscopy, the study of air, mathematical physics, and literature. I have 
traced relationships between space as object, the space of the imagination, and the space 
of the page, arguing that spatiality is a key component in knowledge-making, allowing 
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for new types of seeing and the recognition of relationships. Spatiality foregrounds the 
relativity — this reliance on the relation between objects understood in relation to the 
self — that is at the heart of scientific uncertainty but which is inherent to human 
knowledge. As well as contributing to the process of making new knowledge, the 
spatial strategies of these authors also have an epistemological function in 
accommodating and working with uncertainties. 
In Chapter 1 I showed how Hooke uses visual, spatial modes — including 
tables, lists, themed groups, illustrations — to gather and order his data, across time and 
space and at one view, in order to see patterns and relations so as to be able to raise 
axioms from it. His illustrations, as well as serving as inscriptions of data which can 
themselves be grouped, also represent the outcomes of this practice by depicting an 
understanding of a microscopic object developed by aggregating the knowledge gleaned 
from the patterns and relations understood from various observations of various 
specimens. I argued that Hooke’s methods of seeing are interpretive and that he is not 
merely an amanuensis for the microscope as has previously been suggested. The 
principle of relation also holds at a more abstract level as I have shown in the methods 
of analogy Hooke used to explore the micro world, both in terms of the known macro 
world and on its own terms, embracing the encounter with the unknown and beginning 
the plotting of new knowledge maps, rather than using a purely assimilative approach. 
Spatial arrangement is a key feature of his theory of mind and memory, and echoes his 
incremental approach to knowledge. 
In Chapter 2 I demonstrated a tension between Boyle’s strong adherence to an 
epistemology of nescience and his desire to seek out natural philosophical truths, a 
tension which is echoed in a descriptive style that contains a mix of highly detailed 
narrative but also summary deferrals to the practitioner’s experience; in illustrations that 
don’t attempt to portray the hypothesized object air but which do depict experimental 
apparatus with a high level of detail; and also in his archive, which shows some desire 
to order material so as to reveal new knowledge in a manner akin to Hooke, but which 
also resists premature systematization. In his investigations into air, as well as his 
concern with the demarcation of the experimental space that allows him to ‘see’ and 
work with the invisible air, Boyle also works on recreating the experimental scene for 
the reader. I offered a new reading of this feature to supplement Shapin and Schaffer’s 
popular interpretation of it as a technique to create virtual witnesses who can assent to 
his hypotheses, suggesting that it can also be seen as a technique for inscribing a mental 
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space for the reader, a mental laboratory in which he or she can perform the sort of 
imaginative thinking required for a natural philosophy of a substance like air, which is 
reliant on hypothesis and inferential methods.  
In Chapter 3, I argued for an intimate connection between Newton’s 
epistemological practices and his conception of space. His dynamics (which itself relies 
on his epistemological principles of assuming consistency and admitting contingent 
knowledge on methodological grounds) requires a backdrop of absolute space in order 
for the relative space and motion that we perceive to be understood. I concluded with 
Stein and DiSalle that absolute space exists as a necessary epistemological construct for 
Newtonian dynamics. Furthermore, I showed that Newton’s absolute and relative space 
are not separate but are intimately connected as we can only understand them in terms 
of each other. This relation is echoed in Newton’s spatial exploration of the nature of 
God, who must be similarly understood by man in terms of an abstract corrective to 
relative understanding. 
In Chapter 4 I demonstrated some of the concerns and approaches to method in 
Milton’s epistemology that are similar to those of the Royal Society practitioners 
studied here. Milton’s emphasis on learning and faith ennobles the limits and gaps to 
man’s knowledge at the same time as aspiring beyond those limits. I showed how 
Milton uses the metaphoric qualities inherent in language — the spaces between 
signifier and signified — to interrogate and understand relations, and also how he calls 
forth to the imagination a range of spaces and bounds by means of which he works 
through questions — both physical and psychological — of man’s relation to and place 
in the world. I argued that Milton’s spatiality is relative, but also expansive, tracing 
lines of sight to their furthest extremes and gesturing towards an understanding that 
transcends spatiality as we understand it, that is, towards God. Like Hooke’s 
understanding of the micro world by analogy with the macro, Boyle’s illative 
knowledge of air, and Newton’s imbrication of relative and absolute, Milton approaches 
knowledge of the invisible by means of the visible, and in turn allows the invisible to 
recontextualize and give greater meaning to the visible. 
In each of these case studies I have explored the relationship between external 
and internal space in the thinking and perceiving subject, placing it in the context of 
epistemology and building on Steven Connor’s assertion — at least with regards to the 
thing that is space — that ‘thinking about things is unavoidably a kind of thinking about 
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the kind of thing that thinking is’.1 Further to this unidirectional relation between 
thinking and things, my case studies, which examine this in relation to space, have also 
revealed a more complex dialogue between interior (thought) and exterior (thing). This 
occurs in the ways that processes of thought and perception are externalized on the page 
and with instruments of viewing; the way that objects are brought into the mind; and the 
way the mind creates infinities within by tracing expansive external spatialities.  
It is my hope that my work supplies a gap in the knowledge of processes of 
understanding and knowledge-making in this foundational period for the modern 
thinking of space, and that the findings of my case studies also contribute to the 
understanding of perception and epistemology, particularly with regards to their 
relativity and the dialogue of interior and exterior, in these four writers. I trust that my 
methods of analysing content by means of a close attention to the visual, verbal, and 
mental tools of thought and the connections between them has brought out rich new 
readings of these four authors and emphasized new significances in modes of 
transmission that can be applied more widely. 
The conclusions of my thesis suggest several further lines of enquiry for future 
research. One productive project would be to apply the methods of this thematic study 
more widely to other authors of the period, including outside of England, both in the 
sciences (for example Descartes, Leibniz, and Christiaan Huygens) and in imaginative 
and esoteric literature (writers such as Marvell, Cavendish, Traherne, and Henry More). 
The approach could also be applied to preceding or subsequent periods. 
Another project suggests itself in the emergent dialogue between internal and 
external space in the relation of thing to thinking thing. By tightening the thematic focus 
from a broadly inclusive idea of space to the specific notion of infinity — a 
transcendent idea that gestures beyond our possible comprehension of it — I believe the 
researcher will also move from a more general understanding of knowledge-making to 
the dynamics of the specific moment of encounter with the unknown and the act of 
reaching beyond a limit. By examining how early modern thinkers conceive of an idea 
of perfection or of limitlessness as an object, I propose we can come to understand the 
interior expansiveness of the thinking subject’s mind. 
The third strand of future research growing out of the work on metaphor and 
semiotics in my doctoral project is an investigation into the spatiality of early modern 
                                                1	  Connor,	  ‘Thinking	  Things’,	  (2010),	  p.	  3.	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language, in particular the spatiality of linguistic structure and organizational place in 
early modern artificial language projects, such as Francis Lodwick’s A Common Writing 
(1647), which classifies reality and encodes it in terms of location within a scheme. This 
would be particularly fruitful if paired with a cognitive reading of early modern 
metaphor in the context of the mental space theory of Fauconnier and Turner, which, 
developed in the 1990s is only recently starting to be applied to early modern literature 
and science. I suggest that a related study of metaphor and language schemes will draw 
out the nuances of the cognitive spatiality of language and its role in man’s search for 
an understanding of himself in relation to the world. 
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